

The Sources of Territorial Salience: A Public Opinion Approach*

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Abstract

One of the most robust findings in the study of international security is the link between territory and conflict. Prevailing theories attribute this link to domestic politics: territories are viewed as highly salient to publics, rendering territorial concession a politically risky move and providing incentives for leaders to harden their positions. That public opinion actually views territory as salient, leading it to support hard line policies, has largely been assumed rather than demonstrated. In this article we articulate the observable implications of the territorial salience argument and test them empirically at the micro-level drawing on a series of survey experiments in Israel. We find substantial heterogeneity in individual attitudes towards territory. While a large minority of Israeli voters does not appear to be attached to territory at all, a majority demonstrates territorial attachment, supporting policies that deepen territorial control, even while acknowledging that such policies are likely to lead to conflict escalation. Among this majority, we find that approximately one half rejects concessions due to credibility problems and fear of rival defection, while the other half is largely unconcerned with material costs and benefits, rendering the territory effectively indivisible. These findings provide micro-foundations for theoretical literature on the domestic roots of territorial salience and have important implications for peace-building efforts where territory is at stake.

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Introduction

A large literature has shown that many of the world’s conflicts are waged over territory (Toft, 2014). Territorial disputes are associated not only with conflict onset but with its escalation (Braithwaite and Lemke, 2011) and duration (Fuhrmann and Tir, 2009), and have been shown to be significantly more difficult to resolve (Fearon, 2004; Miller and Gibler, 2011; Walter, 2003). What explains increased belligerence over territory and the apparent intractability of many territorial conflicts?

Some explanations have pointed to territory’s tangible value, conferring resources, strategic advantage, or other benefits (Goertz and Diehl, 1992). Yet if the stakes involved in controlling territory are material, then a bargaining space should exist that allows rivals to avoid costly conflict, whether through division of territory or through alternative arrangements such as side payments. While some scholars have attributed bargaining failure to credible commitment problems (Powell, 2006) or reputational concerns (Walter, 2003), many others have turned to domestic politics to explain the link between territory and conflict.

In this approach, the central role of territory in conflict is attributed to its unique hold on individuals. Territorial issues are thought to be particularly salient to publics for biological, historical, and ideological reasons that exceed their tangible value, leading politicians to highlight them in order to mobilize support (Huth, 1996; Gibler, 2012; Senese, 2005; Tir, 2010; Vasquez, 2009; Wright and Diehl, 2014), and rendering them effectively indivisible (Godard, 2006; Toft, 2006). To date, however, few studies have empirically examined whether and why territorial issues are salient to publics.¹ By inferring domestic-level processes from international-level outcomes, the literature risks conflating any form of bargaining failure with conflict that’s domestically driven. This poses not only a theoretical problem but a policy one. If, for example, bargaining failures are due to the lack of credible commitment, then peace efforts should focus mostly on assurances against defection. If, however, the roots of failure are domestic ideology, then a focus on the material benefits of territorial compromise (i.e., a “peace dividend”) is an inadequate means of mobilizing public support.

Recognizing that the domestic foundations of territorial salience have largely been assumed rather than demonstrated, a number of recent studies have sought to test the individual-level correlates of involvement in territorial disputes, finding, for example, that individuals in countries targeted by territorial threat are more nationalistic (Gibler, Hutchison and Miller, 2012), less politically tolerant (Hutchison and Gibler, 2007; Hutchison, 2011), less happy (Miller, 2013), and exhibit higher levels of non-voting participation and lower levels

¹See Zellman (2015); Tanaka (2015) for exceptions.

of protest (Hutchison, 2011). These findings are consistent with the proposition that publics rally around leaders when subject to territorial threat, and have therefore shed important light on the micro-level mechanisms contributing to territorial conflict. However, a key question remains. To our knowledge, no study to date has directly examined the attitudes most relevant to theories of territorial salience: whether individuals are willing to escalate conflict, with all its attendant costs, in order to retain control of territory. For it is only if that is the case that leaders are truly constrained in their bargaining efforts. Reduced tolerance and increased participation do not, in themselves, indicate that individuals are willing to bear the material costs of conflict, nor that they are less likely to support conflict resolution.

The key observable implication of domestic theories of territorial conflict, we argue, is that publics should support policies that deepen territorial control even when such policies are costly. This is because if policy preferences are guided by a desire to maximize instrumental benefits, a bargaining space opens that allows rivals to avoid costly conflict. If, however, individuals are willing to bear substantial material costs in order to retain territorial control, this bargaining space is reduced considerably, locking leaders into conflict-prone behavior and rendering territory effectively indivisible.

To test this expectation we turn to a paradigmatic case of (arguably) intractable conflict, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict over the West Bank. Like many other longstanding disputed territories, the West Bank possesses both tangible and intangible value, making it hard to discern which mechanisms lead to the conflict's entrenchment. To examine whether Israelis are willing to bear substantial costs to retain the territory, thereby minimizing the bargaining space of leaders, we employ a three-step empirical strategy, drawing on a series of original survey experiments.

We begin by examining attitudes towards a key concrete and salient policy related to territorial control in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: settlement construction. We randomly assign respondents to simulated news articles describing a government policy that deepen (settlement construction acceleration) or alleviate (construction freeze) territorial control in the West Bank and ask them to report their level of support for this policy as well as their assessment of its anticipated material outcomes. This allows us to test whether attitudes towards territorial control are sensitive to material costs: If territory is domestically salient, then individuals should be willing to escalate conflict to retain territorial control.

We find robust evidence that a majority of respondents support the policy that deepen territorial control. Strikingly, they do so even though they judge this policy as more likely, on average, to increase violence, reduce the prospects of peace, and harden the rival's negotiation positions than a measure that alleviates territorial control. Put differently, *a majority*

of respondents explicitly support a key policy that they acknowledge is likely to escalate the conflict. Not all respondents hold such attitudes, however, indicating that there is certainly heterogeneity in domestic attachment to territory (we investigate the sources of this heterogeneity in an auxiliary paper.) However, the fact that a majority of respondents prefer a policy that they view as more costly is significant. This finding provides micro-level evidence that supports the domestic salience and effective indivisibility of territory, as it shows that leaders who are responsive to public opinion are constrained in their ability to reach a bargain.

There may, however, be other explanations for this finding. For example, it could be that respondents are simply inconsistent or myopic. Alternatively, it might be that while respondents estimate that territorial gestures are likely to de-escalate conflict, they cannot be sure of this. In the absence of such certainty, they prefer to err on the side of deepening territorial control. This is akin to a credibility problem (Fearon, 1995), in which individuals would support the terms of a bargain if they could be sure that the rival would commit to it. Finally, our policy experiment provides information on policies' expected outcomes, but it does not provide information on what outcomes are relevant to respondents when forming their policy preferences.

To address these issues we use two additional experiments. First, we design a conjoint experiment, which identifies the dimensions of an object (in this case, a policy) that are most likely to engender support (Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto, 2014). Our experiment asks respondents to choose between two major policies under consideration by the Israeli government intended at ending the status quo. For each policy, we randomly vary four attributes across pairings: the policy's effects on terrorism and violence, on the economy, on budget allocation to key social services, and on control over the disputed territory. The conjoint analysis thus allows us to rank the preferences of respondents, and also to assess how much respondents are willing to suffer expected losses in terms of security and material welfare in order to maintain territorial control of the disputed land.

Second, we designed a set of innovative questions that measure the level of credibility that respondents require for agreeing to territorial compromise in exchange for economic and security gains. Survey respondents who categorically reject territorial compromise and forgo its material and security benefits *even when the assurance of gains is guaranteed* can be considered as viewing territory as effectively indivisible, since they are not willing to take even minimal risks to reach a bargain.

Results from our conjoint analysis reveal first, that for a majority of respondents territorial control is the most important dimension when formulating policy preferences, trumping

security and welfare considerations. Second, the conjoint also allows separating between two types of right-wing respondents: potential compromisers and ideologues. Whereas members of the first group support territorial control, they are open to strike a bargain if the conditions are right. By contrast, a large share of right-wing respondents (slightly over 50%) offer no bargaining space as they would be willing to maintain territorial control even at the price of increased Palestinian violence and reduced economic wellbeing, or social welfare.

Results from our credibility vignettes indicate that a substantial share of right-wing respondents, but not all, categorically rejects territorial compromise, even when the gains from conciliation are presented as completely certain. Taken together, these findings show that for a large segment of the population—the grassroots members of the ruling coalition—preferences for deepening territorial control at the cost of escalating conflict are not a result of irrationality or myopia, nor are they a consequence of uncertainty regarding the benefits of territorial concessions. Rather, they reflect the effective indivisibility of territory to a core constituency of the ruling parties. While public opinion does not, in every case, determine the security policies that leaders adopt, the preferences of domestic audiences, at least in democratic settings, pose a powerful constraint that can be difficult for leaders to overcome (Tomz and Weeks, 2013).

Our study provides micro-foundations for theoretical work on the domestic salience and effective indivisibility of territory, demonstrating that for much (but not all) of the Jewish-Israeli population—territorial control is more important than a range of material benefits. The study also empirically demonstrates that territorial attachment is related to greater willingness to bear the costs of policies that deepen the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Our findings therefore contribute to research on why territorial conflicts tend to be both more violent and difficult to resolve.

Our findings also shed light on a persistent puzzle in the study of state security policy. Scholars have long observed that states regularly respond to threats from dissidents or violent actors with repression, despite the fact that the effectiveness of such repression is mixed at best (Lichbach, 1987; Moore, 1998). Especially puzzling is the continued use of indiscriminate repression, which a large literature has found counterproductive in conflicts ranging from counterinsurgency (Condra and Shapiro, 2012) to revolution (Mason and Krane, 1989; Rasler, 1996) to civil war (Kalyvas, 2006).² Existing approaches usually attribute this seemingly irrational behavior to the constraints that states face in their efforts

²Reliance on repression is even more questionable in light of mounting evidence regarding the positive effects of conciliatory policies that seek to win over ‘hearts and minds’ rather than suppress them (Beath, Christia and Enikolopov, 2012; Dugan and Chenoweth, 2012).

to enhance their security. In this view, repression is a suboptimal strategy that states nevertheless employ since they lack the information or capacity to reduce threats through more effective means (Davenport, 2007). Our study's results offer a simple alternative explanation for the 'paradox of repression': while government security policy may be counterproductive vis-à-vis the rival group, it may be highly effective in terms of appeasing its domestic constituency. When the public supports repressive policies, even while acknowledging their limited effectiveness, governments possess a powerful incentive to continue to repress.

Finally, our study provides a better understanding of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a territorial conflict that has long consumed the interest of policy makers. The literature on that conflict has been divided on the sources of attachment to territory: While many scholars have argued that, with the exception of an ideological minority, the majority of Israeli society views the control of the West Bank in instrumental terms as a strategic and material asset (Newman, 1999; Rynhold and Waxman, 2008), others have argued that Israeli attachment to the West Bank is ideological and symbolic (Lustick, 1993; Ginges et al., 2007). Our findings provide evidence that adjudicates among these claims, pointing to the limitations of a policy approach that focuses solely on increasing the material benefits of peace.

The Domestic Foundations of Territorial Conflict

Past work has shown that territory is associated with interstate conflict onset, escalation, and recurrence (Diehl, 1999; Gibler, 2012; Holsti, 1991; Hensel, 2012; Huth, 1996). Territory is also an important cause of intrastate wars (Kahler, 2006), especially ethnic conflicts, a majority of which have been fought over the control of territory (Toft, 2014). While demonstrating that territorial disputes are central to conflict dynamics is relatively straightforward, theoretically accounting for *why* territory is associated with conflict, and empirically testing such claims, has proven to be more challenging. In general, two leading perspectives have emerged from work on territorial conflict; the first attributing territory's central role to tangible, instrumental considerations, and the second to intangible, symbolic ones.

The first approach focuses on the strategic and material benefits associated with territory (Goertz and Diehl, 1992). This explanation presents a puzzle, however, as material stakes should in principle be divisible, allowing a bargain to be reached. Such a bargain could take the form of side payments or other creative arrangements such as demilitarization of the disputed area. There are however a number of reasons that a bargain may nevertheless fail. Powell (2006) suggests that bargaining failures are rooted in credible commitment problems.

Kahneman and Renshon (2009) maintain that asymmetry in the subjective valuation of the disputed territory—rooted in loss aversion or endowment effects—may be responsible. And Walter (2003) argues that states may decide strategically to avoid negotiating over territory for reputational reasons, fearing that concessions to one group will encourage others to advance additional claims.

Arguing that the intrinsic value of territory accounts for only a minority of territorial conflict (Diehl, 1992; Huth, 1996), the second approach to the role of territory in conflict focuses on its salience to domestic audiences. Studies within this tradition point to biological predisposition, nationalist and ethnic identity, and historical processes that create an attachment among individuals towards territory (Diehl, 1999; Hensel, 1996; Kahler, 2006; Tir, 2010), rendering it effectively indivisible (Goddard, 2006).

One explanation for the domestic salience of territory highlights the genetic predisposition of humans to be territorial. According to this argument, humans, like other animals, are biologically programmed to keep and protect a territory they perceive as theirs, and are thus more likely to go to war over territorial disputes than other issues (Vasquez, 1993). States are viewed as aggregates of individual and small group behavior, whose territorial attachments are rooted in evolutionary traits. Building on this insight, Johnson and Toft (2014) argue that humans require territory for the security, resources, and kinship that are essential for survival. This “evolutionary legacy of territory” leads to a lower threshold for aggression and willingness to pay high costs for territorial integrity.

A second explanation draws on theories of identity. In this view, the root of national identity rests on a claim of historical affinity to land. Because people’s sense of identity and belonging is grounded in particular territories, or homelands, they are willing to bear costs to maintain it (Forsberg, 1996; Hensel, 2012; Murphy, 1990). Newman (1999, 2006), for example, argues that attachment to territory is primordial, an element in the formation of group identity forged through a historic process that imbues land with historical, mythical, or religious meaning. The salience of homeland territories, then, is symbolic and emotional, as territory is “deeply stored in the collective memories of nations, ethnic groups, and families” (Forsberg, 1996, p. 438). Making a similar argument with regard to ethnic conflict, Toft (2003, 2006) suggests that ethnic groups are defined by association with a particular territorial homeland, and that this association is vital to their group existence. As a result of this constitutive role of territory, ethnic groups will demand sovereignty when their cause has adequate capacity and legitimacy. Hassner (2003), on the other hand, traces symbolic attachment to land to the religious sanctity of particular spaces, rather than to ethnic or national affinities.

Importantly, the attachment of publics to land, whether for biological, national, ethnic, or religious reasons, renders it effectively indivisible. As Toft (2006, 46) argues, “People who live there think of the land - its occupation and control - as a part of themselves. Divide it or share its control and you may as well hack off an arm or leg.” The issue is not one of credible commitments or of reputational costs, as the dispute does not hinge on a cost-benefit analysis. When large segments of the public are attached to land, tangible guarantees of benefits are simply irrelevant.

These domestic dynamics, it is argued, play a key role in shaping the calculations of leaders. Vasquez’s (1993) steps to war theory describes a dynamic in which elites capitalize on territorial attachment to mobilize public opinion as the conflict escalates, reducing their bargaining space as domestic audiences become more willing to bear conflict’s costs. Similarly, Goddard (2006) argues that territory is strategically constructed as indivisible by political actors to appeal to domestic audiences and build broader coalitions. Over time, rival actors become locked into these positions, and deviation from them becomes politically impossible. This is in line with Fearon’s (1995) argument that while a bargaining space should theoretically exist even for highly contentious issues, some issues may become *effectively* indivisible due to domestic political mechanisms.

The domestic foundations of territorial conflict, while subject to substantial theorizing, have until recently not been empirically tested. A number of recent studies have sought to address this gap. For example, Wright and Diehl (2014) draw on selectorate theory to argue that, all else equal, democracies should value territory that is salient to the public due to their greater responsiveness to public opinion, while autocracies should value territory with intrinsic value, as it can be used to benefit elites. Other studies have examined individual-level variables directly, drawing on cross-national survey data to examine the domestic correlates of territorial disputes. Such studies have found that individuals in countries targeted by territorial threat are less politically tolerant (Hutchison and Gibler, 2007; Hutchison, 2011) and more likely to identify as members of their national group than their ethnic group (Gibler, Hutchison and Miller, 2012). While an important first step, these studies have not tested the core assumption underlying domestic theories of territorial conflict: that publics are willing to bear substantial material costs to retain control over territory. Evidence for this assumption remains elusive in the absence of individual-level data that directly examines attitudes towards territory and that is explicitly designed to examine the degree to which respondents are willing to support costly policies that escalate conflict. This study provides, to the best of our knowledge, the first micro-level evidence of these dynamics in a key ongoing armed struggle: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Research Design

Our analysis draws on a series of original survey experiments we fielded online to a sample of 3,180 Jewish Israeli voters.³ The surveys were administered in two waves. The first wave, conducted in April 2014, included a sample of 1,963 adult Israelis stratified by gender, age, religiosity, and residence. It was designed to assess the reaction of Israelis to various policies, randomly assigning respondents to descriptions of policies that deepen or alleviate territorial control. The second wave was administered in January 2015 to a sample of 1,217 respondents, stratified by gender, age, education and residence.⁴ Summary statistics of both samples are reported in Tables A.1 and A.2.⁵

The two survey waves took place in different contextual environments. The first was conducted in the relatively peaceful months of negotiations led by United States Secretary of State John Kerry. The second survey was fielded a few months after the collapse of the negotiations, and in the wake of the bloody conflict in Gaza 2014, which killed more than 2,100 Palestinians and 72 Israelis.⁶

In both survey waves, participants were told the following: “You will now be asked to read a brief background paragraph and then a number of reports about the actions of the Israeli government. The reports are hypothetical, but are based on similar reports published in the news in the past. At the end of each news report you’ll be asked to answer a number of questions.” Respondents then read the following brief description of the situation in the West Bank: “According to the Israeli Central Statistics Bureau, the Israeli population in 2013 numbered approximately 8,000,000 people. Of these, about 300,000 Israelis live in about 120 settlements constructed outside the Green Line, in the Territories of the West Bank. In addition, approximately 2,264,000 Palestinians live in these Territories. Israeli citizens constitute 10% of the population of the West Bank and Palestinians constitute 90%.”

³The surveys were administered by iPanel, Israel’s largest opt-in Internet survey firm, and the only Israeli Internet survey firm to have received a certificate of approval from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem’s Department of Statistics, stating that with appropriate weighting its panel can be used as a sampling frame for the Israeli Jewish population. Panel members collect points for responding to surveys, which they can then redeem for gift certificates.

⁴In the first wave, the survey company invited 13,226 individuals to participate, and among those, 2,697 began the survey (20.4 percent). Among those who responded, 1,963 completed the first wave (72.8 percent). In the second wave, 11,000 invitations were sent, and 2,422 began the survey (22 percent). Among those who responded, 1,217 completed the survey (50.2 percent).

⁵In a comparison of our sample to the Israeli population we find that it is similarly distributed in terms of age, gender, income, education, religiosity, and area of residence, see section 1.3 of the SI for a more detailed discussion.

⁶See “Gaza crisis: Toll of operations in Gaza,” BBC News, September 1, 2014.

To gauge public attitudes towards territory, we presented participants with a simulated news report concerning Israeli settlement policy in the West Bank, designed to conform as closely as possible to actual news articles from recent years.⁷ We randomly varied whether territorial control was deepened or loosened, by exposing half of respondents to a policy increasing the construction of settlements, and the other half to a policy freezing the construction of settlements. We utilize settlement policy as an indicator because settlement construction is clearly motivated by the desire to deepen the control of disputed territory, and because it is understood both in Israel and by the international community as a key obstacle to territorial compromise between Israelis and Palestinians. Conversely, a freeze in settlement construction implicitly recognizes the disputed nature of Israel’s claim to sovereignty over the territory.

The full text of the vignette follows:

Settlements (loosening): *Israeli settlement construction in the West Bank was frozen yesterday. The settlement freeze is expected to continue in the near future. Experts estimate that freezing construction will significantly improve Palestinian livelihood. A government source said that the policy was enacted in accordance with a decision by the Israeli Security Cabinet, and stated that it advances Israel’s national interests and is aligned with Israel’s commitment to pursue a just and long lasting peace.*

Settlements (deepening): *In the last quarter there has been a sharp increase in settlement construction in the West Bank. The construction is expected to continue in the near future. Experts estimate that the accelerated construction will significantly harm Palestinian livelihood. A government source said that the policy was enacted in accordance with a decision by the Israeli Security Cabinet, and mentioned that it advances Israel’s national interests and is aligned with Israel’s commitment to pursue a just and long lasting peace.*

After reading the policy vignette, respondents were asked to state their level of support for the policy on a four-point scale ranging from “strongly oppose” to “strongly support.” Next, they were asked to evaluate whether the policy is expected to worsen, leave unchanged, or improve each of the following outcomes: (1) Palestinian violence in the short-term; (2) levels of violence in the long-term; (3) the state of the Israeli economy; (4) the likelihood of reaching a peace agreement with the Palestinians.

⁷In both waves we also ask about other policies not directly associated with territorial control. These policy vignettes are analyzed elsewhere. In the second wave, the results of the territorial control question are based on a sample of 813 respondents.

In the second wave, we asked several additional questions designed to shed light on the mechanisms explaining territorial attitudes. These included questions on a range of individual attributes, such as demographic background, personality, and personal risk orientation. In addition, we designed a conjoint experiment to gauge the which factors are most important to individuals in determining policy support: control of territory, security, economic welfare, or social services. Finally, we asked questions designed to assess the degree of credibility respondents require in order to support territorial concessions. For the sake of clarity we describe these questions fully in our discussion of causal mechanisms later in the paper.

Public attitudes towards territorial control

To determine levels of support for the two opposing settlement policies, we regress our variable of policy support on a deepening/loosening indicator. We use a binary variable that is equal to one if the respondent supports the policy described in the vignette and zero otherwise.⁸ Notably, results from our first wave are consistent with those of the second, despite surveying different samples in very different political climates. In the interest of brevity, we report findings from our second wave survey here and present results of the first wave in Section 3 of the SI.

We find that the majority of respondents exposed to the settlement construction vignette, 53%, express support for that policy. In contrast, a significantly smaller share of respondents, 47%, express support for a settlement freeze. This significant difference is notable given the well-known opposition of Palestinians and the international community to Jewish settlements in the West Bank, and their role in making territorial compromise exceedingly difficult to achieve. However, these results in themselves do not indicate why respondents are more likely to support settlement construction, and whether they too see the policy as costly. As argued above, it is only when the public supports territorial control despite its costs that we conclude that a bargaining space has been effectively reduced.


We therefore turn to an examination of public assessment of each policy’s consequences. Do respondents believe that territorial control enhances their security or benefits the country materially, or do they view the policy as costly? For each outcome examined, we estimate and plot predicted probabilities for an ordered logit model in which the main treatment is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 for territorial ‘loosening’ and 0 for ‘deepening.’ In all models, the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the respondents’ evaluation of the policy

⁸Our findings are similar when estimating ordered logit models using the four-point scale, as described in the SI.

is negative (e.g., the policy is expected to increase violence in the short or the long-term), and zero otherwise.

Figure 1 reports respondents' evaluation of the effects of the two opposing settlement policies. For all four outcomes, deepening territorial control through settlement expansion is judged as significantly more harmful than a policy that freezes settlement construction and signals willingness to compromise: the majority of our sample expects that deepening territorial control will increase short-term violence and decrease the likelihood of peace. In addition, a plurality of respondents believes that settlement expansion will increase long-term violence and be harmful to the economy. These findings stand in stark contrast to the support for settlement expansion expressed by a majority of respondents, suggesting a puzzling question: why would most of the public support deepening territorial control when it believes that such a policy is likely to increase violence, harm the economy and reduce the likelihood of a peaceful resolution of a protracted bloody conflict? On its face, this finding seems to provide support for theories on the domestic salience of territory, as it suggests that the public is willing to escalate conflict in order to maintain territorial control.


Figure 1: Evaluating Policies



However, these aggregate results may be misleading, reflecting an ecological fallacy: perhaps the minority that opposes policies that deepen territorial control views settlement expansion extremely negatively, while the majority that supports the policy has weak positive expectations. In such a case the result should be an overall mean negative evaluation that, nonetheless, poses no puzzle. In order to examine this possibility we rerun the analysis for policy support and policy evaluation, interacting our treatment variable—whether respondents were randomly assigned to loosening or a deepening vignette—with respondents’ self-placement on a seven points ideological (left-right) scale.

Figure 2 reveals that, as expected, political ideology crucially determines support for settlement expansion, which increases as one moves right on the political self-placement scale. Whereas for those identifying as the left (1-3 on the ideological scale) and the center (ideology scale equals 4), support for settlement freezing is far higher than for settlement construction, the opposite is true among right-wing Israelis (4-7 on the self-placed ideological scale). Notably, a majority of respondents (53%) self-identified as right-wing, as compared to only 22% of the sample that identified as left-wing.

Figure 2: Support for Conciliatory and Coercive Policies




We now turn to examine expectations of policy effectiveness by political ideology. Figures 3 and 4 show that the center-left views settlement expansion as far more harmful than settlement freezing in all domains: short- and long-term violence, state of the economy and

the likelihood of reaching a peaceful agreement. This provides a rather strong indication that the center-left policy position, which opposes deepening territorial control, is crucially shaped by instrumental—material and security—considerations. Importantly it seems quite inappropriate to view the 46 percent of the population that self-identifies as center-left as holding any sort of territorial attachment. This group is opposed to deepening control over disputed territory, believing that it will have negative consequence. This substantial heterogeneity in the population is important, given the tendency of International Relations theories on territorial conflict to treat countries monolithically, implying that the entire population attaches special salience to territory.⁹

Interestingly, however, the policy assessment patterns of the Right are not very different than those of the Left and Center (though smaller in magnitude). Figures 3 and 4 show that those identifying as right-wing are also more likely to view settlement construction as more damaging than a settlement freeze, leading to an increase in short and long-term violence and a decline in the likelihood of reaching a peace agreement. There is a relatively small subset of far-right respondents that views a settlement freeze as more harmful for the economy, but this does not seem to be large enough to explain the overwhelming support for settlement expansion among the far right.


⁹See recent critique by Tanaka (2015).

Figure 3: Evaluating Policies: Violence



In sum, right-wing respondents generally believe that policies that deepen territorial control are less effective than policies that loosen it in reducing short and long-term violence, and in promoting peaceful resolution of the conflict. These perceptions, by members of the block that forms a solid majority of the Israeli electorate, stand in remarkable contrast to the

Figure 4: Evaluating Policies: Economy and Likelihood of Peace



overwhelming support for deepening territorial control among right-wing respondents. For this share of the population, the puzzle identified earlier remains: voters lend their support to policies that they perceive are, on average, more likely to increase violence and reduce the likelihood of peace. This result is consistent with theories that attribute territorial conflict

to the salience of territory to the public, for reasons that go beyond instrumental cost-benefit concerns. As a result, individuals are willing to bear substantial material costs to maintain territorial control, constraining the bargaining space of leaders and reducing their incentives to compromise.

However, there may be other explanations that account for this finding. We consider several alternatives: first, that voters who prefer less effective policies are simply inconsistent or irrational. Second, it is possible that the right in Israel is simply risk averse: while it perceives territorial concessions as more likely to lead to improved security and for some respondents, economic wellbeing, it is uncertain that such benefits will materialize. In the absence of assurance (due to credible commitment problems), it rejects concessions and supports the status quo. Third, it is possible that economic considerations play a crucial role in driving policy preferences such that extreme right-wing respondents downplay security considerations for material gains. Note, however, that without knowing which considerations respondents prioritize when forming policy preferences, it is hard to assess the relative importance of different expected policy outcomes. To address this issue, and to test more generally the power of these alternative explanations, we conduct two additional analyses: a conjoint experiment, and a “credibility exercise.” Each is described in turn.

Explaining Territorial Attitudes

Conjoint Analysis

To assess which considerations drive policy preferences, we utilize a conjoint experiment designed to test the influence of various policy attributes on generating support for that policy. We asked participants to consider a hypothetical scenario in which the Israeli government is considering implementing one of two policies that may substantially change the Israeli-Palestinian status quo. After a brief introduction explaining the task, we showed participants possible outcomes of two generic policies (“A” and “B”) as shown in Table 1. The instructions asked participants to imagine that the government is turning to the public to decide between the two policies in a plebiscite and indicate which of the two policy proposals they would support.

To inform policy choice, respondents were presented with policy attributes that varied along four domains that are central to debates on ways to address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: the policy’s effect on *security*, *the economy*, *budget allocation to social services versus defense*, and control over the disputed *territory*. Each attribute took one of several values,

as described in Table 2. For example, the policy’s impact on security was operationalized as its effect on terrorist and rocket attacks, since this has been perceived by Israel as the primary threat to its security since the decline of the conventional military threat posed to it by its neighbors after the end of the Cold War.¹⁰ This threat has been viewed as far more acute since Hamas’s 2007 takeover of Gaza. Values on this item ranged from a substantial decrease in rockets and terrorist attacks to a significant increase in such attacks. In the territorial domain, values varied between maintaining territorial control of the West Bank and withdrawing from the territory.

This approach has several unique features. First, the random assignment of policy attributes enables identification of the causal effect of each attribute on the probability of policy support.¹¹ This allows us to disentangle policy attributes that are naturally correlated, such as security and territorial control. Second, we measure the effect of all attributes on the same scale, which allows us to assess the relative importance of each attribute. Together these features make it possible to estimate whether respondents value territory above a variety of strategic and material benefits. In addition, the conjoint design allows examining the conditions under which some attributes matter more or less based on respondents’ characteristics, as well as the interaction effects of different attributes.¹²

Following Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto (2014), we estimate average marginal component effects (AMCEs), which estimate the average difference in the probability that a policy with a given outcome—say, a reduction in rocket attacks—is preferred over a policy with a baseline outcome—such as no change in the level of rocket attacks. Since the attributes (i.e., the outcomes) of a policy are randomly assigned, each outcome in a given domain is combined with the same distribution of outcomes in the other domains on average, which allows for a simple comparison of mean values. We estimate the AMCEs using a regression of a binary outcome variable: *Policy chosen* on a set of factor variables for each outcome in each domain. Since each respondent chooses between two policies, there are two possible policy profiles for each respondent. To obtain accurate standard errors, we cluster standard errors by respondent ID.

$$Policy\ chosen_i = \alpha + \beta_1 T_{i,2} + \beta_2 S_{i,2} + \beta_3 S_{i,3} + \beta_4 E_{i,2} + \beta_5 E_{i,3} + \beta_6 B_{i,2} + \beta_7 B_{i,3} + \epsilon_i \quad (1)$$

¹⁰A second strategic threat, that of a nuclear Iran, is irrelevant to the territorial control of the West Bank.

¹¹See SI, Section 1.1, for balance tests for each domain in the conjoint experiment.

¹²For an examination of the interaction effects of different policy attributes based on Imai and Egami (2015), see Section 2.2 in the SI.

Table 1: Experimental Design

After the recent military operation in Gaza, the Israeli government came to the conclusion that it needs to take an action that may have a strong impact on Israel’s economy, security, and social arenas. Below are the consequences of two possible policies:

	Policy A	Policy B
Territory	Israeli control in the West Bank will remain unchanged	Israel will withdraw from most of the West Bank
Security	Rocket and terrorist attacks will decrease significantly	Rocket and terrorist attacks will remain unchanged
Economy	Israel’s economy will be severely harmed	Israel’s economy will grow significantly
Budget	The security, education, and health budgets will remain in their present form	The security budget will decrease, and the education and health budgets will increase

The Israeli government turns to the public to decide between these two policies in a plebiscite. Based on the information presented in the table above, which policy would you support?

1. Policy A
2. Policy B

Table 2: Values for Policy Outcomes in Conjoint Experiment

Domain	Values
Territory (T)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Israeli control in the West Bank will remain unchanged. 2. Israel will withdraw from most of the West Bank.
Security (S)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Rocket and terrorist attacks will remain unchanged. 2. Rocket and terrorist attacks will decrease significantly. 3. Rocket and terrorist attacks will increase significantly.
Economy (E)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The economy will remain unchanged. 2. Israel’s economy will be severely harmed. 3. Israel’s economy will grow significantly.
Budget (B)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. The security, education, and health budgets will remain unchanged. 2. The security budget will increase and the health and education budgets will decrease. 3. The security budget will decrease and the health and education budgets will increase.

Results of the Conjoint Experiment


Figure 5 shows results for the full sample, plotting the AMCEs along with 95% confidence intervals (see SI, Section 2.3, for tabular results of all figures). The point estimate on each attribute represents its average effect on the probability that participants choose a policy containing this attribute over a policy with the baseline attribute. Points without confidence intervals denote baseline attributes. As Figure 5 shows, a policy that includes withdrawal from territory is 34.8 percentage points less likely to be chosen by respondents. The territorial attribute has the largest effect by far on policy choice, more than one and a half times the effect of the next most salient attribute, security. A policy leading to an increase in rocket attacks is 18.6 percentage points less likely to be selected, and a policy that reduces terrorist violence increases the probability of policy choice by 19.2 percentage points. In the economic domain, a policy that harms the economy decreases the likelihood of a policy being chosen by 12.1 percentage points. And in the budget domain, a policy leading to an increase in the budget allocation to security at the expense of health and education is 6.7 percentage points less likely to be chosen.

These results demonstrate that maintaining territorial control over the West Bank is a more important factor in determining the policy choice of Israeli constituents than security, the state of the economy, and social welfare. Moreover, it provides a compelling explanation for the counterintuitive policy preferences reported above. It is not that respondents are irrational or myopic in choosing policies that they acknowledge will escalate conflict, nor that they are concerned most crucially with economic rather than security outcomes, but rather that they prioritize territorial control over a range of strategic and material benefits.

Since our policy experiment suggested that territorial attachment is conditioned by political ideology, we present the conjoint results disaggregated by the three key political blocks in Israel.¹³ Figure 6 reveals several important findings: first, whereas territorial control is secondary to security considerations among center and left-leaning respondents, it plays a crucial role in the formation of policy preferences among right-wing voters. Second, the state of the economy and budget allocation to social services hardly factor into right-wing voters' preference formation, further confirming our argument that instrumental considerations cannot account for their overwhelming support for settlement construction in the policy experiment described above.


¹³We code respondents as “left” if they identified themselves as 1-3 on the seven point ideology scale described above; “right” if they identified themselves as 5-7; and center if they identified as 4.

Figure 5: Effects of Policy Attributes on Probability of Policy Choice



Note: The figure plots AMCEs of randomly assigned policy attributes on the probability of a policy being chosen by Israeli survey participants. Estimates are based on the OLS regression model reported in equation 1, with standard errors clustered by respondent. The bars around the point estimates represent 95% confidence intervals. Points without horizontal bars represent baseline attribute values.

Figure 6: Effects of Policy Attributes on Probability of Policy Choice by Ideology




Note: The figure plots AMCEs of randomly assigned policy attributes on the probability of a policy being chosen by Israeli survey participants, broken down by ideological self-placement. Estimates are based on the OLS regression model reported in equation 1, with standard errors clustered by respondent. The bars around the point estimates represent 95% confidence intervals. Points without horizontal bars represent baseline attribute values.

To further probe as to the extent to which voters are willing to bear security and material costs in order to maintain territorial control, we calculate the predicted values of respondents' policy choice by political ideology while holding the four policy attributes at specific values. We report the results in Figure 7. Focusing first on right-wing voters (top panel), we find that over 50 percent of respondents explicitly prefer retaining control over the disputed occupied territories *even when terrorist violence increases substantially, the economy is severely harmed, and the budget allocation to health and education is reduced* ("all else bad"). This too underscores our argument that a substantial segment of the right is willing to bear high material and security costs in order to maintain territorial control. This group, which represents about a third of all survey respondents, can be said to hold positions that render territory effectively indivisible,

At the same time, we also find that about 45% of right-wing voters are willing to support a policy that results in territorial compromise ("give land") if the policy is expected to reduce terror and rocket attacks, improve the economy and allocate greater resources towards social service ("all else good"). For this group—constituents that have expressed a strong attachment to the disputed territory, but are willing to give it up if the benefits are sufficiently high (or the costs of maintaining the territory are sufficiently high)—territory is important but is not effectively indivisible. Essentially, this group's territorial attachment is rooted in instrumental considerations. This finding underscores the importance of the conjoint experiment in uncovering an under-appreciated and under-theorized variation even among individuals who view territory as particularly salient, express strong territorial attachment, and vote for hawkish parties.

The above analysis is important also in addressing a possible limitation of our conjoint experiment. By randomizing attributes of an object of inquiry, conjoint experiments intend to manipulate subjects' beliefs about a specific feature of the object, and only those beliefs. In any conjoint experiment, however, experimental subjects may nonetheless refer to prior beliefs that are not explicitly stated in the conjoint when selecting among alternatives. For example, it is in principle possible that respondents, especially those identifying as right-wing, continue to implicitly consider security or other material considerations when they choose to prioritize policies that maintain territorial control over the West Bank. That more than 50% of right-wing respondents explicitly reject policies that entail territorial compromise even when "all is bad" seems to suggest that this possible confounding (Dafoe, Zhang and Caughey, 2015) is unlikely to be driving the results of the conjoint.

Figure 7: Preferences for Maintaining Territorial Control (By Ideology)



Note: The figure plots the predicted values, broken by ideology (measured by self-placement), of the Territory indicators reported in Table 2 while holding other attributes at specific values. For “Keep land (all else good),” we set the Territory indicator to “Israeli control in the West Bank will remain unchanged”; the Security indicator to “Rocket and terrorist attacks will decrease significantly”; The Economy indicator to “Israel’s economy will grow significantly”; and the Budget indicator to “The security budget will decrease and the health and education budgets will increase.” For “Give land (all else good)” we changed the Territory indicator to “Israel will withdraw from most of the West Bank.” Finally, for “Keep land (all else bad)” we set the territory indicator to territorial withdrawal and the other three indicators to “Rocket and terrorist attacks will increase significantly”, “Israel’s economy will be severely harmed,” and “The security budget will increase and the health and education budgets will decrease.” The dots indicate point estimates, and the horizontal bars 95% confidence intervals.

The conjoint experiment allows us to rule out two alternative explanations for our finding on territorial policy preferences among the right-wing majority. Taken together, these findings indicate that these voters are not irrational or inconsistent, but rather that they prioritize territorial control over other material benefits. This provides additional support for theories on the domestic foundations of territorial conflict, indicating that at least some individuals are willing to escalate conflict in order to retain territorial control. However, the conjoint experiment does not allow us to rule out an additional alternative explanation: that policy preferences are driven by risk aversion. Specifically, it is possible that citizens estimate that territorial compromise is *likely* to lead to better outcomes, but fear the non-negligible probability that concessions could end in disaster (such as a Hamas takeover in the West Bank akin to the one that occurred in Gaza in 2007). We therefore designed a set of questions regarding the levels of economic and security-related risk that respondents would assume in order to accept territorial compromise. If individuals reject compromise even when there is no risk involved and the guarantee of benefits is completely credible, risk aversion cannot be what informs policy position. Instead we can conclude that such individuals express a purposeful willingness to bear costs, thus exhibiting an “effectively indivisible” policy position.

Credibility Exercise

Our credibility exercise consists of two related questions. The first of these questions posed the following scenario to respondents:

“Imagine that the Israeli government is considering a number of far-reaching gestures to strengthen the Palestinian Authority (PA). These measures have an advantage and a disadvantage: On the one hand, they could lead to a substantial reduction in terrorism, of about 100 attacks a year, due to improved security cooperation with the Palestinians. On the other hand, should the gestures fail, they could strengthen Hamas and increase terrorism by about 30 attacks a year.”

Respondents were then asked to state when they would support the political gestures based solely on the information given in the question. Response categories ranged from “I will support the gestures in any case” through “I will support the gestures if their likelihood of success is at least 5%,” and continued in intervals of 10% until they reached “I will support the gestures if their likelihood of success is 100%” and finally “I will not support the gestures under any circumstances.” Notably, this question did not explicitly reference territorial withdrawal but a “series of political gestures,” which in Israel implies increased

PA control in the West Bank.


The top panel of Figure 8 shows that a full 28% of respondents would reject concessions even if there was 100% certainty that they would lead to a substantial reduction in terrorism. In other words, these individuals are explicitly insensitive to a key tangible strategic benefit of concessions: enhanced security. When combined with the 14% of respondents who require a certainty level of 100% to support concessions, our data suggest that a large share of respondents is not concerned with the credibility of commitments at all, but is willing to forgo instrumental benefits in order to maintain a higher level of territorial control. This is, again, consistent with our finding that about a third of the Israeli electorate holds attitudes towards territorial salience that render it effectively indivisible. Figure 9 (top-left panel) underscores the fact that members of this group are highly concentrated among those identifying as right-wing. The figure also demonstrates, however, the diversity even among those identifying as right: About a half would support concessions if the likelihood of success is non-negligible. This is consistent with results from our conjoint experiment, which indicate that around 45% of right-wing voters would concede territory if all other material outcomes were positive.

Our second question addressed material rather than security considerations. Respondents read a question that stated that Israel currently earns approximately a billion dollars a year from international trade. However, the U.N. Security Council is considering sanctions due to ongoing military occupation of the Occupied Territories. Respondents were told that a team of senior experts estimated that implementation of the sanctions would lead to annual losses of 300 million dollars a year for the Israeli economy. Ending the occupation through mutual agreement with the Palestinians could prevent the sanctions. Respondents were then asked at what level of risk of sanctions they would support such an agreement. Again, responses ranged from “I will support such an agreement in any case” through “I will support the agreement if the risk of sanctions is at least 5%,” and continued in intervals of 10% until they reached “I will support the agreement if the risk of sanctions is 100%” and finally “I will not support the agreement under any circumstances.” As shown in the middle panel of Figure 8, when economic issues are at stake, nearly 38% of respondents would refuse to end to the military occupation even with the certainty of severe economic sanctions. Again, figure 9 (top-right panel) suggests that territorial salience that is rooted in non-instrumental considerations is concentrated among right-wing voters.

These results underscore the findings of our conjoint experiment, indicating that a large minority (around 30-40%) of our sample is insensitive to costs and benefits in the security and economic domains when territorial control is at stake. Though each of the three survey components presented herein— the policy and conjoint experiments and credibility exercise—are


subject to certain limitations, the cumulative evidence suggests that a large share of respondents is willing to escalate conflict in order to retain territorial control, thereby substantially reducing the bargaining space of leaders. At the same time, the evidence calls for caution in attributing territorial attachment to all individuals based on biological, ethnic, or historical factors. Rather, there is important diversity even among those who exhibit strong attachment to the land. We further explore this heterogeneity in the following section.

Figure 8: Support for Concessions and Risk Taking



Note: The figure plots the distribution of responses for level of risk survey participants are willing to take when supporting potentially beneficial Israeli concessions.

Figure 9: Support for Concessions and Risk Taking by Political Bloc



Who Values Territory?

Two central findings emerge from our analysis thus far. First, we find that a majority of Israeli voters, those identifying as right-wing, express strong territorial attachment. However, we also find that for some of these voters, attachment is instrumental. Their reluctance to make concessions does not stem from ideological attachment that trumps strategic calculations, but rather from their assessment of the rival’s credibility, and their fear of defection. Put in terms of bargaining theory, these voters are concerned with commitment problems, while other right-wing voters perceive territory as effectively indivisible. A natural next step, then, is to try and identify which characteristics can distinguish between these two types of voters. To do so, we return to the conjoint experiment and conduct the following heterogeneous analysis.

First we re-estimate model 1 several times using only the subsample of respondents identifying as right-wing. In each iteration of the model we add an interaction between the four treatment variables (i.e., the four randomized policy attributes) and a covariate capturing demographic characteristics, psychological traits, and personal risk orientation.¹⁴ All covariates have been dichotomized for ease of interpretation, using either the median value (for continuous measures) or a natural splitting category (for categorical variables). We then calculate the predicted probability that respondents with these covariates hold “effectively indivisible” policy positions; i.e., that they select the generic policy that maintains territorial control even when all other outcomes (terror and rocket attacks, the economy and budget allocation to social services) “are bad.”

Results presented in Figure 10 suggest that a number of socio-demographics predict “effective indivisibility” policy positions. In particular, religiosity and age are significantly associated with more ideological and uncompromising political attitudes, with somewhat weaker evidence for gender and income. For example, whereas right-wing voters identifying as religious have a 62% probability of selecting a policy that maintains territorial control when all else is bad, right-wing voters identifying as secular have only a 43% probability of selecting such a policy, under those “bad” conditions. This difference is significant ($pvalue = 0.020$). This finding is consistent with studies arguing that religion prescribes a set of deontological rules (e.g., denoting places as holy or sacred) that override cost-benefit calculations (Ginges et al., 2007; Hassner, 2003). Similarly, younger right-wing voters (under the age of 45) have a 61% probability of selecting a policy that keeps the land when all else is bad, as compared

¹⁴Please refer to the online appendix for a comprehensive description of how each individual-level covariate was measured.

to 46% of older voters; this difference is significant at the 10% level ($pvalue = 0.067$). This finding is consistent with the idea that younger constituents tend to be more ideologically driven and uncompromising than older voters. Interestingly, we also find an association between risk acceptance and non-instrumental territorial attachment, though this does not quite reach statistical significance.




Figure 10: Predicted probabilities for keeping land even when “all else is bad” by respondents’ demographics, risk attitudes and personality traits

Discussion and Conclusion

The long-observed link between territorial disputes and conflict onset, escalation, duration, and termination has been widely attributed to the tendencies of publics to view territory as salient and indivisible. Yet to date, research has not directly investigated the central implication of this theory: that publics are willing to bear substantial material costs to retain control of territory. Using the case of Israel, this study provides the first systematic analysis of the micro-foundations of territorial salience and indivisibility.

Several key findings emerge from our study. First, we find that a majority of Israelis support policies that deepen control over the West Bank, even though a firm majority also believes that such policies are likely to escalate both short and long-term violence, reduce the likelihood of peace, and harm the economy. Second, we show that for a significant share of the population, these seemingly contradictory preferences are in fact a consequence of the high value attached to territorial control, above and beyond concerns over violence and terrorism, material well being, and social services. Third, we show that there is important variation among voters in attitudes towards disputed territory. A significant minority (40-45%), identifying as center or left, does not appear attached to the disputed territory, prioritizing other issues such as security and economic wellbeing. Among right-wing voters who do view territory as highly salient there is important variation as well: while some are perfectly willing to bear substantial material costs to retain territorial control, others reject concessions due to concerns about the rival's credibility and likelihood of defection. Specifically, we find that only about a third of the population hold non-instrumental attitudes that can truly be considered as rendering the disputed territory effectively indivisible.

These findings, consistent across a variety of measures, and derived from survey experiments replicated on different samples in two very different time periods, provide micro-level support for theories on the domestic foundations of territorial conflict, revealing that some individuals are so attached to territory that they are willing to escalate conflict in order to continue to control it. However, they call for caution in attributing such attitudes to all individuals, as is implicit in much of the literature. In the Israeli-Palestinian case, we find that such attitudes can be attributed to approximately a third of the Jewish-Israeli population. A third, while not the majority, can nevertheless exercise strong influence on elites, leading to political outbidding and constraining their bargaining space.

Most directly, this study contributes to the large literature on territorial conflict, which to date has struggled to empirically test the micro-foundations of the salience and constructed indivisibility of territory to domestic audiences. Our findings on public support for coun-

terproductive policies also contribute to a literature on state repression, which has puzzled over the tendency of states to use indiscriminate repression against dissent even when such repression is counterproductive. While that literature has highlighted the constraints states face in implementing effective security policy, our results suggest that such policies may instead be the result of domestic incentives. When the public supports coercive policies, even as it is aware of its negative consequences, governments have political incentive to utilize it.

Our study suggests a number of avenues for future research. First, our findings regarding voter heterogeneity cast doubt on biological and evolutionary perspectives emphasizing the territoriality of all individuals. They also raise the question of who values territory and why. The findings presented here suggest that demographic factors such as age and religiosity, as well as personality traits such as individual risk orientation, are associated with greater attachment to territory. Further investigation of these individual-level predictors is a task for future research. Second, as public opinion is not static but rather is subject to changes over time, an important question is whether and how attitudes towards territory can shift.¹⁵ Finally, that our study finds evidence for preference heterogeneity further suggests that whether or not territory is constructed as indivisible likely varies temporally and spatially. Indeed, we believe that such heterogeneity underpins the importance of in-depth analysis of specific cases. Our hope is that future work would attempt to replicate our procedure (if not our findings) in different conflict areas, such as the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir or Eastern Ukraine.

In addition to the contribution to the theoretical debate on conflict and territory, our findings have important policy implications for the promotion of peaceful conflict resolution. First, they suggest that framing a peace agreement solely in instrumental terms—by highlighting security and material benefits—is unlikely to win over a substantial share of the Israeli population. At least in this context, peace-building efforts should take ideological dimensions seriously, in the discourse they employ and in the stakeholders they involve. Additionally, our findings point to the important role of leadership in advocating non-violent means to resolve conflict (Schultz, 2005). When public opinion attaches strong value to control over territory, leaders will need substantial individual and political clout to promote negotiations in the face of widespread public opposition.

¹⁵See for example Zellman (2015).

Appendix

Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics: First Wave Sample

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	N
<i>Demographic variables</i>					
Age	40.58	14.50	18	70	1963
Female	0.51	0.50	0	1	1963
Income					
<i>Much less than avg.</i>	0.14	0.35	0	1	1962
<i>Little less than avg.</i>	0.29	0.46	0	1	1963
<i>Like avg.</i>	0.17	0.37	0	1	1962
<i>Little more than avg.</i>	0.32	0.47	0	1	1963
<i>Much more than avg.</i>	0.07	0.26	0	1	1963
Education					
<i>No matriculation</i>	0.00	0.06	0	1	1963
<i>High school</i>	0.19	0.39	0	1	1962
<i>Vocational</i>	0.17	0.38	0	1	1962
<i>Academic</i>	0.62	0.49	0	1	1963
Area of residence					
<i>West Bank or Jerusalem</i>	0.11	0.32	0	1	1963
<i>Outside West bank or Jerusalem</i>	0.89	0.32	0	1	1963
Religiosity					
<i>Secular</i>	0.52	0.50	0	1	1963
<i>Traditional</i>	0.31	0.46	0	1	1963
<i>Religious</i>	0.14	0.35	0	1	1963
<i>Haredi</i>	0.03	0.17	0	1	1963
Ethnicity					
<i>Mizrachi</i>	0.33	0.47	0	1	1963
<i>Ashkenazi</i>	0.46	0.50	0	1	1963
<i>Political ideology</i>					
Right-left self placement	3.44	1.44	1	7	1963
Support two-state solution	2.40	0.98	1	4	1963
Voting in 2013					
<i>Voted for right-wing parties</i>	0.43	0.49	0	1	1795
<i>Voted for centrist parties</i>	0.35	0.48	0	1	1795
<i>Voted for left-wing parties</i>	0.23	0.42	0	1	1795
<i>Support for policies loosening and deepening territorial control</i>					
Settlements: loosening	0.45	0.50	0	1	303
Settlements: deepening	0.59	0.49	0	1	302
Negotiations: start	0.60	0.49	0	1	300
Negotiations: stop	0.54	0.50	0	1	301

Table A.2: Descriptive statistics: Second Wave Sample

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max	N
<i>Demographic variables</i>					
Age	41.01	14.29	18	70	1217
Female	0.54	0.50	0	1	1217
Income					
<i>Much less than avg.</i>	0.26	0.44	0	1	1217
<i>Little less than avg.</i>	0.19	0.39	0	1	1217
<i>Like avg.</i>	0.20	0.40	0	1	1217
<i>Little more than avg.</i>	0.18	0.38	0	1	1217
<i>Much more than avg.</i>	0.10	0.29	0	1	1217
Education					
<i>No matriculation</i>	0.26	0.44	0	1	1217
<i>High school</i>	0.22	0.42	0	1	1217
<i>Vocational</i>	0.22	0.42	0	1	1217
<i>Academic</i>	0.30	0.46	0	1	1217
Area of residence					
<i>West Bank or Jerusalem</i>	0.14	0.34	0	1	1217
<i>Outside the West bank or Jerusalem</i>	0.86	0.34	0	1	1217
Religiosity					
<i>Secular</i>	0.55	0.50	0	1	1217
<i>Traditional</i>	0.21	0.41	0	1	1217
<i>Religious</i>	0.13	0.34	0	1	1217
<i>Haredi</i>	0.10	0.30	0	1	1217
Ethnicity					
<i>Mizrachi</i>	0.34	0.47	0	1	1217
<i>Ashkenazi</i>	0.44	0.50	0	1	1217
<i>Political ideology</i>					
Right-left self placement	3.25	1.62	1	7	1217
Support compromised solutions to the conflict	0.47	0.50	0	1	1196
Voting in 2013					
<i>Voted for right-wing parties</i>	0.51	0.50	0	1	1098
<i>Voted for centrist parties</i>	0.32	0.47	0	1	1098
<i>Voted for left-wing parties</i>	0.17	0.38	0	1	1098
<i>Support for policies loosening and deepening territorial control</i>					
Checkpoints: loosening	0.40	0.49	0	1	408
Checkpoints: deepening	0.63	0.48	0	1	404
Settlements: loosening	0.47	0.50	0	1	405
Settlements: deepening	0.53	0.50	0	1	408
Peace agreement: loosening	0.46	0.50	0	1	404
Military operation: deepening	0.75	0.43	0	1	405

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