

Information, Mobilization, and Demand for Redistribution: A Survey Experiment in South Africa

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Abstract

This paper presents a survey experiment in South Africa that focuses on the role of mobilization for demand for redistribution. Previous literature has found that providing information on inequality raises concerns about inequality but does not lead to a change in tax preferences. We argue that mobilization might provide the missing link between information and political behavior regarding demand for redistribution. We operationalize mobilization from an individual perspective as the belief that a decrease in inequality is feasible. If this belief is absent, information about inequality might simply increase the pessimism of respondents and remain inconsequential for policy preferences. We test this idea with a survey experiment in two townships in Cape Town, which includes three treatments. The first treatment provides information on local inequality. The second treatment provides information on inequality in comparative perspective, including information on the (much lower inequality) in neighboring countries. The third is elite support for redistribution with video messages of South African leaders about the need to fight inequality. Consistent with previous literature, we find that information on local inequality increases concern for inequality but has no effects on tax preferences. Information on inequality in comparative perspective and the videos shake the belief that a decrease in inequality is feasible and consequently lead to a change in tax preferences. While the mechanism regarding information on inequality in comparative perspective is as expected, the one for the videos is puzzling: videos make people believe that inequality is more, instead

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of less, inevitable, and this leads to lower tax preferences. We conjecture that this is due to a lack of credibility of the leaders considered which makes viewers more pessimistic and has a demobilizing effect.

1 Introduction

There is increasing concern with the rising income inequality observed during recent decades in many countries of the world. This concern has not been followed however by increasing levels of progressive redistribution. This is puzzling because the standard framework for thinking about redistribution would suggest that increasing inequality should lead to higher demand for redistribution and, ultimately, to more observed redistribution (Meltzer and Richard, 1981). In fact, this puzzle applies more generally, to comparisons between countries as much as to trends over time.

In response to these observations, a large literature has emerged trying to refine our understanding of how levels of redistribution are determined. An important part of that literature has focused on the demand side: on how preferences for redistribution are formed. In a recent review article, Alesina and Giuliano (2009) survey several models and theoretical arguments from this literature. Starting with seminal contributions such as the role of expected upward mobility (Benabou and Ok, 2001), the authors emphasize factors such as: perceptions on the fairness of the income distribution, political indoctrination, and perceptions regarding negative externalities of inequality, among others.

From an empirical point of view, the attempts to uncover the role of such factors have been largely observational (for example Alesina and Ferrara (2005)). Acknowledging the difficulty to interpret these estimates causally, a strand of studies has emerged that provides experimental evidence based on survey experiments. Survey experiments are particularly well suited to answer causal questions about the role of information and perceptions on attitudes towards a variety of political issues.¹ Thus, such experiments have studied empirically the role of providing different types of information and of priming on demand for redistribution and related social policy preferences. The type of information provided in these experiments include the true position of households in the income distribution (Cruces et al., 2013) and the demographic characteristics of welfare recipients (Kuklinski et al., 2000); the type of framing/priming concerns importantly the way taxes are presented to respondents (McCaffery and Baron, 2006) (McCaffery and Baron, 2004).

In an important recent contribution, Kuziemko et al. (2013) study the role of providing information on the income distribution for demand for redistribution in the US. Using a series of survey experiments the authors find that providing

¹The political science literature using survey experiments has grown considerably in the last decade. See among many others Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010 (attitudes toward immigration); Anduiza, Gallego, and Muoz 2013, Lupu 2014, (attitudes toward corruption); Naoi and Kume 2011 (attitudes toward economic liberalization); for drives of voting behavior more generally, see Gaines, Kuklinski, and Quirk 2007; Mutz 2011; Barabas and Jerit 2010.

information on the increase in US inequality leads respondents to consider inequality as a more serious problem. However, this change in perception does not carry over to actual tax policy preferences.² This holds true despite the fact that the information they provide includes evidence suggesting that inequality is not harmful for growth.

This paper presents a survey experiment on demand for redistribution in South Africa focusing on a factor so far disregarded by the literature on demand for redistribution: the importance of mobilization. This concept is central in the literature on the sociology and social psychology of collective action which highlights the fact that grievances - in our case knowing about the extent of inequality and even being concerned about it - is not enough to drive political behaviour: Individuals need to be mobilized, which implies that they need to believe in the success of collective action. For our purpose, we operationalize the concept of “being mobilized” as the belief that a decrease in inequality is a feasible enterprise. This corresponds to the idea of “group efficacy” from the social psychology literature on collective action (see Tajfel (1974), Klandermans (1984) and Van Zomeren et al. (2008)).³ Mobilization in general and beliefs regarding the inevitability of inequality in particular may provide an answer to the puzzle from Kuziemko et al. (2013) that providing information on inequality raises concerns about it, but does not lead to changes in tax preferences. We argue and test the idea that the missing link between information and stated tax preferences is precisely the belief in the inevitability of inequality. If this belief is present, information about inequality might simply increase the pessimism and grievances of respondents but remain inconsequential for policy preferences.

Individuals might hold the belief that high inequality is inevitable particularly in places where inequality and redistribution are not prominent in elite discourse, thus making it appear that there is no possibility of reducing it (see Bidner et al. (2013) for a model that could justify such mechanism). This channel points to the importance of (credible) leadership discourse for understanding changes in preferences for redistribution and can thus help explain why increases in inequality might not be accompanied by higher demand for redistribution. The importance of mobilization for demand for redistribution can also address an additional puzzle in the context of South Africa: while having one of the largest levels of inequality in the world, South Africa displays only average levels of demand for redistribution. We argue this can be due to the shift in elite discourse from a primarily redistributive one at the beginning of the transition to one mainly focused on jobs and growth subsequently.

We present the results of a survey experiment conducted in two different townships in Cape Town: Khayelithsa, a ‘African Black’ township, and Delft,

²The only tax preference that is affected concerns the estate tax, that apparently only affects about affects the top one thousandth richest families

³Two types of mechanism could push such individuals to state low preferences for redistribution. First, the need to avoid cognitive dissonance can lead them to justify their inaction with low stated preferences for redistribution (see Mullainathan et al.(2009)). Second, the emotional cost of perceiving the high inequality as inevitable may push individuals to justify it as legitimate and thus demanding a lower tax (see Major et al. (2001)).

a “Coloured” township. African Black and Coloured groups in Cape Town differ on average in many respects and this is reflected in our two samples. The Khayelitsha sample is poorer, more likely to live in informal settlements, and more likely to feel politically close to the ANC, the party ruling South Africa since the democratic transition with an overwhelming African Black base.

The full study will consist of two waves. The first wave of around 1600 respondents was interviewed in March and April 2014 – just before the South African general elections. A second wave is planned early 2015. This will allow us to examine whether our survey yields different results in an environment with high political mobilization (i.e. pre-election) and one without.

Our survey includes three treatments. One treatment shows information on local inequality: differences in income and asset ownership between different neighborhoods in Cape Town. This treatment is meant to capture the effect of local information on redistributive preferences. Our second and third treatments attempt to influence the belief that a decrease in inequality is feasible in two ways. The first is information on inequality in comparative perspective, including information on neighboring countries where inequality is much lower. Through this treatment, we attempt to increase respondents’ perception that very high inequality is not a fact of life. The second treatment in this vein is elite support for redistribution with video messages of South African leaders about the need to fight inequality. With this, we are attempting to counteract the dominant economic discourse in South Africa since the late 1990s which has emphasized growth, fiscal discipline, and employment instead of inequality and redistribution.

Our findings corroborate those of Kuziemko et al. (2013) regarding the role of local information. We find that local information on inequality increases the chances of viewing it as a serious problem but has no effects on tax preferences or support for redistributive policies. This evidence, emerging as it does in a vastly different setting from the one in Kuziemko et al. (2013), provides strong support for the external validity of their findings.

The two treatments seeking to shake the belief that a decrease in inequality is feasible do show large impacts on tax preferences, in the two townships. The “international information” treatment has the expected effects: a large negative effect on believing that the high level of inequality in South Africa is inevitable, leading to an increase in support for top taxes and for the introduction of a basic income grant. In Khayelitsha, it also increases the willingness to take action. The video messages with elite support for inequality have, in contrast, the opposite effect. They *increase* the perception that inequality is inevitable and decrease support for top taxes.

The fact that tax preferences follow perceptions of inequality inevitability in the expected direction in the two treatments and that this applies to the two townships is quite strong evidence in favor of the relevance of the factor we propose. The fact that elite discourse shows such a strong negative effect on the perceptions of individuals in the two townships is however puzzling. We might have expected this to occur in Delft, where voters might feel distant from the leaders selected, but it was not expected for Khayelitsha. We conjecture that

this is due to a lack of source credibility (Druckman, 2001) the size of which we had somewhat underestimated. The divergence between policies, discourse and personal lifestyle of certain South African leaders over the last decade on the one hand, and the messages shown in our experiment on the other, might have been too large for it to have the intended effect. A follow-up with group interviews discussing the video messages suggest that participants indeed often felt depressed or neutral about the videos.

A common - and justified - critique of survey experiments contends that the effects found in these surveys might be a) transitory (i.e. the effects do not last) and b) overestimated (i.e. in the “clean” environment of the survey, subjects are not exposed to competing information, and are therefore more likely to be affected by the treatment than they would otherwise be; in addition, they might want to “agree” with the interviewer) (see Gaines et al. (2007); Barabas and Jerit (2010)). The present survey experiment addresses this critique in two ways. First, we are not concerned about transitory effects because our argument is not that our one shot treatments intend to emulate a real world effect. Instead, our argument is that without sufficient and credible (elite) support for redistribution, demand for redistribution remains low. In other words, the real life version of the treatments would be a broad change of the public discourse in South Africa that emphasizes that inequality is too high and the need for redistribution. Hence, the treatments in our survey would just be one of many “treatments” respondents would be exposed to if the dominant public discourse was leaning toward redistribution instead of growth/employment.

Second, we introduce an important novelty in our survey: the survey offers respondents to take a real action. Whereas some extant studies ask about impact on vote choice, or intention to send a petition, our survey offers respondents the possibility to act on the spot, by signing a petition or by sending an SMS in favor of or against a certain policy. Offering to take action is, of course, a tough test of how important the effects are to our respondents because it bears costs for them; for the petition, because they put out their name, for the SMS even more because respondents have to pay for it. Moreover, taking an action might require a certain level of emotion about the topic - irrespective of a treatment effect on opinions. And indeed, only one of our effects carries over to an action in a significant way in the overall analysis. However, looking at the effect by politician, we find important differences across politicians. Importantly, some politicians generate a *demobilizing* effect on taking action, in line with the argument about the relationship between video messages and pessimism regarding redistribution.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a short background of inequality and redistribution in South Africa. Section 3 describes the survey and its design. Section 4 presents the data and descriptive statistics. Section 5 shows the results, and section 6 concludes.

2 Inequality and Demand for Redistribution in South Africa

South Africa is one of the most unequal countries in the world. According to standard political economy models (Meltzer and Richard, 1981) this would lead to very high levels of redistribution. As the origins of present-day inequality lie in a colonial history and Apartheid institutional arrangements where a white minority enriched itself by denying political and economic rights to a black majority, one might expect redistribution to be even higher since the democratic transition. However, fiscal redistribution is only slightly above the low Latin American levels (Leibbrandt et al., 2011).⁴

The African National Congress (ANC) that came to power after the end of Apartheid and has governed with large majorities since made a strong emphasis on redistributive justice only initially. In 1994, it was elected on a redistribution promise in form of the reconstruction and development programme (RDP) (Natrass and Seekings, 2001). However, already in 1996, the government presented a new economic policy strategy, "Growth, Employment, and Redistribution" (GEAR). The GEAR strategy document paid only scant attention to RDP issues and education, health and welfare policies (Michie and Padayachee, 1998). Instead, its main emphasis – and the dominant economic policy discourse since its inception – is growth and employment. Only since 2013, there has been a growing discussion in the ANC leadership regarding the need for a "second" transition", implying that the transition in 1994 had indeed been a political transition only. This change of mind is probably partly due to the emergence of the "Economic Freedom Fighters" (EFF), a new party founded by Julius Malema, a former leader of the ANC's Youth League, that seeks to mobilize the large numbers of unemployed youth. The EFF questions strongly the post-Apartheid economic policies and demands the nationalization of mines and the redistribution of land without compensation.

Most of the ANC's social policies have focused on the rolling out of social grants, such as the pension fund and the child support grant, on which an increasing number of the population depends to make ends meet. While these have had an effect on poverty, the income distribution remained largely unaffected (Leibbrandt et al., 2010) and continues to follow the Apartheid pattern with the white population still being predominantly in the top decile, followed by the Indians, the Coloureds, and the African blacks being at the bottom.⁵

Against this background, it is surprising that South Africans do not have higher levels of demand for redistribution, according to standard surveys. Inspecting two variables from the 2007 World Value Survey, that are typically used

⁴Leibbrandt et al. 2011 find that taxes and transfers decreased the Gini coefficient only by around five points, which is only slightly better than redistribution in Latin America, where the average is a decrease of 2 percentage points for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, and Mexico (Goi et al., 2011). In contrast, in Europe the figure is close to 20 (ibid.).

⁵The key change in the income distribution since the end of Apartheid is the growing intragroup inequality.

in cross country studies on demand for redistribution reveals that South African demand is generally average and in fact smaller than in other non-OECD countries (see table1). Although an increasing number of service delivery protests as well as generally low levels of trust suggest dissatisfaction with government performance, this has not transformed in an increase in demand for redistribution. This mixed picture was also confirmed in focus group discussions that were carried out by the authors in June and October 2012 in preparation of this study. Although respondents were generally disappointed by the small economic returns of the democratic transition, they generally demanded jobs from the government, not redistribution through social policies.

[Table 1 around here]

3 The Survey

3.1 Data Collection

The data presented in this paper consists of around 1600 respondents that were interviewed in March and April 2014 – just before the South African general elections at the beginning of May. The sample consists of residents of two different townships in Cape Town: 1200 African Blacks in Khayelitsha and 440 Coloureds in Delft. Both are poor townships with high levels of unemployment and low income. The Coloured parts of Delft are a bit better off than Khayelitsha but much worse off than the rich white parts of Cape Town. We used an English questionnaire as basis that was translated in Xhosa and Afrikaans, a back translation was done with the feedback of the fieldworkers. Respondents could choose the questionnaire language at the beginning of the interview. The interviews lasted between 30-45 minutes⁶

The data was captured on mobile devices and directly transmitted to the server after the completion of the interview together with the GPS location. This allowed for an immediate check of the accuracy of the interview location and monitoring of data quality.⁷ About half way through the survey, we adapted the design to allow for a higher incidence of the international treatment alone. This change will be controlled for in each of the OLS regressions below.

3.2 Treatments

The survey was designed to test different drivers of demand for redistribution through three types of treatment. A first type concerns information about inequality, a second is a hybrid between information and mobilization, and a third is elite mobilization against inequality. (An overview of the survey design is presented in figure 1 below.)

⁶The surveyors' population group corresponded to that one of the respective interviewees. The data was collected by a survey company, the authors provided training for the fieldworkers.

⁷We also used standard methods of ongoing data quality checks, such as call backs by the survey company.

[Figure 1 around here]

The first set of treatments (“local”) presents information on inequality in South Africa in a variety of ways. We focus on differences between neighborhoods in Cape Town, that local residents automatically - and correctly - associate with different population groups. This is so because of the Apartheid laws that assigned population groups (“races”) specific areas of residence. Although these laws were abolished in the early 1990s, income constraints have left the homogeneity of neighborhoods induced by the Apartheid laws almost intact in most areas.

In a first step, participants were asked to guess the median income in a typically white neighborhood of Cape Town. Subsequently, they were shown the correct figure in comparison to typically Coloured areas such as Athlone and typically African areas such as Gugulethu. In a second step, differences in ownership of assets in these neighborhoods were displayed. The objective was to inform participants about the high levels of inequality between neighborhoods that they associate with their own group vs. others. (See figure 2 for an example of this treatment).⁸

[Figure 2 around here]

The second treatment “international” presents inequality in South Africa in comparison to other countries. It shows the rich-poor ratio in South Africa, as well as in some other developing and Western countries. Importantly, it includes some neighboring countries of South Africa and shows that South Africa’s rich:poor ratio is by far the worst among the countries presented. The treatment is constructed so that respondents first see the rich:poor ratio in different countries and then are asked to guess the figure for South Africa. The last screen shows them the correct bar for South Africa among the other countries as shown in figure 3. The treatment thus has two components. The first is information about inequality in South Africa, this time in international perspective. The second component intends to suggest to respondents that South Africa’s level of inequality is not a fact of life given that it is much lower in other countries.

[Figure 3 around here]

The third type of treatments “video” is elite support for redistribution. We operationalize this in form of three video speeches by members of the South African elite, one by South Africa’s president Jacob Zuma, one by archbishop Desmond Tutu, and a third by the above mentioned Julius Malema.⁹ These speeches are quite different in content and level of involvement of the speaker:

⁸We did not include the survey participants’ neighborhoods in this information for two reasons. First, we did not want respondents to think about their individual situation but about inequality more generally. Second, Delft also has areas that are African Black and it is therefore unclear which population group different respondents would associate with this neighborhood.

⁹The videos were available either in English (the original version) or in dubbed Xhosa/Afrikaans versions to the participants.

Desmond Tutu condemns the gap between rich and poor in moral terms in an engaged way, Jacob Zuma is reading from a script that announces the government’s intention to decrease inequality, whereas Julius Malema aggressively speaks up against inequality mostly in racial terms and promises a variety of redistributive policies. These speeches are intended influence respondents’ perceptions of the possibility of collective action for decreasing inequality. Importantly, these speeches are given *in addition* to either the “international” treatment or different “local” treatments.

4 Data

4.1 Descriptive Statistics

Table 2 shows some key descriptive statistics for the Delft and Khayelitsha sample compared to the data from the 2011 population census, where available. The survey’s aim was not to be fully representative of these two townships as we are not interested in them *per se*. However, we did want to avoid obtaining an overly peculiar sample. In particular, we did want to include both formal and informal dwellers. Our sampling strategy consisted of drawing randomly a set of Enumeration Areas, stratified by formality (EAs have around 200 household each) and then let fieldworkers choose every 12th house in a random walk in the EA.

[Table 2 around here]

The key difference of our samples compared to the census is that we have more women (around 10 pps more in both areas). This has to do with the fact that men are more likely to be employed and absent from the dwelling during daytime. Although we asked fieldworkers to schedule appointments with the potentially absent person selected for the interview, we only asked them to return to the house prior to sunset, for security reasons. To improve the sex ratio in our survey, we instructed fieldworkers to do as many interviews as possible during the weekends but this was only partially possible because alcohol abuse is a common problem in townships in the weekend. Given this, we are generally satisfied with the gender ratio. In Khayelitsha, the gender ratio carried over to having fewer employed persons that in the census although this could also be the result of asking the question in a different way. The level of high school graduates (“matric”) is roughly in line with census data and so is the share of informal housing in Khayelitsha; in Delft, the absence of informal housing in our sample is the result of our design which chose EAs with formal housing only in that area. The reason is that we did not want to further stratify our already small Coloured sample.

There are some notable differences in our sample between Khayelitsha and Delft in terms of employment status, mean income, formal housing and the reception of government grants. This is mainly the legacy of the Apartheid regime that invested slightly more in Coloured areas than in African areas in an attempt to co-opt them. Although both groups were politically excluded and

had no freedom of movement, Coloureds had some small privileges compared to Africans. In the post-Apartheid world, these carry over to better housing, employment and income. In this context, it is noteworthy that Delft is a relatively bad-off Coloured Area.

4.2 Outcome Variables

Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics of key outcomes variables for the control group. It is divided by neighborhood and, within Khayelitsha, whether the household was located in the formal or informal part of the neighborhood, leaving us with three distinct groups: Delft, Khayelitsha formal, and Khayelitsha informal (i.e. shacks).

The table is organized in three types of outcomes: attitudes towards inequality, policy preferences, and “action” outcomes where respondents can transmit their redistributive preferences to politicians.¹⁰

Attitudes target perceptions about the fairness of the income distribution and the prospects for decreasing inequality in South Africa. The first outcome variable of interest is a question about whether inequality is a serious problem in South Africa, emulating the surveys in Kuziemko et al. (2013).¹¹ The second is whether the rich in deserve their high incomes. Perceptions regarding change are a question about whether the high level of inequality in South Africa is inevitable and another about whether politicians care about decreasing inequality in South Africa.

Tax policy preferences are questions about an increase in the top marginal tax rate, a question about whether taxes should be generally increased to improve service delivery, a question about the introduction of a basic income grant in South Africa, and a question asking whether white South Africans ought to pay extra taxes.¹²

The fourth type of outcomes are “action” outcomes. Compared to other survey experiments, we believe that this is an important innovation of our survey. At best, other survey experiments ask whether respondents would be willing to take action but to the best of our knowledge have never followed up on this. In our survey, respondents can choose between sending an SMS (at a real cost) and signing an online petition on the surveyor’s tablet.¹³ In the petition and

¹⁰The exact wording of the outcome questions is provided in table 4.

¹¹The question is identical to that in Kuziemko et al. survey with one exception: because our pilots showed that respondents seem to confuse inequality with equality we replaced the word with “gap between rich and poor” throughout the survey.

¹²A discussion about the introduction of a basic income grant has been going on for years in South Africa, whereas there is no public debate about raising taxes for top earners. Notice that this latter group starts with around 60000 Zar per month. The white tax was proposed by Desmond Tutu as a compensation for Apartheid.

¹³The SMS was sent to a phone number belonging to the survey company with the promise that we would let politicians know what share of our respondents were supporting certain policies. We chose this method for two reasons. First, because we wanted to know how many people would, in effect, send an SMS after stating that they intended to do so. Second, because the survey took place shortly before the parliamentary elections in May 2014, we did not want

sms they can express their opinion on tax increases for the rich and the basic income grant. The table reports the share of respondents taking action *in favor of redistribution*. Moreover, the table distinguishes between those saying that they would send an SMS and those actually sending it.

[Table 3 around here.]

All variables are coded as binary variables so the values in table 3 are the shares favoring a certain position/action. There are some noticeable results in general as well as regarding differences between groups. The first important insight is the very high share (around 90 per cent) in all groups agreeing with the statement that inequality is a serious problem in South Africa. As a comparison, Kuziemko et al. (2013) find a control group mean of only 28 per cent stating that inequality is a very serious problem in the U.S.. In our survey, the very high level of concern about inequality contrasts sharply with very low shares who want to increase taxes for the rich. This pattern is present across all groups but particularly marked for the informal group, that is, the group that lives in the worst conditions and has benefited the least from the end of Apartheid. In this group, almost all respondents state that inequality is a serious problem. Consistent with this is that only around half of them state that the rich deserve their incomes, a much lower number than in the other groups. At the same time, however, this group has the lowest share of respondents seeking to increase taxes for the rich (only about 18 per cent). This suggests that - as found in the paper of Kuziemko et al (2013), attitudes/opinions about inequality are not sufficient to generate tax preferences. From the cross-section, it appears that this missing link could indeed be beliefs about the potential of change. In the control group, higher shares of respondents believing that the current high levels of inequality in South Africa are inevitable go together with lower shares of respondents seeking to increase taxes for the rich and vice-versa.

In contrast to taxes, support for the basic income grant is much higher. This is generally in line with the elite discourse in South Africa, where social grants have large place in elite discourse but increasing taxes has not. In addition, there are some interesting differences between Khayelitsha (formal and informal) and Delft that reflect the different degree of perceived integration into politics in post-Apartheid South Africa and the different socio-economic status of these groups. For example, the respondents in Khayelitsha are more willing to increase taxes in general than in Delft - possibly because most of the respondents in the former area are not paying taxes and possibly because they feel that they receive more from the state than in Delft. African black respondents are also much more willing to tax whites than are Coloured respondents - a likely result of Coloureds feeling closer to the whites in post-Apartheid South Africa.¹⁴

Regarding the action outcome, the overall large share of respondents willing to take action is remarkable, especially in the informal area and in Delft which

to cause local disruptions via potentially flooding the phones of politicians.

¹⁴Most coloureds support the "Democratic alliance", a party mostly led by whites and perceived as a "white party" in South Africa.

are perhaps the most disgruntled respondents in our survey, albeit for different reasons. The willingness to sign a petition is substantially larger than to send an SMS - resulting either from the difference in material cost associated with these actions or from the difference in action ‘type’, where a petition is more a civil society type of action whereas SMS require a certain level of trust in politicians.¹⁵. Of general importance is moreover the large gap between the intention to send an SMS to express policy preferences and those actually sending it (as low as 18 per cent of those stating that they would send it in Delft) which highlights the importance of introducing measurable actions in survey experiments as a validity check.

4.3 Randomization

Table 5 shows the demographic characteristics and some pre-treatment attitudinal variables by treatment arm. Each column corresponds to a regression of the respective variable as outcome on the four treatments: local, local+video, international, international+video. These and all regressions below are performed using OLS with robust standard errors; since outcomes are binary this implies we use a linear probability model framework.

Because of the randomization, there should not be any significant differences between the respondents in the various treatment groups and the control. This is generally correct but there are some relevant outliers. Respondents receiving the local information treatments were slightly older than the control; respondents receiving the international video treatment were about 10 per cent less likely to live in informal housing (“iron”, referring to the roof material). Some additional differences in attitudinal pre-treatment variables (work vs. luck, lazy vs. unfair) are negligible in size as these variables are coded from 1-10).

With the exception of the differences in formal housing, the randomization looks generally fine but we will nevertheless display results with and without controls for demographic characteristics when analysing the data below.

[Tables 5 around here]

5 Results

5.1 Attitudes

Table 7 shows the effect of our treatments on attitudes about inequality. Treatment variables are coded so that coefficients for the video variables are to be interpreted as the effect of the video in addition to that of the respective information on its own, which is in turn given by the coefficient of the information variables. For each outcome, we report results with and without covariates.

¹⁵In comparison, intention to sign a petition in the survey experiments of Kuziemko et al. was around 23 per cent in the control group.

Information on both local and international inequality generate a mild increase in the degree to which respondents view inequality as a problem. This effect even if small is remarkable, given that, as mentioned above, most respondents already believe that inequality is a problem in South Africa. In contrast, none of our treatments has any sizable effect on the legitimization of the income distribution: neither being exposed to the high levels of inequality in South Africa or to political elites condemning such levels of inequality makes respondents believe that the rich are undeserving.

The most relevant results concern the inevitability of inequality. While local inequality information does not affect perceptions of inevitability of inequality, international inequality information does, and very strongly so: respondents are more than 15pp less likely to think that high inequality is inevitable after seeing how much lower inequality is in other countries. Importantly, these effects essentially disappear with the video treatments. In other words, when people see that inequality is lower in other countries, they come to think that high levels of inequality are not inevitable, but when after they see their local politicians talking about it, they abandon this hope. Interestingly, this happens only after receiving the international treatment before. A possible explanation is that whereas the local treatment does not raise respondents' expectation, the international treatment does. Seeing their leaders talk about inequality only confirms reality to the local treatment group, whereas it upsets the international group (that has just seen that things are much better even in neighboring countries).

The strong discouraging effect of the videos on the feasibility of inequality change was not expected. While we anticipated no or even a negative effect for Delft, where political preferences are generally against the leaders shown in the videos, we expected a positive effect for Khayelitsha. Group interviews (three African Black, two Coloured) we conducted as a follow-up to the survey may provide some insights into these effects, although these interviews are certainly not representative. In these interviews, we showed the three videos to participants and asked them after each video how they felt about the speaker and what emotions the video had provoked in them. As shown in table 8, only a small share of respondents liked Julius Malema or Jacob Zuma and there was a fair share of respondents feeling either depressed, neutral, or bored about their messages. To some extent, this was even the case for Desmond Tutu's message, although he was well liked in both townships. We believe that such feelings betray the fact that the messages prompted pessimism about redistribution and inequality persistence instead of the perception that South Africa's elite is committed to decreasing inequality, as we had intended.

[Table 8 around here]

Results on whether politicians care about reducing inequality are to a certain extent surprising but in line with the interpretation of the video effects. Providing information about inequality, hence making inequality more salient and problematic, makes people believe that politicians care about the problem. This would appear to suggest an electorate with high degree of trust on their politicians. However, when showing them videos where politicians explicitly con-

demn inequality and say they want to do something about it this effect is not intensified; if at all the coefficients are negative although small and imprecisely estimated.

[Table 7 around here]

5.2 Policy preferences

The different treatments display very distinctive effects on policy preferences (see table 9). The local information treatment essentially has no effect on any policy preference. In contrast, the international treatment has a strong positive effect on some policy preferences, namely on top taxes and on the basic income grant. The video messages also do not show uniform effects. After the local information treatment, they have essentially no effect. In contrast, the videos have a strong *negative* effect if they are provided on top of of the international information treatment, again for top taxes and the basic income grant. Essentially, the videos undo international information treatment effect, as was the case for inevitability attitudes.

This is one of the core results of this paper. As in Kuziemko et al. (2013), providing information about local inequality increases the perception that inequality is a serious problem, but it does not affect policy preferences. In contrast, the providing information about the much lower inequality elsewhere (international treatment) affects policy preferences. We conjecture that this is because the international treatment decreases the perception that the South African level of inequality is inevitable. Indeed, this interpretation is also supported by the fact that the videos after international treatment decrease inevitability and, in turn, redistributive preferences.

Notice that only the support for top income taxes and the basic income grant were affected, but not the support for general tax increases. However, we will see below that this maybe because richer people in the sample might find it more costly to push for higher general taxes, since they would also have to pay for them.

[Table 9 around here]

5.3 Actions

This outcome was introduced in order to evaluate whether respondents were willing to bear a cost to “disseminate” their preferences. To this end, respondents were randomly offered to either sign a petition regarding two policies that they had just been asked about: the increase of the top marginal tax rate and the introduction of a basic income grant. The item was randomized in the survey in order to avoid that respondents wanting to take an action would always choose the petition, as this action was free of charge. And indeed, as shown in the descriptive statistics, there was a large discrepancy between signing the petition and the willingness to send an SMS, as well as between the declared intention to send an SMS and actually sending it.

As shown in table 10, the treatment effects on attitudes and policy preferences do generally not translate into actions in a clear-cut way but are broadly sensible. The international treatment decreases the sending of SMSs expressing support for regressive policies; the international video treatment, in turn increase support for signing the petition expressing support for regressive policies, a finding that makes sense in view of the regressive policy preferences induced by seeing the video.

To gain a better understanding of the effects of these videos, we decompose the effects in the action outcome by politician, and, additionally, look into two effects. The first, is, as above the effect on taking action for *redistributive* policies (see table 11), the second, on taking action for *regressive* policies (see table 12). It has to be noted that some of the results are not very robust across specification, likely to result from the small sample sizes, especially for the videos given after the international treatment (around fifty observations per video). Therefore, we will mostly focus on some robust core results.

The important result in this table is how one politician in particular, Julius Malema, generates highly “negative” actions. The reaction to Malema is clearly one of disengagement for redistribution with people sending less SMS supporting progressive policies. This reaction occurs regardless of whether the video is shown on top of the local or the international information treatment. In contrast, the message by Jacob Zuma, South Africa’s quite unpopular president, leaves respondents unaffected. For Desmond Tutu, the results are somewhat unclear, but the reaction also appears to go in the direction of disengagement in favor of redistribution. Bringing into the picture the effects the respective messages have on the two policy preferences respondents could act upon afterwards (i.e. the basic income grant and taxes for the rich) suggests three, complementary insights. First, there appears to be a relationship between the size of the effect on policy preferences and the willingness to take action as the Zuma message has a much smaller effect on policy preferences and no effect on actions. Second, there can be an effect on action even without an effect on policy preferences, if the leader is unpopular enough, as it is the case for Julius Malema when his message is provided after the local information treatment. Third, elite messages can have a *demobilizing* effect. We conjecture that this can be the result either of the unpopularity of the messages or the fact, that the respondents often felt depressed or neutral about the video messages rather than upset - as suggested by group interviews that we carried out to understand better the results of the video messages in the survey.

5.4 Results in different communities

As a robustness check for our results and to obtain further insights we run the analysis by community as defined above: Delft, a coloured neighborhood with only formal housing, respondents in formal housing in Khayelitsha, and informal settlements in Khayelitsha. As discussed above, these communities are different not only in their socio-economic status, but also in their attitudes to government.

Coloureds are generally more hostile to the ANC government, perceiving it to promote the interests of African Blacks only while leaving Coloureds to their own devices. South Africans living in informal settlements are those who have benefited less from transition. Often, they are more recent migrants from the rural areas and struggle to get access to services and, more generally, to the state.

Tables 13, 14, and 15 show the treatment effects on attitudes and policy preferences by community.¹⁶ The main results are present in all communities. The local information treatment increases the perception that inequality is a problem but has generally no further effects. The international information treatment decreases the perception that inequality is inevitable, and, in turn demand for increasing top taxes. The video messages, when provided after the international information treatment, undo the effect on both. We can thus be confident that our results were not driven by one particular community.

The tables also provide two additional interesting results. First, for the informal sample the international information affects not only the demand for higher top taxes, but also for general taxes. In contrast, general taxes do not respond to any treatment in any of the formal samples. This makes sense, since informal respondents are least likely to pay any sort of taxes and would thus find it less difficult to support a general increase in taxes.

Second, policy preferences, and in particular, preferences about top taxes, do not seem to respond to opinions about whether politicians find reducing inequality important. Delft (table 15) illustrates this point best. Providing information, be it local or international, increases perceptions that politicians care. However, only the international treatment leads to an increasing demand in top taxes. Similarly, videos have a tremendously negative impact on respondents perception about whether politicians care about decreasing inequality, regardless of whether they come after the international or local information treatment. But only when the video is provided on top of the international information demand for top taxes decreases. A similar point can be taken from formal Khayelitsha (table 14). After receiving the local information and a video treatment, respondents believe that politicians are serious about reducing inequality, but this does not lead them to demand higher taxes. Virtually all the cases that end up in a substantial change in top taxes are accompanied by consequent changes in inevitability perceptions. In sum, this points at the importance of other components of inevitability besides politicians will.

6 Concluding Remarks

To be completed.

¹⁶We do not include the action outcomes because the sample sizes are too small.

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Tables and Figures

Table 1: Demand for Redistribution in South Africa vs. Average World Values Survey

	Mean Incomes more equal	Mean government take care of poor
South Africa	4.5	6.1
Non-OECD	5.1	6.3
OECD	4.3	5.7
Total	4.9	6.1

Data from the 2005-2007 Wave. N Country=57. Weights used.
Both variables range from 1-10. Higher values imply more demand.




Figure 1: Survey Design

Computers




Figure 2: Example local treatment




Figure 3: International Treatment

Table 2: Mean Demographic Characteristics, by area

area	female	employed	age	household income	matric	formal housing	government grants
sample Khayelitsha	0.62	0.29	36.63	2,301	0.28	0.45	0.42
census 2011 Khayelitsha	0.51	0.40	NA	1,706*	0.35	0.45	NA
Delft	0.64	0.42	40.31	2,584	0.22	0.85	0.33
census 2011 Delft	0.51	0.38	NA	*	0.19	0.85	NA

* This is median instead of mean income. Median income is 1750 ZAR in the Khayelitsha sample and 2500 ZAR in Delft

Table 3: Outcome Variables: Descriptive statistics

Control Group	Khayelitsha informal	Khayelitsha formal	Delft
demographic			
earn	0.30	0.27	0.40
iron walls	0.24	0.30	0.23
attitudes			
politicians care inq	0.88	0.87	0.93
rich deserve	0.51	0.64	0.65
inq inevitable	0.59	0.54	0.44
inq problem	0.39	0.36	0.47
policy preferences			
higher top tax	0.18	0.20	0.36
higher general taxes	0.36	0.39	0.24
big	0.64	0.48	0.72
tax whites	0.42	0.44	0.16
actions			
sms said	0.42	0.26	0.57
sms sent	0.17	0.09	0.08
petition	0.59	0.45	0.72

Selected items from questionnaire

inq_problem Do you think the gap between rich and poor is a serious problem in South Africa?

big Some people propose a new government grant called the "Basic Income Grant". This is a grant to all South Africans. This would be different from existing social grants like the old age pension or the child support grant, because everybody would get it. Do you support the introduction of a Basic Income Grant?

tax_top In South Africa, people must pay taxes depending on their income. Rich people pay about one third of their income as taxes. For example, somebody who makes R60,000 per month pays R20,000 in taxes and keeps R40,000 for himself. Do you think RICH people should pay more, less or the same taxes?

action If you feel strongly about the Basic Income Grant or taxes for the rich, you can take an action to express your opinion.

sms You could send a SMS to your ward councillor. The way you can do this through our study is to send a SMS to the coordinator of our study and after we are done with all the interviews, we will send a message to your councillor telling him which policies people in our study support. We will not tell him your name, just how many people in our study shared your opinion. Would you like to send a SMS to express your opinion about any of these policies?

petition You can sign a petition expressing your opinion. At the end of our study, we will forward this petition to South African politicians letting them know which policies people in our study support. We will not tell them your name, just how many people in our study shared your opinion. Would you like to sign a petition?

petition_tax_increase PETITION SUPPORTING AN INCREASE IN TOP MARGINAL TAX RATE Rich people in South Africa should contribute more to helping people get out of poverty. I support an increase of taxes for people earning more than 50.000 Rand per month. This money should be used to help poor people.

petition_tax_decrease PETITION SUPPORTING A DECREASE IN TOP MARGINAL TAX RATE Rich people work hard for their income. I support a DECREASE of taxes for people earning more than 50.000 Rand per month because effort should be rewarded in South Africa.

petition_big_yes PETITION SUPPORTING THE INTRODUCTION OF A BASIC INCOME GRANT. Many South Africans are unemployed and struggle to make a living. A basic income grant would help them to make ends meet. I support the introduction of a new basic income grant.

petition_big_no PETITION AGAINST THE INTRODUCTION OF A BASIC INCOME GRANT. Government grants should be reserved for people who really need them such as old people and children. The basic income grant would deter people from looking for a job. I am against the introduction of a basic income grant.

tax_white Some people say that WHITE South Africans should pay a special tax in addition to their normal taxes. Do you agree?

tax_gen Government officials often complain that there is not enough money to improve public infrastructures like schools, roads, or sanitation. Do you think taxes should be higher so that the government has more money to improve this?

rich_deserve Do you think that the rich in South Africa deserve their high incomes?

inq_inevitable Do you think that the large gap between rich and poor in South Africa...
inevitable is inevitable – it's a fact of life
smaller could be made smaller

politicians_care Do you think that making the gap between the rich and the poor smaller is important to South African social and political leaders?

Figure 4: Outcome Questions

Table 4: Demographic characteristics by area

	Khayelitsha		Delft	
	sample	census 2011	sample	census 2011
female	0.61	0.51	0.64	0.51
employed	0.30	0.40	0.42	0.38
age	36.39		40.31	
matric	0.28	0.35	0.22	0.19
informal housing	0.57	0.55	0.01	0.15
government grants	0.40		0.33	

Table 5: Randomization

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
local info	0.018 (0.032)	2.02 (0.94)**	0.007 (0.031)	0.0059 (0.0294)	0.0091 (0.0324)	-0.0058 (0.0313)	-0.0038 (0.0695)	-0.031 (0.035)	-0.327 (0.188)*	-0.244 (0.174)
int info	0.071 (0.046)	1.33 (1.33)	-0.019 (0.044)	-0.0416 (0.0417)	0.0696 (0.0460)	0.0075 (0.0437)	0.1308 (0.0993)	-0.023 (0.051)	-0.185 (0.265)	-0.235 (0.247)
video loc	-0.011 (0.033)	-1.08 (0.97)	0.013 (0.032)	0.0298 (0.0304)	0.0057 (0.0335)	-0.0335 (0.0327)	0.0071 (0.0719)	0.032 (0.036)	0.019 (0.194)	0.327 (0.180)*
video int	-0.092 (0.057)	-0.32 (1.63)	0.035 (0.054)	0.0158 (0.0514)	-0.0943 (0.0567)*	-0.0376 (0.0548)	-0.1303 (0.1214)	0.062 (0.062)	-0.078 (0.326)	-0.015 (0.303)
outcome	female	age	earn	matric	iron	wasteful	corruptn	poum	workvsluck	lazyvsunfair
mean_ctrl	0.6	36.4	0.32	0.26	0.41	0.74	3.63	0.6	4.71	6.72
N	1644	1632	1641	1638	1644	1487	1462	1426	1618	1622

Table 6: Outcome variables in the control group, by community

	Khayelitsha informal	Khayelitsha formal	Delft
attitudes			
inq problem	0.88	0.87	0.93
rich deserve	0.51	0.64	0.65
inq inevitable	0.59	0.54	0.44
politicians care inq	0.39	0.36	0.47
policy preferences			
higher top tax	0.18	0.20	0.36
higher general taxes	0.36	0.39	0.24
big	0.64	0.48	0.72
tax whites	0.42	0.44	0.16
actions			
sms said progressive	0.42	0.26	0.57
sms sent progressive	0.17	0.09	0.08
petition progressive	0.59	0.45	0.72

Table 7: Treatment effects on attitudes

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
local info	0.031 (0.019)*	0.03008 (0.01844)	-0.027 (0.034)	-0.0329 (0.0330)	-0.024 (0.035)	-0.035 (0.034)	0.075 (0.034)**	0.083 (0.032)**
int info	0.043 (0.026)*	0.04096 (0.02618)	-0.015 (0.047)	-0.0058 (0.0465)	-0.175 (0.049)***	-0.162 (0.048)***	0.054 (0.048)	0.051 (0.046)
video and local info	0.017 (0.019)	0.01923 (0.01893)	0.049 (0.035)	0.0382 (0.0340)	-0.016 (0.036)	-0.009 (0.035)	-0.021 (0.035)	-0.015 (0.034)
video and int info	-0.014 (0.032)	-0.00062 (0.03231)	0.028 (0.059)	-0.0167 (0.0580)	0.126 (0.060)**	0.083 (0.059)	-0.070 (0.059)	-0.017 (0.057)
outcome	inq_problem	inq_problem	rich_reserve	rich_reserve	inq_inevitable	inq_inevitable	polit_care	polit_care
covariates	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
mean_ctrl	0.89	0.89	0.59	0.59	0.53	0.53	0.4	0.4
N	1613	1604	1530	1521	1353	1345	1554	1544

Table 8: Attitudes towards leaders and videos from focus groups

	Like			Feel about video					
	no	neutral	yes	angry	worried	depressed	bored	neutral	happy
Malema	0.41	0.25	0.34	0.09	0.32	0.09	0.06	0.15	0.29
Tutu	0.06	0.09	0.81	0.06	0.11	0.17	0.03	0.20	0.43
Zuma	0.50	0.31	0.19	0.09	0.17	0.29	0.17	0.14	0.14

Table 9: Treatment effects on policy preferences

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
local info	-0.0177 (0.0293)	-0.0038 (0.0280)	-0.0373 (0.0314)	-0.040 (0.031)	-0.024 (0.032)	-0.020 (0.031)	0.043 (0.032)	0.0435 (0.0315)
int info	0.1146 (0.0412)***	0.1193 (0.0395)***	0.0278 (0.0446)	0.018 (0.044)	0.100 (0.046)**	0.089 (0.044)**	0.036 (0.045)	0.0278 (0.0446)
video and local info	-0.0077 (0.0301)	-0.0028 (0.0288)	0.0086 (0.0323)	0.020 (0.032)	0.025 (0.034)	0.026 (0.032)	0.007 (0.033)	0.0127 (0.0327)
video and int info	-0.1380 (0.0505)***	-0.1191 (0.0488)**	-0.0290 (0.0548)	-0.022 (0.054)	-0.083 (0.056)	-0.083 (0.054)	-0.010 (0.055)	-0.0088 (0.0551)
outcome covariates	tax_top No	tax_top Yes	tax_gen No	tax_gen Yes	big No	big Yes	tax.white No	tax.white Yes
mean_ctrl	0.24	0.24	0.33	0.33	0.61	0.61	0.36	0.36
N	1412	1403	1595	1586	1560	1551	1594	1585

Table 10: Treatment effects on actions

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
local info	0.0085 (0.0315)	0.0143 (0.0306)	-0.015 (0.020)	-0.013 (0.019)	-0.026 (0.047)	-0.043 (0.045)	0.060 (0.034)*	0.056 (0.030)*
int info	-0.0058 (0.0437)	-0.0073 (0.0425)	-0.070 (0.027)**	-0.069 (0.026)***	0.039 (0.067)	0.043 (0.064)	0.014 (0.049)	0.030 (0.043)
video and local info	-0.0240 (0.0323)	-0.0301 (0.0314)	-0.010 (0.020)	-0.016 (0.019)	-0.039 (0.048)	-0.029 (0.046)	-0.044 (0.035)	-0.062 (0.031)**
video and int info	-0.0416 (0.0544)	-0.0411 (0.0532)	0.031 (0.034)	0.011 (0.032)	0.039 (0.082)	-0.012 (0.080)	0.132 (0.061)**	0.051 (0.053)
outcome	sms_sent_progrsv	sms_sent_progrsv	sms_sent_regrsv	sms_sent_regrsv	petition_progrsv	petition_progrsv	petition_regrsv	petition_regrsv
covariates	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
mean_ctrl	0.12	0.12	0.06	0.06	0.58	0.58	0.12	0.12
N	745	741	743	739	793	789	793	789

Table 11: Treatment effects of different videos on progressive redistribution action

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
localTRUE	-0.0176 (0.0293)	-0.0036 (0.0281)	-0.024 (0.032)	-0.020 (0.031)	-0.0345 (0.0460)	-0.0094 (0.0416)	0.0088 (0.0315)	0.0146 (0.0306)	-0.0268 (0.0466)	-0.0434 (0.0447)
tutu_loc	-0.0185 (0.0433)	-0.0061 (0.0415)	-0.020 (0.049)	-0.019 (0.046)	-0.0458 (0.0673)	-0.0695 (0.0607)	-0.0204 (0.0462)	-0.0391 (0.0447)	-0.1640 (0.0699)**	-0.1516 (0.0675)**
malema_loc	-0.0089 (0.0407)	-0.0146 (0.0388)	0.034 (0.045)	0.034 (0.042)	-0.0893 (0.0637)	-0.1109 (0.0574)*	-0.0634 (0.0437)	-0.0709 (0.0423)*	-0.0041 (0.0635)	0.0071 (0.0610)
zuma_loc	0.0042 (0.0444)	0.0147 (0.0425)	0.058 (0.049)	0.059 (0.046)	0.0095 (0.0683)	-0.0243 (0.0616)	0.0194 (0.0469)	0.0272 (0.0453)	0.0399 (0.0682)	0.0433 (0.0657)
internationalTRUE	0.1147 (0.0413)***	0.1194 (0.0395)***	0.100 (0.046)**	0.089 (0.044)**	0.0192 (0.0639)	0.0224 (0.0579)	-0.0059 (0.0437)	-0.0069 (0.0424)	0.0382 (0.0670)	0.0426 (0.0642)
tutu_int	-0.1711 (0.0671)**	-0.1441 (0.0643)**	-0.081 (0.076)	-0.094 (0.072)	-0.0230 (0.1066)	-0.0217 (0.0964)	0.0396 (0.0731)	0.0327 (0.0709)	0.1218 (0.1138)	0.0374 (0.1094)
malema_int	-0.1843 (0.0839)**	-0.1640 (0.0817)**	-0.135 (0.089)	-0.128 (0.085)	-0.2268 (0.1316)*	-0.2399 (0.1189)**	-0.1176 (0.0903)	-0.1441 (0.0875)*	0.0484 (0.1292)	0.0151 (0.1276)
zuma_int	-0.0786 (0.0674)	-0.0704 (0.0645)	-0.053 (0.075)	-0.047 (0.071)	-0.0259 (0.1064)	-0.0667 (0.0959)	-0.0782 (0.0729)	-0.0546 (0.0706)	-0.0330 (0.1075)	-0.0714 (0.1037)
outcome	tax_top	tax_top	big	big	sms_said_progrsv	sms_said_progrsv	sms_sent_progrsv	sms_sent_progrsv	petition_progrsv	petition_progrsv
covariates	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
mean_ctrl	0.24	0.24	0.61	0.61	0.4	0.4	0.12	0.12	0.58	0.58
N	1412	1403	1560	1551	742	738	745	741	793	789

Table 12: Treatment effects of different videos on regressive redistribution action

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
localTRUE	-0.0176 (0.0293)	-0.0036 (0.0281)	-0.024 (0.032)	-0.020 (0.031)	-0.036 (0.026)	-0.031 (0.024)	-0.015 (0.020)	-0.01303 (0.01868)	0.060 (0.034)*	0.056 (0.030)*
tutu_loc	-0.0185 (0.0433)	-0.0061 (0.0415)	-0.020 (0.049)	-0.019 (0.046)	0.026 (0.039)	-0.014 (0.035)	0.024 (0.029)	-0.00055 (0.02730)	-0.058 (0.052)	-0.089 (0.045)**
malema_loc	-0.0089 (0.0407)	-0.0146 (0.0388)	0.034 (0.045)	0.034 (0.042)	0.054 (0.037)	0.053 (0.033)	-0.028 (0.027)	-0.02734 (0.02582)	-0.090 (0.047)*	-0.081 (0.041)**
zuma_loc	0.0042 (0.0444)	0.0147 (0.0425)	0.058 (0.049)	0.059 (0.046)	-0.022 (0.039)	-0.015 (0.035)	-0.024 (0.029)	-0.01751 (0.02768)	0.028 (0.050)	-0.012 (0.044)
internationalTRUE	0.1147 (0.0413)***	0.1194 (0.0395)***	0.100 (0.046)**	0.089 (0.044)**	-0.035 (0.037)	-0.048 (0.033)	-0.070 (0.027)**	-0.06906 (0.02603)***	0.014 (0.049)	0.030 (0.043)
tutu_int	-0.1711 (0.0671)**	-0.1441 (0.0643)**	-0.081 (0.076)	-0.094 (0.072)	0.025 (0.061)	-0.012 (0.055)	0.017 (0.046)	-0.01235 (0.04334)	0.169 (0.084)**	0.048 (0.073)
malema_int	-0.1843 (0.0839)**	-0.1640 (0.0817)**	-0.135 (0.089)	-0.128 (0.085)	0.011 (0.076)	-0.023 (0.068)	0.081 (0.057)	0.04934 (0.05346)	0.119 (0.095)	0.073 (0.085)
zuma_int	-0.0786 (0.0674)	-0.0704 (0.0645)	-0.053 (0.075)	-0.047 (0.071)	-0.054 (0.061)	-0.044 (0.055)	0.015 (0.046)	0.01355 (0.04315)	0.109 (0.079)	0.041 (0.069)
outcome	tax_top	tax_top	big	big	sms_said_regrsv	sms_said_regrsv	sms_sent_regrsv	sms_sent_regrsv	petition_regrsv	petition_regrsv
covariates	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
mean_ctrl	0.24	0.24	0.61	0.61	0.1	0.1	0.06	0.06	0.12	0.12
N	1412	1403	1560	1551	742	738	743	739	793	789

Table 13: Treatment effects in informal settlements

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
local info	0.026 (0.031)	0.02675 (0.03059)	-0.0183 (0.0594)	-0.034 (0.057)	0.077 (0.054)	0.072 (0.054)	-0.038 (0.042)	-0.028 (0.040)	-0.062 (0.052)	-0.057 (0.050)	0.028 (0.052)	0.018 (0.051)
int info	0.059 (0.042)	0.05088 (0.04160)	-0.2072 (0.0785)***	-0.183 (0.075)**	0.040 (0.072)	0.026 (0.072)	0.108 (0.055)*	0.088 (0.053)*	0.058 (0.071)	0.054 (0.067)	0.128 (0.070)*	0.150 (0.069)**
video and local info	0.036 (0.030)	0.04030 (0.03024)	-0.0041 (0.0599)	-0.020 (0.057)	-0.045 (0.054)	-0.027 (0.054)	-0.026 (0.042)	-0.036 (0.040)	0.073 (0.052)	0.053 (0.049)	-0.046 (0.051)	-0.025 (0.051)
video and int info	-0.047 (0.052)	-0.00073 (0.05184)	0.1192 (0.0990)	0.023 (0.096)	-0.018 (0.090)	0.042 (0.091)	-0.121 (0.069)*	-0.104 (0.066)	-0.112 (0.087)	-0.116 (0.083)	-0.181 (0.088)**	-0.211 (0.087)**
outcome covariates	inq_problem No	inq_problem Yes	inq_inevitable No	inq_inevitable Yes	polit_care No	polit_care Yes	tax_top No	tax_top Yes	big No	big Yes	tax_gen No	tax_gen Yes
mean_ctrl	0.88	0.88	0.59	0.59	0.39	0.39	0.18	0.18	0.64	0.64	0.36	0.36
N	681	678	508	505	646	643	573	570	664	661	672	669

Table 14: Treatment effects in formal settlements: Khayeltsha

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
local info	0.0733 (0.0314)**	0.0786 (0.0318)**	0.00031 (0.06177)	-0.0079 (0.0597)	0.06125 (0.05944)	0.085 (0.059)	-0.013 (0.050)	0.0220 (0.0474)	-0.0079 (0.0572)	-0.0013 (0.0540)	-0.103 (0.057)*	-0.085 (0.056)
int info	0.0148 (0.0496)	0.0026 (0.0495)	-0.15786 (0.09998)	-0.1581 (0.0952)*	0.00085 (0.09612)	0.013 (0.094)	0.073 (0.080)	0.0889 (0.0744)	0.1506 (0.0901)*	0.1536 (0.0839)*	-0.062 (0.091)	-0.039 (0.088)
video and local info	0.0009 (0.0322)	-0.0030 (0.0323)	-0.07341 (0.06450)	-0.0467 (0.0619)	0.10512 (0.06137)*	0.080 (0.061)	0.017 (0.052)	0.0082 (0.0485)	-0.0353 (0.0594)	-0.0175 (0.0556)	0.028 (0.058)	0.028 (0.057)
video and int info	0.0576 (0.0568)	0.0709 (0.0569)	0.15520 (0.11287)	0.1556 (0.1080)	0.06090 (0.10961)	0.087 (0.108)	-0.098 (0.091)	-0.0791 (0.0855)	-0.0378 (0.1034)	-0.0737 (0.0967)	0.098 (0.104)	0.072 (0.101)
outcome covariates	inq_problem No	inq_problem Yes	inq_inevitable No	inq_inevitable Yes	polit_care No	polit_care Yes	tax_top No	tax_top Yes	big No	big Yes	tax_gen No	tax_gen Yes
mean_ctrl	0.87	0.87	0.54	0.54	0.36	0.36	0.2	0.2	0.48	0.48	0.39	0.39
N	514	512	435	433	495	493	457	456	509	508	505	503

Table 15: Treatment effects in formal settlements: Delft

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
local info	-0.012 (0.034)	-0.0066 (0.0339)	-0.054 (0.060)	-0.049 (0.061)	0.094 (0.064)	0.096 (0.053)*	-0.0017 (0.0644)	0.024 (0.064)	0.0067 (0.0582)	0.024 (0.055)	-0.052 (0.052)	-0.061 (0.051)
int info	0.041 (0.046)	0.0543 (0.0463)	-0.147 (0.081)*	-0.129 (0.082)	0.101 (0.087)	0.096 (0.072)	0.1557 (0.0889)*	0.182 (0.089)**	0.0782 (0.0807)	0.059 (0.076)	-0.032 (0.071)	-0.048 (0.070)
video and local info	-0.003 (0.037)	0.0023 (0.0371)	0.013 (0.065)	0.033 (0.066)	-0.141 (0.070)**	-0.121 (0.059)**	0.0071 (0.0695)	0.014 (0.070)	0.0232 (0.0648)	0.044 (0.061)	0.061 (0.057)	0.095 (0.056)*
video and int info	-0.041 (0.062)	-0.0351 (0.0621)	0.091 (0.109)	0.107 (0.111)	-0.305 (0.117)***	-0.219 (0.098)**	-0.2131 (0.1172)*	-0.196 (0.118)*	-0.0901 (0.1077)	-0.041 (0.102)	0.071 (0.094)	0.088 (0.094)
outcome	inq_problem	inq_problem	inq_inevitable	inq_inevitable	polit_care	polit_care	tax_top	tax_top	big	big	tax_gen	tax_gen
covariates	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
mean_ctrl	0.92	0.92	0.44	0.44	0.47	0.47	0.36	0.36	0.73	0.73	0.24	0.24
N	418	414	410	407	413	408	382	377	387	382	418	414