

# Capturing Voters' Hearts

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**Abstract**

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
## 1 Cohesion & Competitiveness

Parties competing in two round elections often face difficult choices. On the first ballot of the election the candidates compete against one another for the coveted spots on the second ballot. In doing so the candidates employ a variety of strategies available to candidates seeking office; adopting and adjusting campaign platforms, manipulating the salience of various issues, and engaging in positive and/or negative advertising. In many ways each of these strategies is geared towards convincing voters that the candidate is better suited for office than the other candidates — much of the campaigning is aimed at distinguishing ones candidacy, and characteristics, from the other candidates. The candidate's need to distinguish himself from the other candidates may, however, come back to hunt the candidate in the second round of the election — whether or not the candidate has advanced onto the second ballot. If the candidate was successful in advancing onto the second ballot, her strategy on the first ballot may have served to alienate the supporters of unsuccessful candidates who otherwise might have been inclined to vote for the candidate on the second ballot. A candidate that was unsuccessful on the first ballot may similarly come to regret his campaign strategy even though it obviously cannot affect her chance of winning office as, it may affect the willingness of her supporters to vote her preferred candidate on the second ballot.

If electoral campaigns were waged purely on the basis of the candidates' characteristics and qualification the presence of a second ballot would not pose much of a problem for the candidates. But the fact is that most electoral contest — at least those we tend to be interested in — are waged in terms of policy. The fact that elections tend to be about policy in a substantial part, and that voters tend to have a common perception of the policy space, places ideologically similar parties in competition with one another. Thus, in order to gain advantage on the first ballot, a party will have to target its ideological neighbors — whose supporters are most easily swayed to reevaluate their decision who to support. A simple spatial model highlights the incentives facing the parties. Consider the position of the Communists in figure 1. In terms of policy competition, the Communists primarily compete with the Socialist — by adopting a more centrist platform the Communists can increase their vote share but their gain is the Socialists' loss. The Conservatives are, however, not affected by the Communists adopting a more moderate platform (as long as they don't leapfrog the Socialists). That still leaves us to consider the possibility that the Communists could gain by devising a strategy to win votes from the Conservatives by campaigning on valence issues, e.g., running a negative campaign advertisements directed at the conservative candidate. However, a successful campaign against the Conservative candidate would primarily affect the voters that previously were indifferent between the Socialists and the Conservatives or weakly preferred the Socialist candidate to the Conservative one. The Communist strategy would, therefore, primarily benefit the Socialists. The Communist candidate may still benefit indirectly in the sense that it might make a Socialist victory more like, which would be

preferred to a Conservative candidate winning. In sum, one may expect the intensity of the competition on the first ballot to be the greatest among the candidates that stand to gain the most by standing together on the second ballot.

**FIGURE 1: THREE PARTY COMPETITION**



The observation that members of the same ideological block face such a dilemma is not novel. In France, the Socialist Party and the Communist party have long history of forming electoral alliances that stipulate that the candidate winning fewer votes on the first ballot of the election should withdraw from the race and endorse the more successful party if both of the candidates advance onto the second ballot.<sup>1</sup> Focusing on the alliance between the Socialist and the Communist, Rochon & Pierce (1985) note the presence of incentives to act in both cohesive and competitive manner and find, using data from interviews with Socialist candidates, that the incentives to act cohesively give way to competitiveness precisely when they are most likely to matter, i.e., when the left bloc has a reasonable chance of carrying the constituency.

In a series of works, Tsebelis (1988a,b, 1990), takes issue with Rochon & Pierce's (1985) conclusion. Tsebelis, in particular, argues that if Rochon & Pierce's (1985) argument is true, it is difficult to understand why the parties would act cohesively when it is unlikely to make a difference and, since they are destined to be unsuccessful, it makes little sense for the parties to renew their cooperative agreement election after election. Using a simple formal model, Tsebelis argues that two factors influence the effectiveness of the second round agreement between the Socialists and the Communists. First, the closeness of the contest between the left bloc and the right bloc should increase the effectiveness of the agreement, i.e., when voters find themselves in a situation where the probability that their vote may be pivotal is higher they will be more likely to put aside any bitterness that the competition between the two parties on the left may have engendered and cast their second ballot vote for the left bloc winner on the first ballot. Second, the closer the contest between the Socialists and the Communists the more intense the competition between the two parties can be expected

<sup>1</sup>The run-off system used in legislative elections in France employs a vote threshold requirement, allowing any candidate that wins more votes than 12.5% of the number of registered voters to advance onto the second ballot.

to be. Where the competition between the parties is intense, the parties are less likely to hold back in their criticism of the other party with the consequence that the voters of the losing party of the alliance are less likely to transfer their votes to the winning party on the second ballot. Using data from the 1978 French legislative election, Tsebelis finds that support for both of his hypotheses. Votes transfers occur more efficiently where the left bloc and the right bloc are more evenly matched in terms of their electoral support and where the support of the parties within the left bloc is more asymmetric.

Much has changed in French politics since the election studied by Tsebelis. In 1978 the Communists and the Socialists were fairly evenly matched in terms of their electoral support — making the 1978 election ideal for studying Tsebelis' hypothesis about intra-bloc competition. Since then, as shown in figure 1, the Communist's support had declined significantly and in 2007 its support was just over one-fifth of its support in 1978.<sup>2</sup> It is, therefore, interesting to consider whether patterns of vote transfers have changed as a result of the changing electoral strength of the two parties and what the possible consequences for intra-bloc cooperation are. Before subjecting Tsebelis' theory to additional testing using more recent data, I revisit Tsebelis' theory to show that his theoretical framework yields some additional hypotheses.

**TABLE 1: EVOLUTION OF THE COMMUNIST AND THE SOCIALIST VOTE**

YEAR	COMMUNIST			SOCIALIST		
	VOTES	SEATS	% SEATS	VOTES	SEATS	% SEATS
1978	20.6%	86	17.6%	22.6%	103	21.1%
1981	16.2%	44	9.0%	36.0%	266	54.2%
1986	9.8%	35	6.7%	31.0%	206	36.0%
1988	11.3%	27	4.7%	34.8%	260	45.2%
1993	9.3%	24	4.2%	17.6%	53	9.2%
1997	9.9%	35	6.1%	23.5%	246	42.6%
2002	4.8%	21	3.6%	24.1%	141	24.4%
2007	4.3%	15	2.6%	24.7%	186	32.2%

## 2 Competing with Allies

Tsebelis (1988a,b, 1990) presents a simple model in which the two parties choose whether to cooperate or to defect. Cooperation implies that the parties refrain from attacking their ally on the first ballot in order to maximize the transfer of votes to the winner on the second ballot while defecting means that the party decides not to hold back in its criticism of its ally in the hope of being the winner of the bloc on the first ballot. Tsebelis then argues that the payoff from cooperation equals  $R' + p_v V$  where  $R'$  is the expected utility of making, and sticking to, an agreement at the national level,  $V_i$  is the value that the party associates with the bloc's candidate winning the seat in the district and  $p_v$  is the probability of the

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<sup>2</sup>Note that the 1986 election was held using a proportional representation system.

bloc winning the district. Similarly, the payoff from defection equals  $T' + p_{prox}U_i$  where  $T'$  is the value associate with making the alliance at the national level,  $p_{prox}$  is the probability of party  $i$  being the winner within the bloc and  $U_i$  is the value party  $i$  associates with being the party represented on the first ballot. Based on this formulation of the parties' utilities, Tsebelis argues that the degree of cohesion that results, and therefore the amount of vote transfers that takes place, can be described as:

$$cohesion = c + (aV)victory - (bU)proximity \quad (1)$$

Tsebelis' model is somewhat arcane and it is not clear that the model provides much insight beyond what is assumed, i.e., that the candidates care both about whether they are themselves are in office and, if not, who carries the constituency. I will now reformulate Tsebelis' model slightly to help clarify the implication of these assumptions. To keep things simple I focus only on the constituency and ignore the possibility that the outcome in the constituency might impact which bloc holds the majority at the national level.

Let  $p_w$  denote the probability that the left bloc wins the election. To denote the utility of the bloc carrying the constituency let  $W_i$  denote the utility of party  $i$  winning the seat while  $W_j$  denotes the parties ally winning the seat. It is natural to assume that  $W_i > W_j$ . Let  $p_i$  denote the probability that party  $i$  is the party within the bloc that wins the most votes. The expected utility of party  $i$  can then be written as:

$$\begin{aligned} u_i &= (1 - p_w)0 + p_w[p_iW_i + (1 - p_i)W_j] \\ &= p_w[p_iW_i + (1 - p_i)W_j] \\ &= p_w p_i W_i + (p_w - p_w p_i)W_j \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

Following Tsebelis, assume defecting from the alliance increases the probability of party  $i$  leading the bloc on the first ballot and decreases the probability of the party bloc winning the seat, i.e.,  $\frac{\partial p_w}{\partial d_i} < 0$  and  $\frac{\partial p_i}{\partial d_i} > 0$ . Thus, the marginal effect of defection is:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial u_i}{\partial d_i} &= \frac{\partial p_w}{\partial d_i} p_i W_i + \frac{\partial p_i}{\partial d_i} p_w W_i + \left( \frac{\partial p_w}{\partial d_i} - \frac{\partial p_w}{\partial d_i} p_i - \frac{\partial p_i}{\partial d_i} p_w \right) W_j \\ &= \left( \frac{\partial p_w}{\partial d_i} p_i + \frac{\partial p_i}{\partial d_i} p_w \right) (W_i - W_j) + \frac{\partial p_w}{\partial d_i} W_j \\ &= \frac{\partial p_w}{\partial d_i} p_i (W_i - W_j) + \frac{\partial p_i}{\partial d_i} p_w (W_i - W_j) + \frac{\partial p_w}{\partial d_i} W_j \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

It is reasonable to assume that the two marginal effects are at their maxima when  $p_i$  and  $p_w$  are close to .5, i.e., when either party or bloc is perceived as having equal chance of winning. Examining equation 3, note that the first and third term on the right hand side are negative. Thus, defection can only be optimal if the second term, which is positive, is sufficiently large. By examination, the term  $\frac{\partial p_i}{\partial d_i} p_w (W_i - W_j)$  will be large when the bloc is

likely to win the seat in the constituency, the lead within the bloc is closely contested, and when the parties care a lot about whether they or their ally win the seat.

Intuitively, this stands to reason. Engaging in heated intra-bloc campaigning in the first round only makes sense if the parties have a reason to believe that the intra-bloc winner on the first ballot will end up carrying the constituency and win a seat in parliament. In contrast, in a constituency where the left bloc is unlikely to win, the parties stand to gain little from advancing onto the second ballot. The parties' incentives are sketched out in figure 2 — the parties should only defect when the probability that the bloc wins the seat is high *and* the two allies are evenly matched.<sup>3</sup> In sum, assuming that the parties care only about the identity of the winner yields more complex predictions than Tsebelis argues — it is evident that the competitiveness within bloc and the competitiveness across blocs has an interactive effect on the incentive to turn against ones rival.

**FIGURE 2:** THE ROLE OF COMPETITIVENESS

	$p_i \approx \frac{1}{2}$	$p_i \not\approx \frac{1}{2}$
$p_w$ large	DEFECT	COOPERATE
$p_w$ small	COOPERATE	COOPERATE

Tsebelis argument, of course, is slightly more complicated as he assumes that the parties may derive ‘symbolic’ utility from representing the bloc on the second ballot. If the parties do receive positive ‘symbolic’ utility from being represented on the second ballot it implies that there is an additional incentive to defect whenever  $p_i \approx \frac{1}{2}$ . Thus, defection would be the optimal choice when  $p_w$  is very low but as  $p_w$  gets closer to  $\frac{1}{2}$  the possibility of a defection handing the victory to the other bloc will make induce the parties to cooperate.<sup>4</sup>

The 1990 campaign finance reform further altered the strategic calculations of the parties. The reform tied state funding for political parties to their first round vote share (Clift & Fisher, 2004).<sup>5</sup> Tying campaign finances to the parties’ success in the first round of the

<sup>3</sup>Note that it is possible that the effect of  $p_w$  is non-monotonic when  $p_i$  is close to one half. That is, if the marginal effect of defection is large enough when  $p_w$  is close to one half then the parties may worry more about harming the bloc’s chances of winning than the identity of the bloc’s candidate.

<sup>4</sup>Naturally, if the parties assign a sufficiently high value to being represented on the second ballot they would be willing to throw away the possibility of the bloc winning the seat in favor of a spot on the second ballot. However, that were the case then it is doubtful that making a second round agreement would make sense for the parties in the first place.

<sup>5</sup>Initially there was a 5% vote threshold for being included in the allocation and the party had to field

elections should have consequences straightforward on their lack of willingness to hold back their criticism of their allies. Whereas cooperation was the best response to most situations that the parties might find themselves in prior to the campaign finance reform, the opposite is true after the reform. That is, defection should now be the optimal strategy in most situations and certainly so in situations in which the parties' actions are unlikely to be pivotal in determining who represents the bloc on the second ballot and which candidate wins the election. Thus, as shown in the right panel of figure 3, cooperative behavior is only optimal if the contest between the two blocs is close.

**FIGURE 3:** THE ROLE OF COMPETITIVENESS

		SYMBOLIC UTILITY		STATE CONTRIBUTION	
		$p_i \approx \frac{1}{2}$	$p_i \not\approx \frac{1}{2}$	$p_i \approx \frac{1}{2}$	$p_i \not\approx \frac{1}{2}$
$p_w$	<i>large</i>	DEFECT	COOPERATE	DEFECT	DEFECT
	COOPERATE			COOPERATE	
$p_w$	<i>small</i>	DEFECT	COOPERATE	DEFECT	DEFECT

Regardless of what concerns the candidates have in addition to winning a seat in the legislature, the effects of intra- and inter-bloc competition cannot be separated as neatly as Tsebelis claims. The discussion above suggests, again, that the effects of intra- and inter-bloc competition interact in affecting the degree of cohesion observed. Figure 3 also suggest that the patterns of cohesion may have changed over time as the state began subsidizing political campaigns. Prior to the campaign reform, the parties only had an incentive to criticize their allies when the parties were equally matched in terms of votes. Following the reform, however, the parties always have an incentive to defect as long as defection is unlikely to affect the outcome of the inter-bloc contest. Thus, the effect of intra-bloc competition should have declined following the campaign finance reform.

Following Tsebelis, in testing the hypotheses regarding how cohesive the blocs are I focus on the degree to which the supporters of the bloc's loser on the first round transfer their support to the bloc's winner on the second round. Thus, the assumption is that the parties' actions during the campaign affect the voters' willingness to transfer their support to other parties within the same bloc of parties. It is, of course, possible that factors other than the parties' criticism of one another will affect voters' willingness to transfer

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candidates in at least 75 constituencies. Later, after being ruled unconstitutional, the vote threshold was removed and the required number of contested constituencies was lowered to 50.

their votes. In addition to the second round withdrawal agreements, first round nomination agreements are also quite common in France (Golder, 2006). A nomination agreement is an agreement between two or more parties to run a single candidate endorsed by the parties to the agreement in a set of constituency (as opposed to each of the parties running a separate candidate). It is possible that the presence of a nomination agreement affects voters' willingness to transfer their votes. In particular, supporters of candidates that are not parties to the nomination agreements may perceive the nomination agreement to unfairly disadvantage their preferred candidate and may, therefore, be less willing to transfer their votes to the bloc's first round winner.

### 3 Cohesion in the 2002 & 2007 Legislative Elections

To examine the hypotheses offered in the previous section I examine both constituency level data, as Tsebelis did, as well as individual level data using surveys from the 2002 & 2007 legislative elections.<sup>6</sup> For the constituency level data, voter cohesion is measured as the difference between the votes receives by the bloc's winner on the second ballot and the total number of votes won by the allied parties on the first ballot. At the individual level, cohesion can be measured by considering whether a voter that voted for the alliance's loser on the first ballot voted for the alliance's representative on the second ballot. The dependent variable is coded one when the voter transfers her vote and zero else.

The main independent variables are the probability of the allies' victory in the constituency, whether the contests between the allies for a place on the second ballot is close, and whether the contest between the left and the right blocs is close. The probability of the allies' victory is measured as the combined vote share of the bloc's parties on the first ballot. The greater the combined votes share, the greater the likelihood that the bloc will carry the constituency. The closeness of the contest between the left and the right bloc in the constituency is measured as the negative absolute distance between the combined vote shares of the parties belonging to the left and the right bloc.<sup>7</sup> Thus, higher values of the measure indicate more competitive elections. The closeness of the contest for representing the alliance on the second ballot is measured as the negative absolute distance between the parties' vote shares on the first ballot. Finally, constituencies in which a party's ally formed a first round nomination agreement are coded one and zero else. This information is (at the moment) only available for the nomination agreement between the Socialists and the Greens in the 2002 legislative election (Blais & Indridason, 2007).

Tables 2 and 3 present the constituency level results for 2002 and 2007. The results

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<sup>6</sup>Currently the constituency level data examined includes only the last couple of elections but my goal is to expand the coverage all the way back to include all legislatures elections since 1978.

<sup>7</sup>Note that this specification differs slightly from Tsebelis' measure that considered the difference between the vote share of the parties belonging to the bloc and 50%. Tsebelis' measure essentially assumes that the parties assume that the votes cast for the parties that belong neither to the left nor the right bloc on the first bloc will be cast for the opposing bloc.



**TABLE 2: COHESION: CONSTITUENCY LEVEL (2002)**

	SOCIALIST				COMMUNIST		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
LEFT-RIGHT COMP.	.11*** (.02)	.12*** (.03)	-.05* (.03)	-.08** (.03)	.17** (.11)	.11 (.09)	.15 (.10)
WITHIN-BLOC COMP.	.30*** (.04)	.30*** (.04)	.39*** (.03)	.05 (.19)	-.72 (.10)	-.64*** (.09)	-.09 (.57)
LEFT VOTE (1 <sup>st</sup> )			.40*** (.04)	.60*** (.12)		.34 (.11)	.14 (.24)
W-B COMP.*LEFT VOTE				.007* (.004)			-.01 (.01)
OTHER VOTE	.48*** (.10)	.49*** (.10)	.62*** (.08)	.63*** (.08)	1.49*** (.62)	1.56*** (.51)	1.90*** (.62)
GREEN NOMINATION		.93 (.65)	1.52*** (.57)	1.38** (.57)			
CONSTANT	21.44*** (1.36)	21.33*** (1.36)	3.60* (2.08)	-6.29 (5.70)	23.77*** (1.46)	7.98 (5.61)	17.36 (11.02)
OBSERVATIONS	316	316	316	316	21	21	21
R <sup>2</sup>	.26	.27	.45	.46	.76	.85	.86

**TABLE 3: COHESION: CONSTITUENCY LEVEL (2007)**


	SOCIALIST			COMMUNIST		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
LEFT-RIGHT COMP.	.10*** (.02)	-.05** (.02)	-.05** (.02)	.001 (.11)	-.06 (.07)	-.04 (.08)
WITHIN-BLOC COMP.	.28*** (.03)	.35*** (.02)	.34** (.13)	-.84*** (.09)	-.69*** (.06)	-.45 (.50)
LEFT VOTE (1 <sup>st</sup> )		.32*** (.03)	.32*** (.09)		.39*** (.07)	.35*** (.11)
W-B COMP.*LEFT VOTE			.0003 (.003)			-.004 (.009)
OTHER VOTE	.34*** (.10)	.36*** (.09)	.36*** (.09)	.82 (.58)	.97*** (.37)	.98*** (.38)
CONSTANT	24.77*** (.96)	10.62*** (1.63)	10.20** (4.00)	24.63*** (2.54)	6.33* (3.83)	8.41 (5.87)
OBSERVATIONS	355	355	355	21	21	21
R <sup>2</sup>	.29	.45	.45	.89	.94	.94

in the first half of each table consider constituencies in which a Socialist candidate was represented on the second ballot, while the second half considers constituencies where a Communist candidate ran on the second ballot. As the Communist were by the 2002 election a far smaller party than the Socialists there are far fewer observations that fall in the latter category. The first thing to note about the result is the striking similarity between the results for the two results — especially when there is a Socialist candidate on the second ballot — which suggests that the competitive landscape in the constituency are relevant in determining the degree of vote transfers that take place. However, the expectations established above are not entirely borne out. Focusing on the simplest model specification, which comes close to Tsebelis' specification, the results indicate that cohesiveness is greater when the contest between the left and the right bloc is close. This is in line with expectations. The effect of the competitiveness of the contest between the Socialist and the Communist to secure a spot on the second ballot, however, is opposite of what was expected when there is a Socialist candidate on the second ballot. When the candidate on the second ballot is a Communist, WITHIN-BLOC COMPETITIVENESS has a negative effect on cohesion. One interpretation of this finding is that Socialists and Communist sympathizers are simply different — Communists are willing to transfer their votes to Socialists but the opposite is not true. In the context of spatial models of voting this explanation has some appeal, i.e., for Communist voters the Socialist candidate is the lesser of two evils on the second ballot. In contrast, facing a choice between a Communist and a Center-Right candidate, some Socialist voters may prefer the Center-Right candidate or be indifferent and opt to abstain. It is also possible that the differences between the two sets of results simply reflect differences in the degree of the competitiveness of the constituency. Constituencies in which the Communists receive more votes on the first ballot than the Socialists are also likely to be constituencies in which the left bloc is strong and its chances of winning the seat are better. If that is the case, the two parties will campaign more aggressively for a place in the run-off. Constituencies where the Socialist candidate is successful in the first round, one the other hand, are more likely to be constituencies where the gap between the two parties is bigger and the left is less likely to win the seat. In other words, there may be substantive differences between constituencies where Communists advance onto the second ballot and where Socialist candidates advance that may also account for the differences in the observed degree of cohesion.

Including the left bloc vote on the first ballot in the regression improves the fit of the models considerably. The greater the probability that the left bloc carries the constituency increases the degree of cohesion. The addition of the variable to the model specification also causes the effect of LEFT-RIGHT COMPETITION to become negative. This is not unsurprising since LEFT-RIGHT COMPETITION is defined as the difference between the left and the right bloc vote on the first ballot, i.e., a change in LEFT VOTE also means that LEFT-RIGHT COMPETITION changes. As the LEFT VOTE is smaller than the right vote in a large majority of the constituencies included in the analysis it is not surprising that the coefficient of

LEFT-RIGHT COMPETITION switches sign. That is, a marginal increase in LEFT-RIGHT COMPETITION implies a change in LEFT VOTE unless the vote increase of the right bloc comes about without LEFT VOTE decreasing.<sup>8</sup> Thus, since an increase in LEFT VOTE generally implies an increase in the competitiveness of the second round contest, these results should not necessarily be seen as evidence against the hypothesis that the competitiveness of the race reduces cohesion.

**FIGURE 4:** MARGINAL EFFECT OF WITHIN-BLOC COMPETITIVENESS  
CONSTITUENCY LEVEL ANALYSIS (2002)



Allowing the effect of WITHIN-BLOC COMPETITION on cohesion to be conditional on the likelihood that the constituency is carried by a party of the left bloc yields interesting, but unexpected, results. In 2007 there was no effect but in 2002, WITHIN-BLOC COMPETITION resulted in greater cohesion as the probability of a left victory increases, which runs counter to our expectations. The marginal effect is shown graphically in figure 4. A possible explanation for this finding is the asymmetry in the support of the Socialists and the Communists. The Socialist candidate led the Communist candidate by a substantial share of the vote in a great majority of the constituencies. The interaction term may, therefore, simply be picking up the effect of greater cohesion in situation where the left bloc has an opportunity to win a seat.

A greater number of votes for parties outside the left and the right blocs has a positive effect on cohesion. This is expected because at least some of the voters for ‘other’ candidates, most of whom are eliminated in the first round, will opt vote for the candidates that are on the second ballot. Finally, the Socialist candidate received more votes on the

<sup>8</sup>The correlation between the LEFT VOTE and LEFT-RIGHT COMPETITION was .83 in 2002.

second ballot where the Socialists and the Greens presented a joint candidate. It is a little difficult to interpret exactly what this finding means. In my discussion above, I suggested that the presence of such agreement might frustrate supporters of other parties in the left bloc, especially those that form a second round withdrawal, as nomination agreements could be seen as giving the parties to the agreement an unfair advantage. However, a nomination agreement prevents the parties to the agreement from attacking one another in the first round and, therefore, promote greater cohesion within the bloc. Thus, a nomination agreement reduces the degree of negative campaigning, which might affect supporters of all parties within the bloc (and not just those supporting the parties forming the alliance).


The same hypotheses are examined using survey data from the same elections. I focus here on the question whether voters that voted for the Communists on the first ballot chose to vote for the Socialist candidate in the second round. Unfortunately, the number of respondents that voted for Communists on the first ballot (and had the option to vote for a Socialist in the second round) is very small; a total of 87 respondents in the two surveys. Not surprisingly, the estimated coefficients are generally not significant at the conventional levels of statistical significance. It is worth noting, however, that signs of the estimated coefficients are generally in line with expectations. Greater competitiveness between the two blocks increases the likelihood of a Socialist vote while greater competition between the Communists and Socialists reduces the likelihood of a vote being cast for the Socialist candidate. The share of votes cast for 'other parties' reduces the likelihood of vote for the Socialist candidate, perhaps reflecting more intense campaigning in the first round or the fact that the respondents faced greater uncertainty about the likelihood of their vote being pivotal.

**TABLE 4: COHESION: INDIVIDUAL LEVEL**  
Do 1<sup>st</sup> BALLOT COMMUNIST VOTERS TRANSFER THEIR VOTES?

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
LEFT-RIGHT COMP.	.022 (.031)	.025 (.032)	-.0001 (.038)	-.007 (.045)
WITHIN-BLOC COMP.	-.042 (.052)	-.042 (.053)	-.044 (.058)	.341 (.266)
LEFT VOTE (1 <sup>st</sup> )			.051 (.037)	-.132 (.127)
W-B COMP.*LEFT VOTE				-.009 (.006)
OTHER VOTE		-.391* (.201)	-.438** (.205)	-.441** (.210)
CONSTANT	.125 (1.752)	.990 (1.839)	-1.659 (2.775)	6.161 (5.728)
OBSERVATIONS	87	87	87	87
LOG LIKELIHOOD	-51.972	-49.964	-48.858	-47.621

Turning to the interaction between WITHIN-BLOC COMPETITION and LEFT VOTE, the results suggest that the effect of greater competition between the Socialists and Communists makes Communist supporters less likely to vote for the Socialist candidate in the second round when the changes of a left victory are large as shown in figure 5. This is in line with the argument that a place on the second ballot is only worth something if there is a chance that it will result in a seat in the legislature. Thus, the parties campaign more vigorously against one another when it is likely to influence who advances onto the second ballot and if the placement on the second ballot offers a good chance of a seat in the legislature.

**FIGURE 5:** MARGINAL EFFECT OF WITHIN-BLOC COMPETITIVENESS  
INDIVIDUAL LEVEL ANALYSIS (2002 & 2007)



## 4 Conclusions

My conclusions are very preliminary at this stage. There is clear evidence that the distribution of the support in the constituencies explains a substantial part of the variation in the change in support between the first and the second round of the election. The estimated models are not always in line with the hypotheses suggested initially but it appears likely that this is due to the highly asymmetric positions of the parties considered here. Expanding the analysis to additional parties, on the right and the left, and across time to include more elections will offer a greater opportunity to examine the questions addressed here. That would appear to be especially the case with regard to the analysis of the survey data, which was largely supportive of our arguments although the paucity of observations meant that the estimated coefficients failed to reach conventional levels of statistical significance.

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