

## **Affinity Voting Across Electoral Systems**

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### **Abstract**

Existing research is mixed about how electoral systems affect the likelihood that women and visible minority candidates win seats. In this paper, we test implications drawn from theoretical arguments about how the incentives created by electoral rules affect voter behavior. We present the results of a survey experiment conducted in the Vancouver area during the May 2017 provincial election in British Columbia, Canada, using actual candidates in real as well as in hypothetical electoral districts. Although the actual elections were held under single-member district plurality, alternative electoral rules have been proposed for the province and debated in the country in recent years and so citizens have some familiarity with other electoral rules. The respondents voted as if in their actual district, and then in districts of larger magnitude (5 or 15) according to different kinds of proportional representation. By varying the nature of the electoral system, and therefore the opportunities that voters have to express their preferences over specific candidates more or less independently from parties, we can assess to what extent affinity voting is affected by the electoral context.

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## Introduction

When citizens or leaders initiate discussions about electoral reform, much of the focus tends to be on how under-represented parties would fare under different systems. Proponents of more proportional electoral rules argue that increased proportionality in the translation of a party's votes into seats leads to improved representation. This claim draws on the evidence from a large literature that shows the ways in which electoral rules shape party systems and affect what types of parties are likely to win office (Bawn 1993, Clark & Golder 2006, Kaminski 1999). We know less, though, about the ways in which electoral reform might affect the descriptive representation of underrepresented groups. What reforms would make it more likely that women and visible minorities – who are invariably underrepresented in elected bodies compared with their relative size in electorates – are elected in higher numbers? Even though we know a fair amount about the conditions under which the permissiveness of electoral rules allows for a more or less accurate translation of votes into seats for political parties, these studies do not have clear implications with respect to individual candidates and descriptive representation. In this paper, we investigate the conditions under which potential voters are more or less likely to vote for women and visible minorities under different electoral rules, in an electoral context where the electorate had the opportunity to engage in recent public debates about electoral rule reform, and where respondents are likely to be familiar with some of the candidates.

Existing research is mixed about how electoral systems affect the likelihood that women and visible minority candidates win seats. On the one hand, some scholars argue that large electoral districts combined with preference voting create optimal conditions (Shugart 1994, Taagepera 1994). On the other hand, some argue that closed list proportional representation with gender quotas and placement rules are most effective (Jones 1998, Jones and Navia 1999). For scholars interested in descriptive representation, either for its own sake or because it is thought to lead to increased substantive representation, understanding the link between the various elements of electoral rules and the election of women and visible minorities is vital, as electoral systems have myriad combinations of features and elements. For example, gender quotas do not affect women's representation equally effectively in all systems (Schmidt 2009).

Further complicating the issue is that it tends to be difficult to separate the role of electoral rules from the political and cultural context of specific cases. Given the importance of political context to electoral outcomes, it is not surprising that existing studies have found mixed results with respect to voters' propensities to vote based on candidates' gender or other identity characteristics. In this paper, we follow, to some extent, the approach taken in a recent study that sidestepped the complexities of comparing voter behavior across different political contexts by using an internet survey to examine how the *same* respondents would vote in a hypothetical European Parliamentary election under different proportional representation electoral rules (Golder

et al. 2017). In that study, more open electoral rules, which allow the respondents more flexibility in choosing specific candidates, led to more votes being cast for female candidates; this effect was stronger for women respondents. Consistent with some studies on the role of gender affinity voting in majoritarian systems, this proportional representation example finds that identity characteristics of candidates (such as gender) matter less when electoral rules are party-centered, and more when they are candidate centered. We follow the methodology used by Golder et al. (2017) in terms of holding individuals constant while observing their behavior in different electoral systems, but extend it to another geographic area (British Columbia, Canada), to consider a comparison of majoritarian and PR electoral systems and to incorporate race and ethnicity in addition to gender.

We use a survey experiment to isolate and compare the role of majoritarian and proportional electoral rules in terms of voting for women and visible minorities while holding other features of the political context constant. Our central goal is to examine how electoral rules, including district size and how much freedom voters have to indicate their preferences for individual candidates, affect the extent to which voters support women and visible minorities.

### **Theorizing about Affinity Voting across Electoral Systems**

We begin with an assumption that some voters place a greater importance on candidates' gender, ethnicity, religion, etc. than others.<sup>1</sup> In some electoral contests, such preferences are likely to play less of a role (for example, in party-centered elections) but in others, they could affect voting patterns in significant ways. We argue that for a candidate's gender or ethnicity to matter in an election, two elements must be present: voters must have both the desire and the opportunity to choose between candidates with different identity characteristics. For example, voters who have a preference for electing women rather than men will not have the opportunity to express this preference if faced with an all-male list of candidates. Similarly, a voter who wishes to elect a member of an underrepresented ethnic community will not necessarily find such a candidate on the ballot. Voters who care about candidates' gender and ethnicity also care about things like partisan affiliation and candidate quality, and the extent to which any one of these features is more or less important in a particular election, relative to identity characteristics, could easily change over time and be affected by the political context of a particular election.

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<sup>1</sup> As Bittner and Goodyear-Grant (2017, 561) point out, "The intensity of attachment to social groups varies across group members, and that variation has political consequences. Strongly felt identities are more likely to produce group-oriented political attitudes and actions than weakly felt ones."

More importantly for our study, the strength of these different motives for supporting specific candidates and their interaction is likely to depend on the electoral rules. In a single member district plurality system, many voters may face a dilemma between voting based on partisan affiliation and voting for the candidate with their preferred individual characteristics - such as gender or ethnicity. If the partisan motive is strong enough, there will be little room for affinity voting to express itself. By contrast, in a proportional system with open lists, the voter can vote for a party and cast a preferential vote for a candidate, within the party, at the same time. In this system, the conflict between the two motives disappears: the voter can vote based on both partisan affiliation and individual candidate characteristics.

### **Theorizing about Candidate Preferences**

It is useful to first consider potential explanations for gender- or race-based voting that might apply to all voters, before discussing explanations for differences in such affinity voting patterns within a particular group. With respect to all groups, that is, the entire electorate, we expect that many respondents have a propensity to engage in ‘affinity voting’ – voting for someone like them. In other words, they prefer, when given the option (all else equal), to vote for a candidate of the same gender or the same race or ethnicity or on the basis of some other shared characteristic. One reason for affinity voting is that some voters tend to prefer an ‘in-group’ candidate to an ‘out-group’ candidate, perhaps because of an expectation that the candidate has had similar experiences as the voter due to their membership in a shared identity category. As Penney et al. (2016, 3) note, “When voters and candidates share a common socio-demographic trait, particularly one that is visible and politically salient, this can lead to a bond or affinity with the candidate from the perspective of the voter.” Thus, when presented with a female candidate, we would generally expect female voters to vote for the female candidate at higher rates than other voters. When presented with a visible minority candidate, we would generally expect voters from that minority group to vote for the minority candidate at higher rates than other voters.

An ‘in-group’ preference might occur for different reasons. In elections where all candidates have similar policy positions (for example non-partisan elections or primaries within a party), sharing a salient trait can be a useful heuristic device. A voter might feel that a candidate who shares her background – gender, race, region, etc. – is more likely to have faced similar experiences, to hold similar views, and to be more aligned on unforeseen issues that could arise during the upcoming electoral term (Mansbridge 1999). This type of shortcut is most likely to be useful in cases where the voter does not have much information about the candidates. Some voters use candidate background as a proxy for policy position. The reasoning would be that I, as a voter, am more likely to have similar policy positions with a candidate who has a similar background to me than I am to have

with a candidate who has a different background to me. Cutler (2002) finds that the socio-demographic characteristics of leaders influence the vote choices of similarly-situated voters.

Importantly, gender and ethnic group identity are not the only heuristics that can act as information shortcuts for voters. In high-information settings, such as where partisan cues are strong and meaningful, where candidates are well known, and/or where the candidates have clear and distinctive policy positions, using the shortcut of ‘in-group’ affinity to decide how to vote might be less necessary. For example, McGregor et al. (forthcoming) consider how incumbency, gender affinity, and racial affinity voting interact in low-information City Council elections. They find no evidence of gender affinity voting, regardless of the presence of an incumbent, but that racial affinity voting only appears when no incumbent is present. They theorize that increasing representation of underrepresented groups will remain difficult so long as incumbency is common, given the strength of preferences for known candidates. Kam and Zechmeister (2013) use experimental methods to show that name recognition alone can act as a voting cue for voters. In several studies they demonstrate that individuals who were exposed to a name (either through subliminal priming or on lawn signs) were more likely to support that candidate in an election. They argue that name recognition, even separate from any detailed information about the candidate, increased the perception of viability.

Beyond the electoral and information context, there is reason to expect individual-level variation in affinity voting. Voters who self-identify more strongly in terms of gender or ethnicity are likely to have a higher propensity to engage in affinity voting. If some group members share a stronger sense of linked fate (Dawson 1994; Gay, Hochschild and White 2016; McClain et al. 2009; Sanchez and Vargas 2016) with other members of their group, or heightened group consciousness (McClain et al. 2009; Miller et al. 1981; Wilcox 1996), then we might expect to see more affinity voting by some voters than others. If, on average, we see differences across groups in their propensity to engage in affinity voting, this does not preclude variation within groups as well. For example, within any identity group, some voters will care more about their identification as a member of the group than others. We should not expect to see affinity voting from a voter who does not feel a shared identity on a particular dimension. The level of group consciousness exhibited by voters within a group will vary, and this should be reflected in voting patterns. This type of variation would modify the extent to which affinity voting occurs.

Other differences that occur within the electorate, which are not necessarily connected to a voter’s gender or racial/ethnic identity, have to do with attitudes towards different groups in society and whether members of some groups are seen as more appropriate, or qualified, to hold elected office than others. We can ask, loosely speaking, how ‘traditional’ is the voter, where ‘traditional’ refers to the idea that the most natural member of an elected office is a White man. Historically, elected bodies have been predominantly composed of White men in

most Western countries, and this is also true of Canada, where the data for this paper were gathered. Some voters may simply feel more comfortable with a continuation of this historical convention. If a White man held this attitude, he would seem to be pursuing affinity voting but a White woman would not, at least as far as same-gender voting is concerned.

Conversely, some voters might care about increasing levels of descriptive representation in their elected bodies, and would vote for members of currently underrepresented groups. That is, for ideological reasons, some voters might value a legislature that is descriptively representative of the population at large with respect to gender and ethnicity, regardless of their own identification with different social groups. Voters who adhere to more ‘traditional’ norms (e.g. believing women have important roles in the household, being more comfortable with White men in positions of authority) would be less likely to support women and minority candidates, while voters who want to increase the representation of these groups should be more likely to support them. Any voter could fall anywhere on a traditional-progressive spectrum. If voters who are interested in voting to increase descriptive representation were equally likely across all groups, then we would see what looks like affinity voting only in cases where voters from underrepresented groups have the opportunity to vote for a candidate from their group. For example, an Asian woman voting for an Asian woman would appear to be engaging in affinity voting, while a White man voting for an Asian woman would not.

However, we might also expect that members of underrepresented groups are more likely to fall on the progressive rather than the traditional side of the ideological spectrum. If members of underrepresented groups are particularly likely to pay attention to descriptive representation, precisely because the composition of electoral bodies is disproportionate in a way that under represents their group, then we are likely to see uneven levels of affinity voting across groups when voters have the opportunity to choose among candidates who embody different descriptive identities. However, it is important to note that voters do not always have this opportunity, either because of the (lack of) choice of candidates on a ballot, or because the electoral rules do not allow a clear opportunity to indicate such a preference when voting. We will address this point in the next section.

The core of our argument is, then, that patterns of votes for women and/or visible minorities are explained in part by variation within the electorate in the importance that voters place on candidate identity characteristics. We expect that voters will pay more attention to candidates’ identity characteristics in low-information settings where they know little about candidates’ records and policy preferences, as is more likely to occur if no incumbent is seeking re-election in a district. On average, we expect to see more evidence of affinity voting among voters who self-identify strongly with a particular group, assuming that the opportunity for affinity voting is present. We also expect to see more votes for women among voters who do not hold ‘traditional’

values. Importantly, though, the propensity to vote according to identity characteristics is modified by electoral rules, which can vary in the extent to which they allow voters who care about identity characteristics to express this preference.

### **Electoral System Effects**

Having outlined the first component of our expectation about affinity voting (whether voters prefer to support candidates with similar identities), we turn to consider the second component – whether the electoral system provides voters the opportunity to express such a preference. A general argument in the literature on electoral systems is that proportional representation (PR) systems benefit underrepresented groups such as women. Scholars have demonstrated this empirically by comparing women’s level of engagement and representation in PR and majoritarian systems (Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer 2010; McAllister and Studlar 2002). There is some dispute about the exact mechanism(s) by which underrepresented groups gain more representation. On the one hand, some argue that closed list PR systems lead to greater representation when parties put more women on their lists. In closed list PR systems, the party leaders and not the voters determine the list of candidates for the party. Because voters cannot vote for specific candidates in closed list systems, they cannot vote for men over women; therefore the choice of candidates presented to voters and the candidate’s placement on the list are important to consider. For example, if a party that is likely to win three seats includes five women on their list of 10 candidates, but places those women at the end of the list, there will not be an increase in the number of female representatives. Therefore, some researchers argue for the importance of quotas as well as placement rules (Jones 1998, Jones and Navia 1999). On the other hand, there are arguments that favor preference voting as a mechanism for increasing the representation of women and visible minorities (Shugart 1994, Taagepera 1994). If voters are able to cast ballots for individuals then they can coordinate to support specific candidates and potentially overcome any disadvantage due to placement on the party list.

In this paper, we consider an increase in the opportunity to cast a personal vote to be an increase in the permissiveness of the electoral rules. Coupled with a desire to vote for candidates from a specific group, this creates what we theorize to be the perfect opportunity for affinity voting. There is empirical support for this expectation in Golder et al. (2017). In that study, the authors examine how voters’ choices vary under three different types of proportional representation voting systems, ranging from closed list to open list with panachage and cumulation. They find that more permissive systems lead to higher levels of voting for female candidates. Even more interestingly, they find that this holds true for men *and* women, supporting the idea that there is no anti-woman bias among the electorate and that there exists, within the general public, a desire for

greater numbers of female representatives. Not surprisingly, although both effects were significant and positive, there was greater support for women candidates among female voters – thus supporting the expectation that preference and opportunity leads to an increase in affinity voting.

We find the Golder et al. findings persuasive, but also recognize that they are somewhat limited: they were found in the European context, where multiple and small parties are common, and they were realized with voters accustomed to PR elections. It is important to note that voters were faced with candidates from all the European countries, about whom they had very little information (beyond party, gender and citizenship). In general, many citizens of European Union countries tend to pay less attention to the European electoral arena than they do to national or subnational ones. Although respondents could, if they wished, access information about the candidates using a link to their official Web page on the European Parliament’s website, the expectation would have been that respondent typically knew little about the candidates on their ballots. As the authors note, “because of the way these pan-European party lists were constructed, many candidates were unfamiliar to each respondent (because they were MEPs from other countries)” (Golder et al. 2017, 117). Thus, the typical respondent in that study did not recognize the candidates on the hypothetical ballot. In this paper we address these limitations by moving to a first-past-the-post context in a North American, Westminster setting, and examine the effects of majoritarian versus PR electoral rules in a high-information context, in which voters are likely to be familiar with incumbent candidates as well as political party elites.

In essence, our main research question is whether votes for candidates from under-represented groups increase as the electoral system becomes more permissive in a majoritarian, Westminster setting. We analyze this at both the aggregate and individual levels with a series of analyses. First, we look at overall rates of voting for female candidates by electoral system, for women and men. Then, we move to the individual level and use regression analyses to test for unique effects of gender on voting for female candidates across electoral systems, holding party preferences constant. We do the same for candidates from visible minority backgrounds. Finally, we consider alternative specifications to address situations in which affinity voting shortcuts are more or less useful given the information context. Below, we provide details of our case and our research design.

### **Our Case: Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada**

Canadian elections at the federal and provincial level employ first-past-the-post electoral systems, in which voters vote for a single candidate. Coupled with strong party discipline in the Canadian parliament, elections



are largely party-centered affairs. There is also some evidence that local candidates affect vote preferences (Blais et al. 2003), but these effects are dwarfed by party and party leader considerations.

The Canadian context is ideal for extending the Golder et al. (2017) study for a number of reasons. First, as mentioned above, it provides a new geographic and electoral system context. Second, electoral reform is a topic well known to Canadians. A key promise of the Liberal Party in the 2015 federal election was electoral reform, and after it was elected with a majority government it created a parliamentary committee to engage in substantive consultation with experts and electors throughout 2016. Although the government ultimately abandoned their promise and decided against pursuing reform, the topic is nonetheless salient in the country.

Further, we ran our study in British Columbia, the province that has arguably had the longest and most intimate experience with electoral reform. A Citizens' Assembly process occurred in 2004 that led to the recommendation to adopt a form of a single transferable vote system. The issue was put to a referendum in 2005, and it was narrowly defeated when it failed to meet the super-majority threshold that had been set (57.7% were in favor, short of the 60% threshold). The issue was revisited in 2009 with another referendum, which was more soundly defeated. However, the issue is not dead. In October 2017, the ruling New Democratic Party (NDP) introduced legislation to call a referendum on proportional representation, to be held by November 2018. The NDP had promised to hold such a referendum during their recent election campaign. Thus, issues of electoral systems and their effects are salient to the respondents in our study.

The third reason that Canada is an ideal place to study affinity voting and electoral system effects is the mixed evidence of affinity voting in the past. O'Neill (1998) finds that female party leaders were disproportionately supported by women, and Cutler (2002) finds that all voters respond to their socio-demographic similarity to party leaders. However, Goodyear-Grant (2010) finds no evidence that women favoured female candidates in the 2004 and 2006 elections. Similarly, Goodyear-Grant and Croskill (2011) find no persuasive evidence of affinity voting in the 2000 and 2004 elections, even when they restricted their sample to non-partisans to remove the strong effects of partisan preference. We remain convinced by our argument above, that attitudes toward electing women will vary across the population, and have no reason to suspect that Canadians hold these preferences any less than other electorates. What is more likely, in our estimation, is that preferences for affinity voting have been stunted by the lack of opportunity to express them due to the electoral system. To sum up our discussion thus far, we expect that voters who have the strongest feelings of gender or ethnic group identification will be the most likely to demonstrate affinity voting, conditional on having a sufficiently diverse set of candidates on the ballot, and that this is most likely to occur in low-information contexts. We designed a survey experiment, along the lines of Golder et al. (2017), to investigate this expectation.

## Experimental Design

We evaluate our expectations using data from a survey experiment conducted just in advance of the May 9, 2017 British Columbia provincial election. The data was gathered using Qualtrics and distributed by Research Now, and is part of the Making Electoral Democracy Work project (Blais 2010). We restricted the geographic scope of our study to the 15 districts (ridings) in the Vancouver area, to preserve a very high level of realism in the study, as will become clear in the description below. We gathered data from 1195 respondents, 950 of whom provided a FPTP vote preference. Our study followed the methodology of Golder et al. (2017) and Blais et al. (2012) in that we presented respondents with the opportunity to express vote preferences under three different electoral systems. All respondents were presented with the candidates in their own district and asked who they intended to vote for. They were then randomly assigned to one of two groups, both of which presented electoral choices in hypothetical multi-candidate districts.

In Group 1, the district magnitude was 15, encompassing all of the districts in the Vancouver area included in our study. Respondents in this group were first invited to vote under a closed list proportional representation system, where they saw the names of all of the candidates running for the various parties.<sup>2</sup> Respondents were then invited to vote in an open list system, and instructed to select a single candidate from one of the party lists. The party lists were constructed by aggregating all candidates across the districts so, for example, respondents saw lists that included the names of 15 Liberal candidates, 15 NDP candidates, 15 Green candidates, etc. In total, 559 subjects provided a vote preference under the closed list system; 545 provided a preference under the open list system.

In Group 2, we created three hypothetical districts with a district magnitude of 5, so respondents were assigned to the multi-member district that included their own actual district. Respondents were then asked to vote in a closed list system, with party lists compiled as described above. Finally, respondents were invited to vote using an STV ballot, such that they were asked to rank candidates across party lists. This mimics the BC-STV system that was proposed in 2004. We have 512 closed list party vote preferences for this group, and 380 unique STV first preferences.<sup>3</sup>

In addition to these votes, we included a number of other questions on the survey to gather data about attitudes toward parties, leaders, electoral systems, the BC government, and in-groups – either those who share their

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<sup>2</sup> Candidates were listed alphabetically.

<sup>3</sup> Some respondents ranked more than one candidate first, more than one candidate second, etc. We restrict our sample here to those who provided a unique first place ranking.

gender or those who share their ethnicity - as well as socio-demographics. We also asked questions about respondents' gender and racial attitudes to gauge where they stood on the traditional – progressive spectrum.


The candidates put forward by the different political parties provided the required diversity. The Liberal Party ran 7 female candidates, the New Democratic Party (NDP) ran 6, and the Green Party ran 4 women in the 15 districts. There were also two female candidates from the minor parties, one Libertarian and one from Your Political Party (YPP). There was also considerable variation in ethnicity. The Liberals ran 6 visible minority candidates, the NDP 5 and the Green Party 2. From the minor parties, there were another 6 candidates (one Conservative, three YPP and two Libertarian).

From the survey data, we created variables to represent the amount of support for women in each electoral system. In FPTP, the variable is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the selected candidate in the respondent's district is a woman, 0 otherwise. In the closed list systems, the variable is equivalent to the proportion of women on the party list chosen by the respondent. In the open list system, the variable is based upon the gender of the candidate chosen by the respondent, taking a value of 1 if the candidate is a female and 0 otherwise. In the STV system, the variable is based upon the gender of the candidate ranked first by the respondent, taking a value of 1 if the candidate is a female and 0 otherwise. We followed the same procedure to develop variables to represent support for visible minority candidates.

### **Analysis: Support for Female Candidates**

We will look at the determinants of votes for women before turning to votes for visible minority candidates. Mindful of the results found in Golder et al. (2017), we begin by addressing their key finding: that votes for women increase as the electoral system becomes more permissive. We first consider the aggregate level. In Figure 1, we present the mean votes for women under the three systems in Group 1 (M=15) and Group 2 (M=5), by respondent gender. The results of Group 1 - for FPTP, closed list PR, and open list PR - are on the left, and the results of Group 2 – for FPTP, closed list PR, and first preferences under STV - are on the right.

Figure 1. Mean Votes for Women Candidates by electoral system, by gender of respondent




As we expected, support for female candidates is higher under PR than FPTP. Greater support for women in a closed list system fits with the expectation that women and underrepresented groups will benefit from a list system when parties will present balanced candidate lists. It also suggests that candidates from underrepresented groups tend to run in less competitive districts under FPTP, a finding shown to be true for women by Thomas and Bodet (2013). We see this in both district magnitude groups. However, directly opposite to the finding of Golder and her colleagues, the support for women in the open list and STV systems, which allow for preference voting within parties, is not highest overall. In Group 1, open list votes for women are somewhat higher than under FPTP rules, but in Group 2, votes for women under STV are even lower than under FPTP. We restricted the sample to respondents who voted for the same party under each system to see if this result is due to voters switching parties, but we found that the same curious result holds, if anything, even more strongly for women.

These findings suggest that instead of expressing a preference for same-gender candidates when the electoral system permits it, women actually have a bias *against* female candidates. In Group 1, with open list voting in a district size of 15, the bias is larger for women than men. This result is curious on several fronts – not only is it different than the findings of Golder et al. (2017), but it also contradicts the literature on affinity voting. Furthermore, even though there are mixed findings regarding affinity voting in Canada, in no case has there

been evidence that women (or men, for that matter) are biased against female candidates. We investigate this finding further by separating the results by the party preferred in the open list PR (Group 1) or STV (Group 2) vote.

Figure 2 shows the results by party, again for Group 1 on the left and Group 2 on the right. We focus on the voters for the two largest parties, the Liberal Party and the NDP. The main observation from these results is that the lower preference for females in open list and STV ballots is being driven by NDP supporters. This is a curious finding since the party is considered to be left-wing, and it has a clear equity policy aimed to improve female representation.

Figure 2. Mean Votes for Women by electoral system, by gender and FPTP vote of respondent



However, for supporters of the Liberal Party who voted in 15 member districts (Group 1), we see that the results are as we expected: female candidates receive the highest level of votes under open list. The same finding is observed for Green party supporters in that group (not shown).

In Group 2, the results are mixed. Liberal Party supporters report voting for female candidates more under the STV system compared to the closed list districts, but not markedly more than under FPTP. With NDP supporters, however, we see dramatic differences across the different electoral rules. Male NDP supporters

seem to be willing to support female candidates if confronted with a closed list in a PR election, but are less likely to vote for a woman in either a single-district plurality or an STV election. Green supporters (not shown) support female candidates more in closed list and STV ballots than under FPTP.

These aggregate-level results are strikingly out of step with our expectations. We see clear evidence of increased voting for women as the electoral system becomes more permissive in only 50% of the party cases (Liberal and Green supporters in Group 1 and female Green supporters in Group 2). In both groups, NDP supporters report significantly *less* support for female candidates when they are able to express preference votes. The reason for this is not clear, but given the literature cited above regarding the use of cues other than affinity, we suspect that there are some features of NDP candidates that the voters may be responding to other than gender. Looking at the candidates in greater detail, we see that the NDP had six female candidates in the Vancouver area, one of whom was a multi-term incumbent, and five male incumbents, three of whom were multi-term. This ratio is clearly imbalanced toward male incumbents. Similarly, the Liberal Party had seven female candidates, one of whom was a multi-term incumbent, and four male incumbents (only one multi-term). It is possible that voters responded more strongly to the cue of experience (incumbency) when given the opportunity to cast a preference vote.

We move our analysis to the individual-level to investigate this possibility. If we control for the presence of an incumbent, perhaps we will reveal underlying support for female candidates by female voters. We ran logit models with ward and party fixed effects, weighted by demographics and vote choice, for votes for women in open list PR (Group 1) and STV first preferences (Group 2) separately.

Table 1. Propensity to Vote for a Woman under Open List PR

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	Coeff	SE	Coeff	SE	Coeff	SE	Coeff	SE
Female	-0.00	0.24	-0.04	0.25	-0.27	0.28	-2.47	1.65
Vote FPTP Lib	1.35*	0.54	1.41**	0.51	1.33*	0.53	1.89**	0.58
Vote FPTP NDP	-0.40	0.46	-0.43	0.44	-0.70	0.48	-0.30	0.51
Fraction women CLPR	-1.10	1.92	-0.80	1.91	-0.76	2.02	-1.50	2.41
Age			-0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.01	-0.02 <sup>†</sup>	0.01
Education - College			0.08	0.41	0.13	0.46	0.17	0.51
Education - Bachelor's			-0.80*	0.40	-0.93*	0.45	-1.01*	0.47
Education - Graduate			-0.66	0.43	-0.74	0.48	-0.68	0.50
Women are too easily offended					0.13	0.13	0.23 <sup>†</sup>	0.13
Women seek special favors					0.08	0.15	0.10	0.17
Women seek to gain power over men					0.08	0.15	-0.01	0.16

Women complain about discrimination when they lose	-0.19	0.14	-0.34*	0.16
Feminists are a valuable part of Canadian society	0.20 <sup>†</sup>	0.11	0.12	0.12
Incumbent candidate			-0.66	0.66
Incumbent*Female			-0.11	0.98
Familiar with Candidates			-0.50	0.31
Care about Who Wins Election			-0.08	0.13
Like a Local Candidate			0.17	0.42
Like*Female			-1.24 <sup>†</sup>	0.65
Familiar*Female			0.27	0.49
Care*Female			0.32 <sup>†</sup>	0.17
Constant	-0.51	0.60	0.29	0.74
N	471		471	400
Pseudo R-sq	0.10		0.13	0.17

Note: Entries report coefficients and standard errors (in second column).

<sup>†</sup>p<0.1, \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

For each dependent variable, we ran several models to show how the female variable (our key measure of affinity voting) was affected by including control measures for age, education, and attitudes toward women (four of which are taken from the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory developed by Glick and Fiske (1996)). In Model 4, we include the incumbent variable, a variable to indicate that the respondent said they were familiar with the candidates, and a measure of how much the respondent cared about the election. We also included interaction variables for each of these variables and gender to test for differential effects. Table 1 shows the results for open list PR.

What we find is that very few variables are significant, and voter gender alone never is. Higher education tends to be associated with a lower propensity to vote for a female candidate. Two attitudes regarding women emerge as significant predictors of voting for female candidates, one in the expected direction ('Women complain about discrimination when they lose') and the other one in the opposite direction ('Women are too easily offended'). There is no evidence that women are more inclined to vote for incumbent candidates than men are. Interestingly, the interaction between 'Cares about who wins the election' and gender is significant and positive: there seems to be some (small amount of) gender affinity only among voters who care who wins the election.

Table 2 presents the results for STV votes. Again, gender alone is not significant, and higher education tends to be associated with a lower propensity to vote for a woman candidate. The same two attitudes regarding women emerge as significant predictors of voting for female candidates under STV as under OLPR, but now both in the expected direction. Attitudes towards women seem to matter more than gender itself in explaining the

propensity to vote for a woman. Note that even controlling for attitudes and incumbency, neither voter gender nor the interaction term with gender is significant. As was the case under OLPR, we observe a significant and gender specific effect of the intensity of the voter's interest in the election. Male voters who care about who wins the election are less likely to vote for a female candidate, whereas the opposite is true for female voters. We also find an interesting pattern regarding familiarity with the candidates. Male voters who know the candidates are more likely to vote for a female candidate, whereas the opposite is true for female voters. These findings suggest the following pattern: among voters who have little information and who do not care much about the election, we observe no differences between the votes of male and female voters. But interest in the election and the lack of information seem to trigger some gender affinity voting. These results are interesting because they qualify the results in Golder et al. where strong unconditional gender affinity voting was observed. In the present study, we observe some elements of affinity voting only among informed and interested voters.

Table 2: Propensity to Vote for a Woman under Single Transferable Vote

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	Coeff	SE	Coeff	SE	Coeff	SE	Coeff	SE
Female	0.49	0.36	0.39	0.36	0.26	0.42	-1.08	2.42
Vote FPTP Lib	0.40	0.57	0.37	0.56	0.31	0.75	-1.09	0.79
Vote FPTP NDP	-0.42	0.54	-0.41	0.51	-0.61	0.69	-1.97**	0.69
Fraction women CLPR	5.23***	0.96	5.43***	0.97	5.32***	0.91	6.72***	1.02
Age			0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.02
Education - College			-0.35	0.66	-0.60 <sup>†</sup>	0.67	-0.96	0.76
Education - Bachelor's			-0.94	0.68	-1.32	0.67	-1.84*	0.78
Education - Graduate			-0.94	0.72	-1.14	0.71	-1.64*	0.74
Women are too easily offended					-0.30	0.19	-0.34 <sup>†</sup>	0.20
Women seek special favours					-0.02	0.20	0.02	0.21
Women seek to gain power over men					0.33	0.21	0.24	0.25
Women complain about discrimination when they lose					-0.37*	0.17	-0.36 <sup>†</sup>	0.22
Feminists are a valuable part of Canadian society					-0.13	0.12	-0.17	0.14
Incumbent candidate							-0.55	1.15
Incumbent*Female							0.82	1.33
Familiar with Candidates							2.68***	0.81
Care about Who Wins Election							-0.29*	0.13
Like a Local Candidate							-0.29	0.92
Like*Female							-0.16	1.11
Familiar*Female							-2.69**	0.99
Care*Female							0.55**	0.18



Constant	-							
	3.21***	0.74	-2.99*	1.33	-0.58	1.74	-0.67	2.34
N	319		317		273		244	
Pseudo R-sq	0.23		0.26		0.31		0.39	

Note: Entries report coefficients and standard errors (in second column).

† p<0.1, \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001


This makes sense if one remembers that our objective in designing the survey experiment for this project was to improve upon the external validity in previous studies. To that end, we sought a more representative sample of respondents and made sure that the candidates would be familiar to the respondents. By restricting our sample to the districts in the Vancouver area, the probability that respondents would be familiar with candidates in other districts was high. In contrast, in Golder et al. (2017), voters were asked to cast ballots in a fictional European Parliament election with Europe-wide parties. While the idea of such parties has been discussed, it is not reality. Further, the parties used in the European analysis were based upon the groupings within the EP and the candidates were randomly drawn from the list of sitting Members of the European Parliament. Thus, it is likely that the respondents in our BC study had more information about the parties and candidates than in the European study. Indeed, we find that familiarity with the candidates affects same-gender voting. Recall from our theoretical discussion of affinity voting above that one reason for affinity voting is that casting a vote for a candidate like oneself is an information shortcut. It is possible that familiarity with a local candidate provided enough information for many of our respondents to decide how to vote, and that they did not require an information shortcut. In our sample, 48% of respondents reported being familiar with their own constituency candidates only, while 40% said they were familiar with most or all of the candidate names. Also informative is that in Group 1, 77% of respondents cast their open list vote for the same candidate they chose under FPTP; in Group 2, 73% of respondents ranked their FPTP preference first. According to the results in Table 2, the lack of familiarity with the candidates tends to trigger some same-gender voting. Recall that familiarity did not matter for the voters in Group 1 (see Table 1) though.

In Tables A3 and A4 in the appendix, we replicate the same analyses as in Tables 1 and 2 on the subsample of voters who voted under FPTP for one of the main two parties. We find very similar results regarding the impact of attitudes towards women and familiarity with the candidates.

If we look at support for particular candidates in the most permissive electoral rules setting, that is, open list PR in the large (15 member) district, we see that there is a candidate from each large party that gets a substantially larger set of votes than any of the other candidates. The candidate from the Liberal Party list getting the plurality (29%) of the preferential votes is Suzanne Anton, who should be well known to many of the Vancouver voters. She previously served in the Legislative Assembly of British Columbia and was appointed

British Columbia's Attorney General and Minister of Justice. The NDP candidate getting 29% of the preferential votes is Adrian Hix, who was first elected to the Legislative Assembly of British Columbia in 2005, and served as the leader of the British Columbia New Democratic Party from 2011-2014. The spike in support for well-known candidates is consistent with the argument that information matters, and that voters are more likely to support well-known incumbents from their preferred party, if such a candidate is on the ballot, than to vote according to other criteria.

Figure 5: Fraction of preferential votes received by the Liberal and NDP Candidates under OLPR.



Note: The Liberal candidate getting 29% of the preferential votes is Suzanne Anton and the NDP candidate getting 20% of the preferential votes is Adrian Hix.

### Analysis: Support for Visible Minority Candidates

Now that we have examined evidence for the impact of electoral rules on voters' propensity to engage in gender affinity voting, we turn to an examination of electoral rules and electoral support for visible minority candidates. The type of analysis we conduct is similar, but instead of taking account of gender, we consider whether voters self-identify as a visible minority, and if candidates are visible minorities. In Table 3, we show results of the propensity to vote for a visible minority candidate under open list proportional representation, in

the large (15-member) district. In Table 4 we show results of the propensity to vote for a visible minority candidate under STV.

Table 3. Propensity to Vote for a Visible Minority Candidate under Open List PR

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	Coeff	SE	Coeff	SE	Coeff	SE	Coeff	SE
Visible minority status	0.32	0.28	0.3	0.27	0.15	0.3	0.48	1.7
Vote FPTP Lib	-0.38	0.51	-0.43	0.54	-0.51	0.54	-0.22	0.55
Vote FPTP NDP	0.02	0.48	0.06	0.49	0.08	0.5	0.52	0.55
Fraction visible minority CLPR	2.97*	1.36	2.88*	1.33	2.39+	1.37	3.19*	1.43
Female			-0.36	0.27	-0.35	0.31	-0.1	0.33
Age			0	0.01	0	0.01	0	0.01
Education - College			0.75	0.51	0.85	0.54	1.02	0.65
Education - Bachelor's			0.66	0.48	0.94+	0.52	1.15+	0.63
Education - Graduate			0.71	0.51	0.90+	0.52	1.30*	0.63
Visible minorities in Canada have certain advantages because of the colour of their skin					0.07	0.1	0.08	0.11
Racial problems in Canada are rare isolated situations					0.13	0.12	0.04	0.14
I am angry that racism exists					-0.06	0.12	-0.08	0.13
Canada should have more immigrants than we have now					-0.28*	0.11	-0.23*	0.12
Incumbent candidate							-1.58*	0.64
Incumbent* Respondent Visible minority							-0.38	0.89
Familiar with Candidates							-0.28	0.34
Care about Who Wins Election							-0.04	0.15
Like a Local Candidate							0.05	0.54
Like*Respondent Visible minority							0.21	0.77
Familiar* Respondent Visible minority							0.55	0.58
Care* Respondent Visible minority							-0.1	0.18
Constant	-	0.69	-	0.72	-2.07+	1.19	-1.11	1.96
	2.34***		2.80**					
			*					
N	458		458		406		355	458
Pseudo R-sq	0.03		0.04		0.08		0.13	0.03

Note: Entries report coefficients and standard errors (in second column).

†p<0.1, \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

If the fraction of visible minorities on the closed list is higher, voters are more likely to choose a visible minority candidate under the open list scenario. Higher education levels tend to be associated with a larger propensity to vote for visible minority candidates. Respondents who do not identify as visible minorities are less likely to vote for an incumbent who is a visible minority. The questions that were designed to elicit attitudes towards visible minorities are largely insignificant, with the perplexing exception of respondents who agree with the statement “Canada should have more immigrants than we have now” who are less likely to vote for a visible minority candidate.

Few variables are significant when looking at the determinants of votes under the STV system. NDP voters are more likely to support a visible minority candidate. We also observe that familiarity with the candidates is associated with a higher propensity to vote for a visible minority candidate.

In Tables A5 and A6 in the appendix, we replicate the same analyses as in Tables 3 and 4 on the subsample of voters who voted under FPTP for one of the main two parties. The results are quite similar, the main difference being that in Group 1, the presence of an incumbent candidate in one’s ward significantly decreases the probability of voting for a visible minority candidates.

According to the results shown thus far, the story seems to be that voters tend to cast their preferential vote either for the candidate from their own ward, or for one well-known candidate in the party (Suzanne Anton for the Liberal Party and Adrian Hix for the NDP). For information about the fraction of voters who cast preferential votes for the candidate from their constituency, see Tables A1 and A2 in the appendix. Specifically, we examine the propensity for Liberal Party (Table A1) and NDP (Table A2) voters to cast their preferential vote to the candidate from their own constituency. Since women and visible minority candidates are less visible than other candidates from the respondent’s own party (except for Suzanne Anton), this explains the decrease in the votes for women and visible minority candidates when one moves from closed list PR to open list PR.

Table 4. Propensity to Vote for a Visible Minority Candidate under Single Transferable Vote

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	Coeff	SE	Coeff	SE	Coeff	SE	Coeff	SE
Visible minority status	-0.01	0.27	-0.05	0.28	-0.04	0.3	-1.25	1.61
Vote FPTP Lib	0.26	0.4	0.38	0.42	0.38	0.46	0.64	0.55
Vote FPTP NDP	0.59	0.4	0.65	0.41	0.88*	0.44	1.15*	0.52
Fraction visible minority CLPR	1.32*	0.58	1.25*	0.59	1.20+	0.64	1.07	0.72
Female			0.26	0.26	0.15	0.29	0.07	0.33
Age			0	0.01	0	0.01	-0.01	0.01
Education - College			-0.22	0.44	-0.41	0.48	-0.42	0.54
Education - Bachelor's			-0.22	0.4	-0.35	0.43	-0.38	0.46
Education - Graduate			-0.18	0.42	-0.24	0.46	-0.32	0.52
Visible minorities in Canada have certain advantages because of the colour of their skin					0.06	0.09	0.05	0.1
Racial problems in Canada are rare isolated situations					0.15	0.1	0.16	0.12
I am angry that racism exists					0.02	0.11	0	0.11
Canada should have more immigrants than we have now					0.04	0.1	-0.01	0.11
Incumbent candidate							0.12	0.58
Incumbent* Respondent Visible minority							-0.61	0.9
Familiar with Candidates							0.64+	0.38
Care about Who Wins Election							0	0.1
Like a Local Candidate							-0.03	0.38
Like*Respondent Visible minority							0.71	0.66
Familiar* Respondent Visible minority							-0.26	0.56
Care* Respondent Visible minority							0.21	0.16
Constant	-1.44***	0.34	-1.22+	0.7	-2.18*	1.08	-2.72+	1.39
N	426		424		369		321	
Pseudo R-sq	0.03		0.04		0.05		0.09	

Note: Entries report coefficients and standard errors (in second column).

+p<0.1, \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

We find it useful to also examine the propensity to vote for the same candidate – so voting for the same candidates under open list PR that one voted for under FPTP. It is likely that a respondent’s ward candidate is more familiar to her than candidates from other wards. These results are shown in Table 5. Visible minority respondents and respondents who are well informed about the candidates are less likely to vote for the same candidate that one voted for under FPTP.

Table 5: Propensity to Vote under Open list PR for the same candidate as under FPTP

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Coeff	SE	Coeff	SE	Coeff	SE
Female	0.07	0.32	0.02	0.31	0.01	0.34
Visible minority	-0.95**	0.31	-0.90**	0.30	-0.78*	0.34
Vote FPTP Lib	-0.65 <sup>†</sup>	0.38	-0.88*	0.38	-0.59	0.41
Vote FPTP NDP	1.52**	0.49	1.54**	0.49	1.83***	0.50
Age			0.03**	0.01	0.03*	0.01
Education - College			0.68	0.50	0.67	0.59
Education - Bachelor's			0.22	0.48	0.24	0.55
Education - Graduate			-0.29	0.46	-0.04	0.54
Incumbent candidate					-0.01	0.49
Familiar with Candidates					-1.11**	0.36
Care about Who Wins Election					-0.01	0.09
Like a Local Candidate					0.76*	0.36
Constant	1.32***	0.36	0.10	0.68	1.17	1.04
N	458		458		398	
Pseudo R-sq	0.16		0.21		0.25	

Note: Entries report coefficients and standard errors (in second column).

<sup>†</sup>p<0.1, \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

## Preliminary Conclusions

In this project, we explore the possibility that electoral rules have an effect on the propensity of voters to vote for women and visible minorities. We draw on several strands in the literature on electoral rules and descriptive representation to develop our theoretical expectations. We follow the approach taken in a recent article by Golder et al. 2017, in which individual respondents were asked to vote under different electoral rules, so that we could isolate the effect of electoral rules and avoid the complexity of other differences across national contexts. In that article, the authors found that voters were more likely to vote for women when the electoral rules allowed them more flexibility in choosing candidates. This finding applied to all voters, though the effect was stronger for women.

Two key differences between the Golder et al. study and this one are that (i) the baseline electoral system we begin with is majoritarian, rather than PR, and that (ii) our respondents are much more knowledgeable, facing a more realistic election setting. We ran the survey shortly before a real election and asked voters to cast hypothetical ballots involving candidates that would be known from the campaign. In addition, we chose a context in which the electorate had recently been engaged in public debates about changing their electoral

system. Thus our respondents should have had higher levels of information both about the election and about alternative electoral rules.

Within our sample, we expected voters who wished to engage in affinity voting, or to vote in a way to explicitly attempt to increase (or decrease) the level of descriptive representation, would cast more votes for women when the electoral rules are more open. In this sense, we expected replication of the results for flexible (or open) electoral rules and voting for women that were found by Golder et al. (2017). However, we find mixed support for our expectation. At the aggregate level, there is some evidence that, for supporters of some parties, there is more support for female candidates as the electoral system becomes more permissive. At the individual level, however, there is little confirmation of this.

Research on the effects of information and incumbency on voting behavior suggests that voters in a high-information electoral context are less likely to rely on candidate attributes such as gender or ethnicity when making their choice at the ballot box. Given the greater information context of our study compared to Golder et al. (2017), it is possible that our respondents were less likely, on average, to vote for women. Nonetheless, we still expected to see more support for women candidates under the more open electoral rules. We tested whether this explained the weakness of our individual-level results and found that only caring about the outcome of the election, not incumbency or familiarity with a local candidate, supported the idea of gender affinity voting.

The findings of this paper surprised us, but perhaps we should not have had such strong expectations given the existing research about gender affinity voting in the Canadian context. We expected that starting with a majoritarian electoral system may have had an impact on the results, but we nonetheless expected that preferences for supporting in-group members would be equally distributed among all electorates. We also expected that the incentives provided by electoral systems would be universal and would engage those attitudes. Clearly, more research remains to be done, both in terms of alternative specifications that might better isolate preferences for female candidates and especially in terms of moving to examine the importance of ethnic affinity voting. The results found by McGregor et al. (forthcoming) in the Toronto 2014 election also suggest that the incidence of gender and ethnic affinity voting are not equivalent.

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## Appendix - Question Wordings

### *Electoral System Ballots*

#### **Group 1**

**Closed List PR, M=15:** “In a closed list proportional representation (PR) electoral system, voters are asked to choose between parties that present lists of candidates. Voters cast 1 vote for their preferred party and the proportion of votes are used to determine how many seats are awarded to each party. Seats are then given to the candidates listed first until each party’s seat allocation is exhausted. If such an electoral system was used in your area in BC, your district might have 15 seats and occupy the area currently covered by all of the districts in the Vancouver area. How would you vote if you received the following ballot? Please scroll to the right to see all the candidates. After reading the ballot, please choose one party from the drop down menu below.”

**Open List PR, M=15:** “In an open list proportional representation (PR) electoral system, voters are asked to indicate which candidate they prefer on lists provided by parties. Voters cast 1 vote for a preferred candidate. The proportion of votes given to all candidates of a party are used to determine overall vote support. Those totals are used to determine how many seats are awarded to each party. Seats are then given to the candidates that receive the most personal votes until each party’s seat allocation is exhausted. If such an electoral system was used in your area in BC, your district might have 15 seats and occupy the area currently covered by all of the districts in the Vancouver area. How would you vote if you received the following ballot? Please scroll to the right to see all the candidates. After reading the ballot, please choose one candidate from the drop down menu below.”

#### **Group 2**

**Closed List PR, M=5:** “In a closed list proportional representation (PR) electoral system, voters are asked to choose between parties that present lists of candidates. Voters cast 1 vote for their preferred party and the proportion of votes are used to determine how many seats are awarded to each party. Seats are then given to the candidates listed first until each party’s seat allocation is exhausted. If such an electoral system was used in your area in BC, your district might have 5 seats and occupy the area currently covered by Vancouver-Fairview, Vancouver-False Creek, Vancouver-Langara, Vancouver-Point Grey and Vancouver-Quilchena. How would you vote if you received the following ballot? Please scroll to the right to see all the candidates. After reading the ballot, please choose one party from the drop down menu below.”

**STV, M=5:** “In a Single Transferable Vote electoral system (STV), voters are asked to rank the candidates presented on party lists. They can rank as many candidates as they wish, and can choose candidates from different parties if they wish. Seats are then awarded based upon a quota of votes and surplus votes are redistributed to second and third preferences until all seats are allocated. If such an electoral system was used in your area in BC, your district might have 5 seats and occupy the area currently covered by Vancouver-Fairview, Vancouver-False Creek, Vancouver-Langara, Vancouver-Point Grey and Vancouver-Quilchena. How would you vote if you received the following ballot? Please rank the candidates in order of preference. Please scroll to the right to see all the candidates.”

### *Attitude Questions*

Questions asked on a scale of agreement, from "Disagree Strongly" (1) to "Agree Strongly" (6)

“Women are too easily offended.”

"Many women are actually seeking special favours, such as hiring policies that favour them over men, under the guise of asking for equality."

"Women seek to gain power by getting control over men."

"When women lose to men in a fair competition, they typically complain about being discriminated against."

"Feminists are a valuable part of Canadian society."

Table A1: Fraction of preferential votes received by the Liberal Candidates under OLPR, by ward

Candidate from ward	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	# of voters
				VM	VM	F	F	F	F	F				VM	F	
Ward																
1 Vancouver-Point Grey	36	9	0	0	0	41	0	0	0	9	0	0	0	5	0	22
2 Vancouver-Quilchena	0	45	0	0	0	41	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	9	0	22
3 Vancouver-Fairview	0	0	50	17	0	25	0	0	0	8	0	0	0	0	0	12
4 Vancouver-Langara	0	0	0	25	8	42	0	0	8	0	8	0	0	8	0	12
5 Vancouver-Kensington	0	0	10	10	60	10	0	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	10
6 Vancouver-Fraserview	0	4	0	4	0	83	0	0	0	9	0	0	0	0	0	23
7 Vancouver-Kingsway	0	4	13	13	8	25	8	0	8	4	4	0	4	4	4	24
8 Vancouver-Hastings	0	0	0	0	0	17	0	25	0	33	0	0	0	25	0	12
9 Vancouver-Mount Pleasant	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	75	0	25	0	0	0	0	4
10 Vancouver-False Creek	0	0	0	4	0	26	0	4	0	61	0	0	0	4	0	23
11 Vancouver-West End	5	9	9	0	0	18	0	0	0	14	36	5	0	0	0	21
12 West Vancouver-Sea to Sky	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	50	25	0	25	4
13 West Vancouver-Capila	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	91	9	0	11
14 North Vancouver-Lonsdale	0	0	0	0	7	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	86	0	14
15 North Vancouver-Seymour	0	7	0	0	0	7	0	0	0	7	0	0	0	0	80	15
<b>Total</b>	4%	7%	5%	5%	4%	29%	1%	2%	3%	12%	5%	1%	6%	10%	6%	229

Note: The table reads as follows. Among the 22 voters living in ward 1 (Vancouver-Point Grey) who voted for the Liberal party under OLPR, 36% gave their preferential vote to the candidate from their own ward (ward 1), 9% gave their preferential vote to the candidate from ward 2, 41% from the candidate from ward 6, etc.

Table A2: Fraction of preferential votes received by the NDP Candidates under OLPR, by ward

Candidate from ward	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	# of voters
		F		VM	VM	VM			F	F		F	VM	VM		
Ward																
1 Vancouver-Point Grey	81	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	6	16
2 Vancouver-Quilchena	20	20	0	0	0	0	40	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	20	5
3 Vancouver-Fairview	23	0	54	0	0	8	8	0	0	0	8	0	0	0	0	13
4 Vancouver-Langara	8	0	0	62	8	0	0	0	0	0	8	0	0	8	8	13
5 Vancouver-Kensington	9	0	9	9	18	27	9	0	0	0	9	0	0	0	9	11
6 Vancouver-Fraserview	4	13	13	4	0	54	13	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	24
7 Vancouver-Kingsway	3	3	0	0	0	6	76	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	12	33
8 Vancouver-Hastings	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	71	7	0	7	0	0	0	7	14
9 Vancouver-Mount Pleas	8	0	8	0	0	0	23	8	54	0	0	0	0	0	0	13
10 Vancouver-False Creek	7	7	7	13	0	7	7	7	7	27	13	0	0	0	0	15
11 Vancouver-West End	4	0	4	0	4	4	0	0	0	0	71	4	4	0	7	28
12 West Vancouver-Sea to Sky	20	0	0	0	0	0	20	0	0	0	0	0	20	20	20	5
13 West Vancouver-Capila	0	0	0	0	0	0	33	0	0	0	0	0	11	33	22	9
14 North Vancouver-Lonsdale	15	15	0	0	0	0	15	0	0	0	8	0	0	38	8	13
15 North Vancouver-Seymour	0	0	0	0	7	0	7	0	7	0	0	0	0	7	71	14
<b>Total</b>	12%	4%	6%	5%	2%	9%	20%	5%	5%	2%	12%	0%	1%	5%	11%	226

Note: The table reads as follows. Among the 16 voters living in ward 1 (Vancouver-Point Grey) who voted for the NDP party under OLPR, 81% gave their preferential vote to the candidate from their own ward (ward 1), 6% gave their preferential vote to the candidate from ward 7, 6% from the candidate from ward 9, etc. Table

A3. Propensity to Vote for a Woman under Open List PR, Liberal and NDP FPTP voters only

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	Coeff	SE	Coeff	SE	Coeff	SE	Coeff	SE
Female	0.07	0.27	0.04	0.27	-0.11	0.31	-2.77	2.03
Vote FPTP NDP							-	
	-1.82***	0.32	-1.87***	0.32	-2.02***	0.34	2.20***	0.38
Fraction women CLPR	-2.15	2.61	-1.74	2.69	-1.86	3.00	-2.80	3.37
Age			-0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.01	-0.02	0.01
Education - College			0.31	0.46	0.31	0.52	0.15	0.57
Education - Bachelor's			-0.57	0.43	-0.65	0.50	-1.00 <sup>†</sup>	0.52
Education - Graduate			-0.29	0.47	-0.39	0.55	-0.64	0.56
Women are too easily offended					0.23 <sup>†</sup>	0.13	0.25 <sup>†</sup>	0.13
Women seek special favours					0.03	0.17	0.08	0.18
Women seek to gain power over men					0.07	0.16	-0.06	0.18
Women complain about discrimination when they lose					-0.21	0.16	-0.27	0.18
Feminists are a valuable part of Canadian society					0.16	0.12	0.06	0.12
Incumbent candidate							-0.48	0.76
Incumbent*Female							-0.10	1.18
Familiar with Candidates							-0.62 <sup>†</sup>	0.37
Care about Who Wins Election							-0.09	0.14
Like a Local Candidate							0.09	0.45
Like*Female							-0.95	0.71
Familiar*Female							0.72	0.64
Care*Female							0.27	0.19
Constant	1.28	1.23	1.78	1.31	0.90	1.74	4.82*	2.40
N	382		382		325		288	
Pseudo R-sq	0.12		0.14		0.17		0.21	

Note: Entries report coefficients and standard errors (in second column).

<sup>†</sup>p<0.1 \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

Table A4: Propensity to Vote for a Woman under Single Transferable Vote, Liberal and NDP FPTP voters only

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	Coeff	SE	Coeff	SE	Coeff	SE	Coeff	SE
Female	0.15	0.38	0.06	0.39	0.03	0.46	-2.83	2.69
Vote FPTP NDP	-0.73 <sup>†</sup>	0.38	-0.68 <sup>†</sup>	0.41	-0.94 <sup>†</sup>	0.49	-1.05 <sup>†</sup>	0.54
Fraction women CLPR	5.38***	1.13	5.65***	1.11	5.86***	1.09	6.54***	1.06
Age			0.02*	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.03 <sup>†</sup>	0.02
Education - College			0.04	0.70	-0.13	0.68	-0.17	0.72
Education - Bachelor's			-0.45	0.68	-0.80	0.65	-1.09	0.71
Education - Graduate			-0.39	0.73	-0.59	0.69	-1.09	0.67
Women are too easily offended					-0.46*	0.22	-0.47*	0.23
Women seek special favours					0.14	0.17	0.05	0.22
Women seek to gain power over men					0.37	0.25	0.37	0.27
Women complain about discrimination when they lose					-0.50*	0.20	-0.44 <sup>†</sup>	0.24
Feminists are a valuable part of Canadian society					-0.13	0.13	-0.11	0.15
Incumbent candidate							-0.66	1.21
Incumbent*Female							0.44	1.37
Familiar with Candidates							2.38***	0.70
Care about Who Wins Election							-0.29 <sup>†</sup>	0.15
Like a Local Candidate							-0.35	1.06
Like*Female							-0.07	1.26
Familiar*Female							-1.73 <sup>†</sup>	0.90
Care*Female							0.58**	0.22
Constant	-2.73***	0.47	-3.76***	1.03	-1.16	1.45	-2.19	2.26
N	267		265		231		211	
Pseudo R-sq	0.24		0.27		0.33		0.41	

Note: Entries report coefficients and standard errors (in second column).

<sup>†</sup>p<0.1, \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001



Table A5. Propensity to Vote for a Visible Minority Candidate under Open List PR, Liberal and NDP FPTP voters only

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	Coeff	SE	Coeff	SE	Coeff	SE	Coeff	SE
Visible minority status	0.36	0.29	0.32	0.29	0.13	0.33	1.31	1.76
Vote FPTP NDP	0.41	0.28	0.45	0.29	0.57+	0.32	0.78*	0.38
Fraction visible minority	-0.53	2.76	-1.14	2.54	-2.43	2.93	-1.37	2.74
CLPR								
Female			-0.24	0.29	-0.24	0.33	0	0.36
Age			0	0.01	-0.01	0.01	0	0.01
Education - College			0.84	0.54	0.85	0.57	1.04	0.71
Education - Bachelor's			0.56	0.52	0.77	0.56	1.17+	0.7
Education - Graduate			0.73	0.55	0.86	0.56	1.35+	0.71
Visible minorities in Canada have certain advantages because of the colour of their skin					0.08	0.11	0.07	0.12
Racial problems in Canada are rare isolated situations					0.13	0.12	0.07	0.14
I am angry that racism exists					0.04	0.13	0.03	0.14
Canada should have more immigrants than we have now					-0.32**	0.11	-0.32**	0.12
Incumbent candidate							-2.06**	0.75
Incumbent* Respondent Visible minority							0.07	1.02
Familiar with Candidates							-0.27	0.38
Care about Who Wins Election							0.05	0.14
Like a Local Candidate							0.01	0.6
Like*Respondent Visible minority							0.08	0.85
Familiar* Respondent Visible minority							0.09	0.66
Care* Respondent Visible minority							-0.16	0.17
Constant	-1.37	1.14	-1.41	1.14	-0.69	1.76	-0.07	2.18
N	370		370		330		291	
Pseudo R-sq	0.01		0.02		0.07		0.14	

Note: Entries report coefficients and standard errors (in second column).

† p<0.1, \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001

Table A6. Propensity to Vote for a Visible Minority Candidate under Single Transferable Vote, Liberal and NDP FPTP voters only

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	Coeff	SE	Coeff	SE	Coeff	SE	Coeff	SE
Visible minority status	0.11	0.29	0.06	0.31	0	0.32	-1.41	1.73
Vote FPTP NDP	0.34	0.28	0.27	0.3	0.44	0.31	0.42	0.35
Fraction visible minority	1.16+	0.61	1.05+	0.62	1.13+	0.66	0.97	0.75
CLPR								
Female			0.31	0.28	0.26	0.3	0.18	0.35
Age			-0.01	0.01	0	0.01	-0.01	0.01
Education - College			-0.28	0.49	-0.49	0.53	-0.56	0.59
Education - Bachelor's			-0.35	0.44	-0.48	0.48	-0.45	0.5
Education - Graduate			-0.33	0.46	-0.45	0.51	-0.61	0.56
Visible minorities in Canada have certain advantages because of the colour of their skin					0.06	0.09	0.05	0.11
Racial problems in Canada are rare isolated situations					0.12	0.11	0.14	0.13
I am angry that racism exists					0.02	0.11	0.01	0.12
Canada should have more immigrants than we have now					0.04	0.11	-0.02	0.12
Incumbent candidate							-0.1	0.63
Incumbent* Respondent Visible minority							-0.42	0.95
Familiar with Candidates							0.71+	0.42
Care about Who Wins Election							0.01	0.11
Like a Local Candidate							-0.04	0.41
Like*Respondent Visible minority							0.75	0.72
Familiar* Respondent Visible minority							-0.31	0.62
Care* Respondent Visible minority							0.22	0.17
Constant	-1.17***	0.32	-0.71	0.82	-1.45	1.21	-1.79	1.59
N	345		343		303		269	
Pseudo R-sq	0.02		0.02		0.04		0.08	

Note: Entries report coefficients and standard errors (in second column).

† p<0.1, \* p<0.05, \*\* p<0.01, \*\*\* p<0.001