

Echoes of Violent Conflict

The Effect of the Israel-Palestine Conflict on Hate Crimes in the U.S.

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Work in progress – Please do not circulate

Abstract

Can violent conflict trigger animosity and hate crimes beyond its vicinity? We address this by examining if the Israel-Palestine conflict causes hate crime towards Jews and Muslims in the U.S. Using daily data between 2000-2016, we find that conflict fatalities and U.S. mass media coverage of the conflict trigger hate crimes the following days. Specifically, anti-Jewish hate crimes increase after Israeli attacks. The effect is driven by days with large attacks or intensive media coverage of violence. Anti-Islamic hate crime increases after Palestinian attacks, but the effect of conflict news reporting is weaker. By showing that victimization can transcend the locality of the conflict, we contribute to the literature on the spillovers of violent conflict, triggers of hate crime, and the effects of media on violent behavior.

Keywords: Conflict, Hate crime, Violence, Israel, Palestine, Media

JEL Codes: D74, K42, J15, L82

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1 Introduction

Since 2010, 47 countries have experienced violent conflicts with more than 25 battle-related deaths per year, of which more than half have been classified as ethnic (Vogt et al., 2015). At least 230 million people have ethnic ties to these conflicts and reside in a country outside of the conflict where the clashing ethnic group is also present.¹ Existing research shows that conflicts are more likely to spillover to neighbouring regions and countries with ethnic ties to the conflict (e.g., Black, 2013). One explanation is that violent conflict generates grievances among individuals with identity ties to the clashing groups, thereby triggering violence between the groups in their country of residence (Bosker and de Ree, 2014). Due to patterns of global migration, individuals with identity ties to violent conflicts can be found across the globe. Ethnic and religious conflict may thus trigger grievances among group members geographically removed from the conflict. Consequently, we ask if the dynamics of these conflicts induce violent and criminal behavior beyond its immediate vicinity.

We address this by focusing on one of the most longstanding and divisive violent conflicts fought along ethnic and religious lines in the postwar era: the Israel-Palestine conflict. Using an event study design with daily data between 2000 and 2016, we examine if the Israel-Palestine conflict causes hate crime toward Jews and Muslims in the U.S. Anti-Jewish and anti-Islamic hate crimes are the two most common religiously motivated hate crimes in the U.S., accounting for approximately 12% and 4% of the estimated 250,000 annual hate crimes (BJS, 2013).²

We estimate the effect both of fatal Israeli and Palestinian attacks, collected from the human rights organization *B'Tselem*, and the daily length of U.S. television evening news coverage of the conflict, collected from the *Vanderbilt Television News Archive*, on anti-Jewish and anti-Islamic hate crime incidents as recorded by the FBI. We find that fatal Israeli attacks today and yesterday significantly increase anti-Jewish hate crimes today, and that fatal Palestinian attacks today and yesterday significantly increase anti-Islamic hate crimes today. Our analysis suggests that this effect is primarily driven by days with large

¹These estimates are based on calculations the Ethnic Power Relations Dataset (Wucherpfennig et al., 2012) and the Joshua Project (joshuaproject.net). First, using the Ethnic Power Relations Dataset, we identify all conflicts that are currently ongoing or ended after 2010. We then map the ethnic groups involved in the conflict to data from the Joshua project, which contains data on the size of ethnic groups in all countries of the world. We then sum the number of individuals which belong to the ethnic group involved in the conflict, that reside in another country than the conflict country, where the other ethnic group involved in the conflict is also residing. For example, consider the conflict between the Kurds and the Turkish government in Turkey. We identify all countries besides Turkey where both Kurds and Turks reside, and sum the size of these groups in all such countries excluding Turkey.

²The FBI (2018) defines hate crime as *"a criminal offense committed against a person, property, or society that is motivated, in whole or in part, by the offenders bias against a race, religion, disability, sexual orientation, or ethnicity/national origin."*

attacks. Fatalities from Israeli attacks today and yesterday in the 99th percentile or above increases the number of anti-Jewish hate crimes by 0.96, equivalent to an increase of 40% from the sample mean. The analogous Palestinian attack increases the number of anti-Islamic hate crime by 0.22, equivalent to an increase of 53% from the sample mean. We find little evidence that attacks below the 95th percentile matter for anti-Jewish or anti-Islamic hate crimes.

Between 2000 and 2016, the conflict was, on average, reported on at least once a week in the ABC, NBC or CBS evening news. The analysis of conflict news reporting shows that daily conflict coverage significantly increases hate crimes against Jews but not against Muslims. This effect also appears to be driven by days with extensive news reporting. Conflict news reporting today and yesterday in the 99th percentile or above increases anti-Jewish hate crime by 0.56, equivalent to an increase of 24% from the sample mean. The conflict news reporting in our sample predominantly focuses on Israeli attacks, which likely explains the insignificant effect on anti-Islamic hate crime. Using a dictionary approach, we examine whether the increase in anti-Jewish hate crime is driven by the type of news content or simply the salience of the conflict or Israel. We find that anti-Jewish hate crimes are driven by reporting on violence, while news reporting on the conflict or Israel, which does not mention any violence, has no effect on anti-Jewish hate crime. This suggests that it is the content of the reporting that matters, and not the salience of Israel in the news itself.

The identifying assumption is that the timing of conflict news, Israeli attacks and Palestinian attacks are not endogenous to hate crime incidents or hate crime reporting in the U.S. This would, for example, be a concern if both conflict fatalities and hate crime levels increase on religious holidays for reasons unrelated to the conflict. Or if attacks are timed to important events in the U.S., as shown in a recent paper by [Durante and Zhuravskaya \(2018\)](#), which would also affect the levels of hate crime. To alleviate such concerns, we control for Religious and Federal holidays, as well as major political events and U.S. news pressure. Our results are furthermore robust to i) dropping conflict periods, ii) dropping individual states that dominate hate crime reporting, and iii) using alternative model specifications and lag structures. In addition, we find no effect on anti-Black and anti-Hispanic hate crimes, suggesting that the results are not driven by joint periodicity of fatal attacks in the conflict and hate crimes in the U.S.

This paper contributes to several literatures. First, we contribute to the literature on the spillover effects of violent conflict by offering causal evidence on how information on ethnic violence faraway increases antagonism towards associated groups and induce violent behavior. Previous research has focused on the cross-border contagion effect of civil conflict (see e.g. [Black \(2013\)](#); [Silve and Verdier \(2018\)](#)), as well as the economic and financial

spillover effects of civil conflict (see e.g. [Guidolin and La Ferrara \(2007\)](#); [Guidolin and La Ferrara \(2010\)](#)). In particular, the existence of cross-border ethnic ties has been identified as an important transmitter of conflict and violence, (see e.g. [Lake and Rothchild \(1998\)](#); [Kuran \(1998\)](#); [Buhaug and Gleditsch \(2008\)](#); [Bosker and de Ree \(2014\)](#)). Empirically, several studies have concluded that cross-border conflict contagion is more likely when ethnic ties between countries are strong (e.g. [Buhaug and Gleditsch \(2008\)](#); [Bosker and de Ree \(2014\)](#) and [De Groot \(2011\)](#)). These studies, however, face important endogeneity problems, since unobserved country characteristics correlated with ethnic composition may affect the risk of conflict outset. In addition, while the theoretical literature has proposed a vast array of mechanisms related to the cross-border flows of resources, people and information (see e.g. [Weidmann \(2015\)](#) and [Lake and Rothchild \(1998\)](#)), the empirical studies are unable to identify the specific channels through which ethnic ties facilitate the spread of violence. Our contribution relates to the flow of information, and specifically the mechanism proposed by [Kuran \(1998\)](#), where information on ethnic violence abroad might increase the political salience of ethnic identity at home, increasing antagonism between associated groups and induce violence.

Second, our paper also naturally relates to the broad literature on the behavioral effects of media by demonstrating how rapid media reporting on polarizing conflict events might induce violent behavior.³ Specifically, our paper is related to research examining the effect of media on ethnic violence (e.g. [Yanagizawa-Drott \(2014\)](#)) and ethnic animosity (e.g. [DellaVigna et al. \(2014\)](#)). [Gentzkow and Shapiro \(2004\)](#) study the role of media in Arabic countries in reinforcing anti-American sentiments and argue that exposure to Western media might reduce such sentiments. Relevant within this literature is also research examining the effects of media on violence and criminal behavior, including [Dahl and DellaVigna \(2009\)](#) who study the effect of movie violence on violent crime, and [Bhuller et al. \(2013\)](#) who study the effect of internet use in triggering sex crime.

Third, our paper contributes to the literature on triggers of hate crime and ethnic hatred. We contribute to the literature by examining how dynamics in a two-sided distant ethnic/religious conflict trigger hate crimes towards associated groups. Importantly, and in contrast to previous studies on the effects of terrorist attacks, our setting makes it unlikely that the offender is triggered by changes in their perceived threat of violence or intrusion from the relevant out-group. Theoretical research on hate crime perceives hate crime as reactionary and retributive ([King and Sutton, 2013](#)). Retributing a grievance caused by the behavior, or perception of behavior, from an out-group member creates a sense of social

³For a recent comprehensive overview of the literature on the economic and social impacts of media, see [DellaVigna and La Ferrara \(2015\)](#)

control or closure for the hate crime offender (Black, 1983), especially when legal means of rectification are not available. This act of retribution does not necessarily have to be directed against the individuals that gave rise to the grievance, but can instead be committed against an innocent member of the out-group (Lickel et al., 2006). Consequently, hate crime may vary over time with the occurrence of polarizing, antecedent events, which generate grievances and trigger hate crime. Using event study designs, this expectation has been corroborated in a few studies. Disha et al. (2011) show that hate crimes against Arabs and Muslims in the U.S. increased after the 9/11 attacks. Hanes and Machin (2014) find the same pattern in England after both the 9/11 and the 7/7 attacks in London for anti-Arab and anti-Islamic hate crime, and Ivandic et al. (2019) find a similar pattern on hate crime levels in Manchester also after ten different jihadist terrorist attacks in predominantly western European countries. King and Sutton (2013) find that racially and religiously motivated hate crimes in the U.S. increase after racially contentious trial verdicts and jihadist terrorist attacks. McConnell and Rasul (2018) expand this literature in an interesting way by examining if the increased animosity towards Muslims in the U.S. post 9-11 had spillover effects on Hispanics or Blacks. They find evidence for increased discrimination in the Federal criminal justice system towards Hispanics but not for Blacks, and argue that this reflects 'contagious animosity' running from Muslims to Hispanics. This paper expands this literature by studying a hate crime trigger that differs in several notable ways. First, while the above studies examine extreme and sometimes violent antecedent events, such as Jihadist terrorist attacks, our study is the first to focus on an on-going two-sided conflict.⁴ Second, existing research has largely focused on unexpected terrorist attacks in the context of peace, where the hate crimes and terrorist attacks both occur in culturally, politically, and geographically similar environments. Third, rather than studying single, unexpected, and extreme events, we exploit the variation in conflict dynamics of almost two decades to study how different levels of similar conflict events and reporting trigger hate crime. Do these differences matter for the mechanism being studied? We argue that extreme, unexpected terrorist attacks targeted against a civilian population in a culturally and politically proximate country may induce people to update their beliefs about the out-group threat and the probability of an attack in their own locality. In our study, while not impossible, we deem such perceptions of direct or indirect threat less likely to be drivers of hate crime offenses.

Our paper also relates more broadly to the literature on the long-term determinants of ethnic hatred, as well as the literature on how social identities, and temporal variation in

⁴The Uppsala Conflict Data Program defines an armed conflict as the use of armed force between military forces of two parties, of which at least one is a state, and that has resulted in at least 25 battle-related deaths per year (Gleditsch et al., 2002). Thus, it excludes most of the terrorist attacks studied in the previous literature which are often singular events targeting civilians.

their salience, can affect behavior.⁵.

We structure the article in the following manner. The following section provides a brief background on the conflict. Section 3 presents the data used in the empirical analysis. Section 4 presents the research design and the results of the study. In Section 5 we discuss and examine the robustness and sensitivity of the main results, and Section 6 concludes the paper with a brief discussion of implications, limitations and plans for future work.

2 Conflict Background and Dynamics

The Israel-Palestine conflict is primarily a territorial conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, rooted in the partitioning of Mandatory Palestine into Israel and Palestine by the UN in 1947. The existing borders between the state of Israel and the occupied Palestinian Territories were established in a series of wars in 1948, 1967 and 1973 between Israel and neighboring Arab states, that led to Israel occupying the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.

The conflict is characterized by periodically intense fighting between the Israeli Defence Forces and Palestinian militants. Our sample period contains several such intense conflict periods. In September 2000, Palestinians initiated an uprising against the Israeli occupation, the Second Intifada, which lasted until 2005, claiming approximately 3000 Palestinian and 1000 Israeli civilian and military lives. The Second Intifada was initiated after Ariel Sharon, then candidate for Israeli Prime Minister, made a visit to the Temple Mount. This led to protests among Palestinians, at times violent, which were struck down by the Israeli army. The confrontations intensified with a major military operation, Operation Defensive Shield, launched by Israel into the West Bank in 2002, and several suicide bombings directed against Israelis from Palestinian terrorists. The five years of the Second Intifada accounts for 78% of Israeli casualties and 35% of Palestinian casualties in our sample years.

The period after the end of the Second Intifada is characterized by long periods of low intensity fighting alongside highly intensive conflict periods due to three major Israeli military operations. The three operations shared the stated purpose of halting rocket attacks from the Gaza strip into Israel. In December, 2008, Israel initiated Operation Cast Lead, also known as the Gaza War, inside the Gaza Strip. The subsequent three weeks of fighting resulted in over 1000 Palestinians fatalities and 13 Israeli fatalities. In 2012, Israel launched Operation Pillar of Defense, as a response to intensified responsive attacks from both Palestine and Israel. The eight day operation resulted in approximately 150 Palestinian casualties and

⁵See for example Glaeser (2005); Jha (2013); Voigtlander and Voth (2012); and Grosfeld et al. (2013). Recent contributions have studied the effect of social identities on consumption choices (Atkin et al., 2019), the decision of judges Shayo and Zussman (2011), inter-ethnic trust and violence Depetris-Chauvin et al. (2018), and team production Hjort (2014)

6 Israeli casualties. In 2014, Israeli launched a seven week military operation, known as Operation Protective Edge, in the Gaza Strip. Rocket attacks had intensified following another Israeli military operation in Gaza, a response to the kidnapping and murder of three Israeli teenagers by Hamas. Approximately 1200 Palestinians and 70 Israelis were killed during the operation. The three military operations account for approximately 1.3% of the sample days, but 40% of Palestinian casualties and 7% of Israeli casualties.

Existing research identifies two potentially important patterns in the conflict dynamics. First, [Jaeger and Paserman \(2008\)](#) find that conflict dynamics during the Second Intifada were predominantly unidirectional. While the probability of an Israeli response increased following a Palestinian fatal attack, the probability of a fatal Palestinian attack does not increase after a fatal Israeli attack. Israel systematically retaliate against Palestinian attacks, while Palestinians appear to attack in a more unexpected and randomized fashion.⁶ Hence, fatal attacks, particularly from the Palestinian side, will spur further attacks and intense military operations from the Israeli side will further create temporal clusters of fatal Israeli attacks. When estimating the effect of fatal attacks on hate crimes in the US, this temporal clustering has implications for our choice of statistical model. In particular, a traditional event-study design where one controls for future events is unsuitable, since future events (i.e. future fatal attacks) are themselves triggered by current events (i.e. current fatal attacks). Second, [Durante and Zhuravskaya \(2018\)](#) find that Israel strategically schedules certain attacks and operations the day before news pressure in the U.S. is expected to be high to mitigate bad publicity. When attacks coincide with major political events or sports events in the US, both the probability that the attack is covered by U.S. evening television news and length of coverage decreases. This poses a threat to the identifying assumption that events in the conflict are exogenous to hate crimes in the US. Our estimates will be biased if predictable major political events, which the Israeli Defence Force often choose to attack in conjunction with, are associated with changes in hate crime levels. We discuss the modeling implications of these dynamics in detail in Section 4.

The salience of the religious dimension of the conflict is emphasized in a 2018 poll, showing that American Jews and Muslims are polarized on the issue of the Israel-Palestine conflict.⁷ 41% of American Jews and 37% of American Muslims believe that Israel and Palestine are equally responsible for the ongoing conflict. However, 43% of American Jews believe that Palestine is mostly to blame to conflict, while the same figure for American Muslims is only 5%. Conversely, 30% of American Muslims, but only 4% of American Jews, believe that

⁶We replicate the analysis in Section 7.1 in the Appendix for the entire sample period, and find that this dynamic holds.

⁷<https://feku.org/2018-study-on-muslim-jewish-relations/>, "2018 Study on Muslim-Jewish Relations", Foundation for Ethnic Understanding, accessed 2019-03-21.

Israel is mostly to blame. The polarization is more pronounced among Orthodox Jews and Sunni Muslims.

3 Data

In this section, we describe the data on hate crime incidents, conflict fatalities, and conflict news used in the paper. We also present analyses validating that our measurement of conflict news captures significant events in the conflict.

3.1 Hate Crime Data


Data on incidents of hate crime in the U.S. are obtained from the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR), which are compiled and supplied by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Under the Hate Crime Statistics Act of 1990, all law enforcement agencies in the U.S. have been asked to submit counts of hate crime incidents in their jurisdiction.⁸ Participation is voluntary for agencies and has gradually increased during our period, increasing from 11 690 agencies in 2000 to 15254 agencies in 2016. This accounts for 90 percent of all agencies, covering 290 million inhabitants or 90 percent of the U.S. population (FBI, 2016). Prior research has shown that participation of agencies is related to demographic and political characteristics of jurisdictions (See e.g. (King, 2007; McVeigh et al., 2003)). Under-reporting of hate crimes, both on part of police agencies and individuals, is a well-documented and persistent problem (e.g. BJS (2013) and King et al. (2009)). We ameliorate the selection problem by estimating the effect of the conflict on hate crime by comparing the number of reported hate crimes within the span of a few days of an attack. Consequently, any reporting bias across jurisdictions or over longer time periods is not likely to be a problem. However, since we are using data on reported hate crimes, we cannot rule out that the treatment effects reflect a short-term change in reporting behavior among police agencies or victims and not actual changes in the prevalence of hate crime incidents.

Anti-Jewish hate crimes are the second most common hate crime category in the data, after anti-Black hate crimes, and constitute around 13% of all hate crimes. This also makes it the most common religiously motivated hate crime. Anti-Islamic hate crimes are the second most common religiously motivated hate crime, accounting for 2% of all hate crimes. Figure 1 shows the number of reported anti-Jewish and anti-Islamic hate crimes between 2000-2016 in the US. The two types of hate crime converge during the period. While anti-Jewish hate

⁸If possible, the agencies should provide data on the nature of the offense, location, and characteristics of the offender and victim.

crime steadily decreases and anti-Islamic hate crime increases somewhat.⁹ The figure shows two distinct spikes in hate crime. Anti-Jewish hate crimes spike in October 2000, coinciding with the start of the Second Intifada¹⁰. Anti-Islamic hate crime peaks in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attack. Since the 9/11 attacks coincide with the Second Intifada, we omit the six months following the 9/11 attacks from the sample in our analysis.¹¹

Figure 1: Number of Anti-Jewish and Anti-Islamic Hate Crimes in the USA Aggregated Per Month



Note: Data from FBI (2016). The figure shows the number of anti-Jewish and anti-Islamic hate crimes per month in the U.S. between 09-29-2000 – 12-31-2016. Note that this figure includes the 9/11 period, which we exclude in the other figures and tables which contain hate crime data.

In our data, we have 13658 accounts of anti-Jewish hate crime and 2405 accounts of anti-Islamic hate crime. Anti-Islamic hate crime offenses more often include aggravated and

⁹Long term trends in reported incidents might reflect trends in reporting or agency participation and should be interpreted with caution.

¹⁰This period of intense fighting commenced in September/October 2000 with a number of controversial events, including the visit of Israeli Prime minister Ariel Sharon to the Temple Mount, Palestinian demonstrations and subsequent confrontations, and the videotaped and broadcast killing of a 12-year old Palestinian boy caught in crossfire. The connection between the start of the Second Intifada and hate crimes in the U.S. were also identified by various U.S. news outlets in October 2001, for example in the New York Times article "New Hostility in Mideast Echoes in a Brooklyn Neighborhood": <https://www.nytimes.com/2000/10/05/nyregion/new-hostility-in-mideast-echoes-in-a-brooklyn-neighborhood.html>

¹¹In all subsequent tables, figures and analyses, the hate crime data excludes the 6 months following the 9/11 attacks. In addition to excluding the period following 9/11, we will in Section 5 show that our findings are robust to starting the analysis after the Second Intifada in 2005, as well as excluding different periods of particularly intense fighting.

simple assault, while most anti-Jewish hate crime in our sample are vandalism offenses. Geographically, most anti-Jewish hate crime occurred in New York, New Jersey and California and most anti-Islamic hate crime occurred in California, Michigan, and New York. The most common location for both anti-Jewish and anti-Islamic hate crime is at the residence of the victim. Both types of hate crimes are distributed uniformly across the month of the year and weekdays. Table 10 and Table 11 in the Appendix show summary statistics for the type, location and seasonal variation of anti-Jewish and anti-Islamic hate crime in our sample.

3.2 Data on the Israel-Palestine Conflict

Data on attacks by Israelis and Palestinians comes from the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights *B'Tselem*.¹² It contains information on every fatal attack by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) or Palestinian militants from 29 September 2000, the start of the Second Intifada, to the end of 2016. Columns 5-8 in Table 10 in the Appendix present summary statistics of the total number of fatalities on each side in our sample period, as well as the distribution across weekdays and months of the year. There were a total of 1111 Israeli victims from Palestinian attacks and 9036 Palestinian victims from Israeli attacks. Neither Israeli nor Palestinian attacks show a strong clustering on weekdays compared to weekends. Victims from Palestinian attacks show an even distribution over months of the year, while victims of Israeli attacks show a strong clustering in January and July.

Table 1 presents summary statistics of attacks and fatalities on each side by eight conflict periods. The table shows the total number of victims of Israeli and Palestinian attacks, the average number of victims per day, and the share of days that had an attack, for each conflict period and the entire sample. In addition to the Second Intifada, the sample includes three periods of particularly intense fighting: operation *Cast Lead* in December 2008 and January 2009, operation *Pillar of Defence* in November 2012, and operation *Defensive and Protective Edge* in July 2014, in which there were respectively 61, 22 and 46 fatalities per day on average. *Cast Lead* and *Pillar of Defence* are the primary drivers behind the spike in fatalities in January and July, shown in Table 10. In contrast, the periods between Cast Lead and Pillar of Defense and after Protective Edge are characterized by less intense violence, with a daily incidence of fatalities of 13% and 21%, respectively, driven mostly by Palestinian victims. Over the entire period, the incidence of fatal attacks is generally high. 35% of the days in our sample period had a fatal attack, with an average of total 1.7 victims. This is mainly driven by the high frequency of fatal Israeli attacks. While only 7% of the days in our sample had at least one Israeli victim, 35% of the days had at least one Palestinian

¹²The B'Tselem data is commonly used in scholarship on the Israel-Palestine conflict. See, for instance, Jaeger and Paserman (2008) and Durante and Zhuravskaya (2018).

victim. Thus, there is a considerable overlap between days with Israeli victims and days with Palestinian victims.

Table 1: Number and Daily Rate of Fatalities on Both Sides, by Conflict Period

	2nd Intifada (29Sep2000-15jan2005)	2nd Intifada - Op. CL (15jan2005-26dec2008)	Operation Cast Lead (27dec2008-18jan2009)	Op. CL - Op. PoD (19jan2009-13nov2012)	Operation Pillar of Defence (14nov2012-21nov2012)	Op. PoD- Op. DaPE (22nov2012-7jul2014)	Operation Defensive and Protective Edge (8jul2014-26aug2014)	Post Op. DaPE (27aug2014-31Dec2016)	Total
Days in period	1570	1441	23	1395	8	593	50	858	5938
Israelis									
Fatalities	957	106	9	26	6	10	69	45	1228
Fatalities per day	.61	.07	.39	.02	.75	.02	1.38	.05	.21
Daily incidence of fatalities	.19	.04	.22	.01	.38	.01	.32	.03	.07
Palestinians									
Fatalities	3237	1669	1398	342	169	78	2221	282	9396
Fatalities per day	2.06	1.16	60.78	.25	21.13	.13	44.42	.33	1.58
Daily incidence of fatalities	.61	.36	1	.12	1	.09	.9	.2	.35
Total									
Fatalities	4194	1775	1407	368	175	88	2290	327	10624
Fatalities per day	2.67	1.23	61.17	.26	21.88	.15	45.8	.38	1.79
Daily incidence of fatalities	.66	.38	1	.13	1	.1	.9	.21	.35

Note: Data from the *B'Tselem*. The exact sample period is 09-29-2000 – 12-31-2016, including the 9/11 period. The table shows descriptive statistics for both Israeli and Palestinian fatal attacks split into 8 specific conflict periods, and in the last column, for the total sample period. The conflict periods are described in the top row of the table. For each conflict period, the table shows the number of days in the period, the number Israeli and Palestinian total fatalities, Israeli and Palestinian fatalities per day on average, and the average daily incidence of Israeli and Palestinian fatal attacks. The last three rows show the same statistics for Israeli and Palestinian fatalities combined.

3.3 Conflict News Data and its Association with Conflict Fatalities

To measure U.S. mass media coverage of the Israel-Palestine conflict, we collect information from the evening news on three main TV networks from the Vanderbilt Television News Archive (VTNA). Similar to [Durante and Zhuravskaya \(2018\)](#), we focus on the three major networks that also have a well-defined 30 minute time slot for evening news every day: ABC, CBS and NBC.¹³ Because the length of the evening news is limited, it is ideal for examining the importance of newsworthy events.

Between 2000 and 2016, VTNA contains more than 24000 evening news broadcasts and more than 200 000 individual news stories. For each individual news story, VTNA provides a headline, a summary, the length in seconds, as well as the order of appearance of the story in the full evening news broadcast. To identify news stories about the conflict, we follow [Durante and Zhuravskaya \(2018\)](#) and first identify all stories whose headline contain the words Israel, Palestine, Gaza, West Bank or Hamas, or any words with related roots. This yields a total of 3963 stories. To exclude stories unrelated to the conflict, such as news about Israeli or Palestinian politics, culture or tourism, we apply a word filter to the story headlines and summaries. First, we include stories that have a headline referring to both Israel and any of the above mentioned Palestinian references. Second, we include stories with a headline referring to Israel but no Palestinian reference, but that have a summary containing any of the Palestinian references. Finally, we also include stories that have a Palestinian reference in the headline and no reference to Israel, but that have a summary containing a reference to Israel. We obtain a total of 1714 stories about the conflict using this method. [Table 12](#) in the Appendix gives five examples of news stories and the application of the filter.

We measure conflict on a particular day in two ways. The first is a dummy indicating whether there was at least one conflict related story on NBC, ABC or CBS. The second measures the average length of conflict-related news stories on the same networks. To capture the overall newsworthiness of conflict related stories, we divide the total length of conflict stories by the number of evenings news broadcasts from the three networks that are recorded on a particular day. Therefore, and unlike the measure constructed by [Durante and Zhuravskaya \(2018\)](#), our measure is discounted if one or two networks do not consider a particular conflict related event newsworthy enough to include in the evening news. In this way, our measure captures how newsworthy these national networks consider each conflict related story on a particular day. To the extent that editors on these networks make similar day-to-day judg-

¹³CNN has news around the clock, and Fox News evening broadcasts are not available from the VTNA for the complete sample period.


ments of news stories as other mass media outlets, such as big print and online news papers, our measure can be considered a general proxy for the daily mass media coverage of the Israel-Palestine conflict in the US.

If our measurement of conflict news captures newsworthy events in the Israel-Palestine conflict, we expect a strong association between conflict news and conflict fatalities. In Figure 2, we plot the number of Israeli and Palestinian casualties per month for the entire sample period, excluding the extraordinary intensive fighting in the Gaza Wars of 2008/2009 and July 2014. With the important exception of the excluded short periods of intense fighting, day to day casualties are fewer in the later period. While the period of the Second Intifada, roughly 2000 to 2005, exhibits substantial turbulence and victims on both sides, the period after the first Gaza War is characterized by longer periods of relative calm. The figure shows that our measure of conflict news correlates strongly with conflict fatalities, but also shows considerable variation not explained by conflict fatalities.

Table 2 formally tests the association by regressing conflict news on three lags of fatalities from Israeli and Palestinian attacks using least squares with fixed effects for year, month and day of the week. In column 1, we regress the extensive margin of conflict news, i.e. any news, on any fatalities from Palestinian and Israeli attacks. There is a significant and substantial positive effect on conflict news for all three lags of fatalities from attacks from both sides. A fatal Palestinian attack today increases the probability of any conflict news reporting by 115% compared to the sample mean, and the analogous Israeli attack increases the probability of news reporting by 60%. This pattern is reproduced in column 2, where we regress any conflict news on the number of fatalities from Palestinian and Israeli attacks. A fatal Palestinian attack today with one victim increases the probability of conflict news coverage by 27% compared to the sample mean, and the analogous effect for a fatal Israeli attack is 3%. The difference in magnitude might reflect that fatal Palestinian attacks are less common, and are therefore considered more newsworthy compared to fatal Israeli attacks. In column 3 and 4, we regress the length of conflict news in minutes on both the extensive and intensive margin of fatal Palestinian and Israeli attacks. Column 3 shows that any fatal Israeli attack today increases conflict new coverage by 70% compared to the sample mean, and the analogous effect for any fatal Palestinian attack is 166%. In column 4, we regress minutes of conflict news on the number of victims from Palestinian and Israeli attacks. A fatal Israeli attack with one victim increases the length of conflict news by 6% compared to the sample mean, while a fatal Palestinian attack with one victim the same day increases the length of conflict news by 61%.

Table 2 shows a consistent and strong effect of both Israeli and Palestinian attacks on our measures of conflict news, indicating that our measure of conflict news does indeed capture

Figure 2: Number of Conflict Fatalities and Minutes of Conflict News Per Month



Note: Data from [FBI \(2016\)](#). The figure shows the number of anti-Jewish hate crimes, the number of anti-Islamic hate crimes, and the number of total conflict news coverage on ABC, CBS and NBC per month in the U.S. between 09-29-2000 – 12-31-2016 with the exception of two particularly intense conflict periods: Operation Cast Lead and Operation Defensive and Protective Edge. We exclude these conflict periods to make the graph more legible. We present descriptive statistics on fatalities for the excluded conflict periods in [Table 1](#).

Table 2: Fatal Attacks, Conflict News, and News Pressure

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Any conflict news	Any conflict news	Length of conflict news	Length of conflict news
<i>Any Palestinian attack day...</i>				
(t)	0.177*** (0.024)		0.642*** (0.125)	
(t-1)	0.130*** (0.026)		0.448*** (0.116)	
(t-2)	0.065** (0.025)		0.373** (0.127)	
<i>Any Israeli attack day...</i>				
(t)	0.091*** (0.013)		0.175*** (0.035)	
(t-1)	0.045*** (0.013)		0.136*** (0.036)	
(t-2)	0.057*** (0.013)		0.132*** (0.035)	
<i>Victims Israeli attacks day...</i>				
(t)		0.004*** (0.001)		0.014*** (0.004)
(t-1)		0.003*** (0.001)		0.014*** (0.003)
(t-2)		0.003*** (0.001)		0.010** (0.004)
<i>Victims Palestinian attacks day...</i>				
(t)		0.042*** (0.005)		0.150*** (0.020)
(t-1)		0.026*** (0.005)		0.111*** (0.022)
(t-2)		0.019*** (0.005)		0.087* (0.036)
News pressure	-0.063** (0.021)	-0.057** (0.020)	-0.192*** (0.056)	-0.184*** (0.049)
<i>Controls:</i>				
FEs (year, month, DOW)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Holidays and events	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5700	5700	5700	5700
Mean dependent var.	0.154	0.154	0.244	0.244
Sd. of dependent var.	0.361	0.361	0.895	0.895
Model	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS
F-test Palestinian and Israeli attack	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
R-squared	0.273	0.304	0.251	0.379

Note: In column 1, we regress a dummy for whether there were any conflict-related news in the U.S. on dummies for whether a Palestinian or Israeli attack occurred in the last two days. Column 2 again estimates any conflict news but with the number of victims the last two days from either Palestinian or Israeli attacks. Column 3 and 4 uses the same independent variables, but instead estimates the length of conflict news. All models control for year, calendar-month and weekday fixed effects, and a set of controls for holidays and events which are presented in Section 4.2. All models are estimated using OLS, with Newey West standard errors allowing for autocorrelation of up to seven lags in parenthesis.

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

newsworthy events in the conflict. The percentage of explained variation ranges from 26% to 37%. Although our models account for a substantial part of the variation in conflict news, most of the variation remains unexplained. Several reasons might account for this. First, the overall concurrent news pressure might crowd out reporting on certain attacks, both because of variation in news pressure which is unrelated to the conflict, but also because the Israeli Defence Force is timing certain attacks to minimize U.S. reporting (Durante and Zhuravskaya, 2018). Second, our measure of conflict news likely reflects the newsworthiness of a particular attack, which might not be perfectly captured by the total number of fatalities it generated. For example, certain attacks, such as Palestinian suicide bombings or attacks with many civilian victims, may be particularly controversial and considered more newsworthy. Third, U.S. mass media also covers events in the conflict not reflected in the number of fatalities, such as peace negotiations, expansion of Israeli settlements or non-fatal rocket attacks from the Palestinian side.

4 Does the Israel-Palestine Conflict Trigger Hate Crime?

4.1 Empirical Strategy

We examine how conflict intensity affects hate crime using two types of data. The first is based on conflict fatalities from each side. We estimate the effect on hate crime using equations of the following general form:

$$Hate\ Crime_{tk} = \gamma + \sum_{\tau=(t-7)}^t \alpha_{\tau} P.Attack_{\tau} + \sum_{\tau=(t-7)}^t \beta_{\tau} I.Attack_{\tau} + \omega_t + \delta_{y_t} + \eta_{m_t} + \rho_{d_t} + \epsilon_{tk} \quad (1)$$

where $Hate\ Crime_{t,k}$ is the number of hate crimes towards group k (either Jews or Muslims) on day t . α_{τ} is the effect of either the occurrence of an attack or the size of an attack from the Palestinian side on day τ . β_{τ} estimates the analogous effect of attacks from the Israeli side.¹⁴ We include up to seven lags of the independent variables. ω_t denotes a vector of control variables, which we explain in detail in Section 4.2. We include fixed effects for year, δ_{y_t} , calendar month, η_{m_t} , and day of the week, ρ_{d_t} . ϵ_t is the idiosyncratic error term. Since our dependent variable is count data, we use a negative binomial regression model. To account for serial correlation of hate crimes levels and conflict fatalities we estimate standard errors using the Newey-West estimator, allowing for autocorrelation of up to 7 lags. In all models, we exclude the sixth months period following the 9/11 attack in 2001, during which

¹⁴We also estimate a set of models where we examine the effect of conflict fatalities regardless of what side they are attributed to on hate crime.

anti-Islamic hate crimes reached extreme levels, from our sample.

We further estimate the effect of conflict intensity on hate crimes using data on U.S. mass media coverage of the conflict. Specifically, we estimate versions of the following equation:

$$Hate\ Crime_{tk} = \phi + \sum_{\tau=(t-7)}^t \pi_{\tau} Conflict\ news_{\tau} + \omega_t + \delta_{yt} + \eta_{mt} + \rho_{dt} + \epsilon_{tk} \quad (2)$$

where π_{τ} denotes the effect of either the occurrence of conflict related news or the average length of conflict related news day τ . The dependent variable, the fixed effects and the control variables are the same as in Equation 1, and the equation is also estimated using a negative binomial model with Newey-West standard errors.

An important difference between the two data sources is that the fatalities data distinguishes between fatalities from the different sides, while the conflict news data collapses reporting on attacks and violence from both sides in the same variable. The variable does not differentiate between reporting on Palestinian or Israeli aggression. In our analysis of the conflict news data, we therefore proxy news reporting dominated by violence from one side by restricting the sample to days with either Israeli attacks or Palestinian attacks today or yesterday. In Section 3.3 we show that that both Israeli and Palestinian attacks generate news reporting. By restricting the sample to these dates, we aim to better isolate reporting on aggression from the different sides. This allows us to better disentangle the possible asymmetric responses, such as retributive motives, to Israeli and Palestinian attacks among hate crime offenders.

We refrain from including leads in the main specifications due to post-treatment bias induced by the conflict dynamics. The retaliatory pattern of the conflict, combined with the presence of intense periods of violence in our sample, is likely to make future fatalities outcomes of our treatment variable. Such future fatalities are likely correlated with unobserved characteristics of the contentiousness of an attack, which themselves may increase hate crime. Put differently, the same attacks that make the conflict flare up and generate more fatal attacks might also be the attacks that have a triggering effect on hate crimes in the US, in which case controlling for them will create a downward bias. Although a particular event’s controversy and potential to trigger hate crime is likely better captured in our media variable, which better captures context and relevance to a U.S. audience, the same argument is still partly applicable also with regards to Equation 2. It is possible that a particularly controversial event in the conflict is reported on in the U.S. on day t , triggers hate crimes towards related religious groups in the U.S. while at the same time setting of a chain of further newsworthy events related to the conflict. In this case, future conflict reporting will be

an outcome of the treatment variable and therefore inappropriate as control. Nevertheless, below we present and discuss how the main results are affected by controlling for leads of the independent variables.

4.2 Controls

The identifying assumption underlying a causal interpretation of the estimates is that the timing of fatal attacks and conflict news are exogenous with regard to the timing of anti-Jewish and anti-Islamic hate crime in the US. To control for potential omitted variables that may affect both hate crimes and the timing of attacks, we include in all specifications controls for religious holidays, U.S. news pressure and U.S. political events that drive it, as well as federal holidays.

Religious and national holidays may affect both the likelihood of Israeli and Palestinian attacks and the salience of group membership among Jews and Muslims in the US, which in turn may affect the level of hate crime. This can lead to a spurious correlation between conflict events and anti-Jewish and anti-Islamic hate crime. We therefore include a set of controls for Jewish, Israeli, Islamic and Palestinian holidays and events, listed in Table 13 in the Appendix.

Durante and Zhuravskaya (2018) show that Israeli attacks are more likely to occur the day before U.S. news is dominated by important predictable events. The increased news pressure caused by the predictable events decreases the media coverage of the conflict. Their analysis suggests that the strategic timing applies to attacks that bear risk of civilian casualties in order to minimize next-day coverage. Failure to account for the strategic timing could generate both upward and downward bias in our estimates. We consider three examples of this. First, consider the case where attacks are timed to political events in the US, which have no effect on hate crimes. This decreases the probability that potential hate crime offenders are exposed to information about attacks, and would bias the estimated effect of conflict fatalities on hate crimes downwards, while our estimated effect of conflict news would be unaffected. Second, consider the same strategic timing, but were the predictable political events are associated with increased levels of hate crime. In this case, the estimated effect of fatalities on hate crime could be biased either upwards or downwards, while the estimated effect of conflict news on hate crime will be biased upwards. Third, consider again the same strategic timing, but were the predictable events are associated with lower levels of hate crime. In this case, the estimated effect of both fatalities and conflict news on hate crime will be biased downwards. To address this concern, we control for major political and sports event which are *ex ante* predictable, generate higher levels of news pressure, and are

themselves unlikely to trigger news reporting on the conflict. The events included are listed in Table 13 in the Appendix.¹⁵

To further address this concern, we directly controls for U.S. news pressure today and tomorrow. We construct the news pressure variable following Eisensee and Strömberg (2007), using the length of news stories unrelated to the Israel-Palestine conflict in the evening news broadcasts on ABC, CBS and NBC. The time constraint given by the fixed 30 minute time slot on these broadcasts allows us to measure the presence of newsworthy events. The more important an event is considered, the longer the news segment will be and the earlier in the broadcast the story will occur. We define *News pressure* as the time allotted (in minutes/10) to the top three news stories unrelated to Israel or Palestine in the evening newscast on ABC, CBS and NBC.¹⁶

Despite the above controls, conflict events may coincide with days or periods in which the level of hate crime in the U.S. is systematically different. For example, attacks may be timed to Christian or Federal holidays if holidays affect news consumption levels or the propensity for politicians to immediately react to controversial attacks. If such holidays are associated with systematically different levels of hate crimes, this will bias the estimates. We therefore control for a set of Christian and Federal holidays, as well as the yearly 9/11 anniversary. These holidays and events are listed in Table 13.

4.3 The Effect of Conflict Fatalities on Hate Crime

We first estimate the effect of the total number of conflict fatalities from either Palestinian or Israeli attacks day t on hate crime in Equation 1, and then gradually introduce lags of the independent variables. When several lags of the independent variable are included, we focus on their joint significance. The results, presented in Table 3, suggest that anti-Jewish hate crimes are primarily triggered by victims from Israeli attacks and anti-Islamic hate crimes seems to be triggered by fatalities from both sides. This is shown both by the strong and persistent significance of the immediate lags of the independent variables, and also by the F-test on all lags reported in the bottom two rows. The second lag of Israeli attacks shows a positive effect on anti-Islamic hate crime. This effect, however, is not robust for alternative specifications, and does not remain significant when combined with the immediate lags of victims of Israeli attacks as shown by the F-test.

¹⁵Regarding the exact method select these events, we refer the reader to Durante and Zhuravskaya (2018), as we follow the same method.

¹⁶If there are news stories related to either Israel or Palestine, we define news pressure as the time allotted to the top three stories unrelated to Israel and Palestine, divided by the time allotted to all other stories unrelated to Israel and Palestine. This is then multiplied by the length of the broadcast to get news pressure in minutes.

Table 3: The Effect of Conflict Fatalities on Hate Crime

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Anti- Jewish	Anti- Jewish	Anti- Jewish	Anti- Jewish	Anti- Islamic	Anti- Islamic	Anti- Islamic	Anti- Islamic
<i>Victims Israeli attacks day...</i>								
(t)	0.002 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.003 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)
(t-1)		0.003** (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	0.001* (0.001)		-0.001 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.003)
(t-2)			0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)			0.004*** (0.001)	0.004** (0.001)
(t-3)				0.001 (0.001)				-0.004 (0.002)
(t-4)				0.001 (0.001)				0.003 (0.002)
(t-5)				-0.002* (0.001)				0.001 (0.002)
(t-6)				0.001* (0.001)				-0.002 (0.003)
(t-7)				0.003*** (0.001)				0.002 (0.002)
<i>Victims Palestinian attacks day...</i>								
(t)	0.005 (0.007)	0.004 (0.007)	0.003 (0.007)	0.005 (0.007)	0.010 (0.017)	0.007 (0.018)	0.006 (0.018)	0.006 (0.018)
(t-1)		0.006 (0.007)	0.006 (0.007)	0.005 (0.007)		0.048*** (0.014)	0.047*** (0.014)	0.048*** (0.014)
(t-2)			0.000 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.007)			0.003 (0.017)	0.003 (0.017)
(t-3)				-0.003 (0.006)				0.011 (0.020)
(t-4)				0.003 (0.007)				0.026 (0.016)
(t-5)				0.008 (0.007)				0.008 (0.015)
(t-6)				0.001 (0.007)				-0.035 (0.023)
(t-7)				0.008 (0.006)				0.002 (0.018)
<i>Controls:</i>								
FEs (year, month, DOW)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Holidays and events	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
News Pressure (t and t+1)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5765	5764	5763	5758	5765	5764	5763	5758
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.031	0.031	0.031	0.032	0.044	0.045	0.045	0.046
Mean dependent var.	2.369	2.368	2.367	2.363	0.417	0.417	0.417	0.417
Sd. of dependent var.	1.846	1.844	1.844	1.837	0.699	0.699	0.699	0.699
Model	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB
F-test Isr. attacks (p-value)	0.112	0.015	0.006	0.000	0.238	0.543	0.005	0.040
F-test Pal. attacks (p-value)	0.472	0.577	0.812	0.819	0.545	0.002	0.007	0.004

Note: The dependent variable is the total number of hate crimes toward Jews (columns 1-4) and Muslims (columns 5-8). In column 1 and 5, the independent variables are the total number of victims from an attack from the respective sides at day t. Subsequent columns add up to 7 lags of the independent variables, where column 4 and 8 includes the total fatalities from attacks from the respective sides at t-1 to t-7. All models control for year, calendar-month and weekday fixed effects, as well as a set of controls for holidays, events, and news pressure which are presented in Section 4.2. All models are estimated using a maximum-likelihood negative binomial model with Newey West standard errors allowing for autocorrelation of up to seven lags in parenthesis.

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

In subsequent analysis, we will focus on the effect of fatalities today and yesterday, but the results are qualitatively similar if we also include the day before yesterday in the analysis. This is motivated empirically by the results in Table 3, where the immediate lags seem to matter most, and theoretically motivated to allow enough time for potential offenders to be reached by, and react to, information about the event. The six-to-ten hour time difference between the U.S. and Israel implies that if a significant event occurs in Israel shortly after midnight, for example at 1 a.m., this would be 3(6) p.m. on the U.S. west(east) coast the previous day. Since we do not have information on the time of the day that attacks or hate crimes occur, but only the dates on which they occur, this makes it possible for both media outlets and individuals to react to events in the Middle East the day before they are reported to happen. Due to the same reason, the time difference enables a response in the U.S. on the same calendar date as the conflict event.

Table 4: The Effect of Conflict Fatalities on Hate Crime

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Anti- Jewish	Anti- Jewish	Anti- Jewish	Anti- Jewish	Anti- Islamic	Anti- Islamic	Anti- Islamic	Anti- Islamic	Anti- Black	Anti- Hispanic
Victims any attack (today and yesterday)	0.002** (0.001)				0.002 (0.001)					
Victims Israeli attack (today and yesterday)		0.002** (0.001)		0.002** (0.001)		0.001 (0.001)		0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.000)	0.001 (0.001)
Victims Palestinian attack (today and yesterday)			0.007 (0.005)	0.005 (0.005)			0.031** (0.010)	0.030** (0.010)	0.005 (0.003)	0.000 (0.006)
<i>Controls:</i>										
FEs (year, month, DOW)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Holidays and events	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
News Pressure (t and t+1)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5764	5764	5764	5764	5764	5764	5764	5764	5764	5764
Mean dependent var.	2.368	2.368	2.368	2.368	0.417	0.417	0.417	0.417	6.357	1.255
Sd. of dependent var.	1.844	1.844	1.844	1.844	0.699	0.699	0.699	0.699	2.999	1.221
Model	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB
F-test PA and IA				0.005				0.007	0.155	0.276
Pseudo R-squared	0.031	0.031	0.031	0.031	0.044	0.044	0.044	0.044	0.057	0.031

Note: The dependent variable is the total number of hate crimes toward Jews (columns 1-4), Muslims (columns 5-8), Blacks(column 9), and Hispanics (column 10). The independent variables are the total number of victims the past two days from any attack (columns 1 and 5), Israeli attacks (columns 2 and 6), Palestinian attacks (columns 3 and 7), or all victims but separated into two variables for either side (columns 4, 8, 9, 10). All models control for year, calendar-month and weekday fixed effects, as well as a set of controls for holidays, events, and news pressure which are presented in Section 4.2. All models are estimated using a maximum-likelihood negative binomial model with Newey West standard errors allowing for auto-correlation of up to seven lags in parenthesis.

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table 4 presents the comparable specification to columns 2 and 6 of Table 3, but aggregating the attacks days t and $t - 1$. Column 1 regresses the number of anti-Jewish hate crimes on the total number of fatalities in the conflict, whereas column 2 and 3 separate the victims from either side of the conflict, and column 4 includes victims from both sides, but separated into two variables. The results again suggest that anti-Jewish hate crimes are primarily triggered by victims from Israeli attacks. Column 5-8 present the corresponding results for anti-Islamic hate crimes and suggest that hate crimes towards Muslims are primarily triggered by victims from Palestinian attacks. To interpret the magnitude of the effect, we predict the mean expected effect of an average attack from either side. The average fatal attack, corresponding to 6.61 victims from Israeli attacks and 3.22 victims from Palestinian attacks, increases the number of hate crimes towards Jews by 2.7 percent (.027 hate crimes) and towards Muslims by 10 percent (.041 hate crimes) compared to the sample mean.

Table 14 in the Appendix shows how the main estimates are affected by adding one, two, and seven leads. Columns 1-4 show that the effect of fatalities from Israeli attacks on anti-Jewish hate crimes is reduced and becomes insignificant ones we control for future fatalities, while several coefficients on the leads are significant. This is consistent with the aforementioned explanation and the fact that the Israeli side attacks in a partly predictable and systematically retaliatory pattern, as shown by Jaeger and Paserman (2008) and replicated by us in Section 2. If future fatalities from Israeli attacks are partly reflecting the triggering effect of the attack on day t , then it is not surprising that our main estimate of the effect of Israeli attacks are sensitive to controlling for those future fatalities. Column 5-8 shows that the main effect of fatalities from Palestinian attacks on anti-Islamic hate crime is not sensitive to controlling for future fatalities. Likewise, this is consistent with the findings presented in Section 2, where the timing of Palestinian attacks are more random. If future fatalities from Palestinian attacks is uncorrelated with the triggering effect of a Palestinian attack on day t , then it is not surprising that our main estimates is unaffected by adding future fatalities as controls.

Table 5 splits the independent variables into dummies based on the distribution of fatalities in our sample. By doing so, we relax the assumption of a linear effect of fatalities on hate crimes and allow for non-linear effects of different parts of the distribution of attack dates. By collapsing attack dates into dummies, we also alleviate the concern that our main results are driven by outliers. The independent variables in Table 5 are victims from Israeli and Palestinian attacks day t and $t-1$, categorized by mutually exclusive percentile dummy variables. The reference category is dates with no fatalities today or yesterday. For victims of Israeli attacks, the first variable indicates a fatal attack with one victim, the second from one victim up to the 90th percentile (2-6 victims), the third from the 90th percentile to the

Table 5: Non-linear Effects of Conflict Fatalities on Hate Crime and Conflict News

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Anti-Jewish	Anti-Islamic	Any conflict news	Length of conflict news	Anti-Black	Anti-Hispanic
<i>Israeli attacks (t and t-1)</i>						
1 victim (percentiles: [52-67], 925 dates)	0.039 (0.030)	-0.066 (0.068)	0.014 (0.012)	0.005 (0.022)	0.013 (0.017)	0.023 (0.038)
2-6 victims (percentiles: (67,90], 1400 dates)	0.035 (0.028)	0.167** (0.062)	0.059*** (0.014)	0.064* (0.032)	-0.012 (0.016)	-0.057 (0.036)
7-10 victims (percentiles: (90,95], 238 dates)	-0.038 (0.048)	-0.046 (0.132)	0.125*** (0.032)	0.106 (0.092)	0.000 (0.030)	0.019 (0.064)
11-38 victims (percentiles: (95,99], 217 dates)	0.054 (0.054)	0.183 (0.133)	0.332*** (0.041)	0.831*** (0.180)	0.025 (0.029)	-0.006 (0.069)
>38 victims (percentiles: (99-100], 59 dates)	0.340*** (0.094)	0.199 (0.204)	0.752*** (0.049)	3.246*** (0.529)	-0.031 (0.053)	0.068 (0.109)
<i>Palestinian attacks (t and t-1)</i>						
1 victim (percentiles: [87-93], 371 dates)	0.038 (0.042)	0.051 (0.103)	0.013 (0.024)	0.067 (0.064)	0.024 (0.020)	0.051 (0.057)
2 victims (percentiles: [93-95], 136 dates)	0.014 (0.070)	-0.108 (0.138)	0.079 (0.044)	0.106 (0.125)	0.081* (0.036)	-0.046 (0.078)
3-10 victims (percentiles: (95-99], 205 dates)	0.048 (0.053)	0.241 (0.144)	0.272*** (0.044)	0.653*** (0.167)	-0.004 (0.033)	0.150* (0.069)
>11 victims (percentiles: [99-100], 49 dates)	0.059 (0.079)	0.429* (0.186)	0.453*** (0.047)	2.065*** (0.257)	0.084 (0.061)	-0.176 (0.153)
<i>Controls:</i>						
FEs (year, month, DOW)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Holidays and events	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
News Pressure (t and t+1)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5765	5765	5700	5700	5765	5765
Mean dependent var.	2.369	0.417	0.154	0.244	6.358	1.255
Sd. of dependent var.	1.846	0.699	0.361	0.895	3.002	1.221
Model	ML NB	ML NB	OLS	OLS	ML NB	ML NB
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.032	0.046			0.058	0.032
F-test Palestinian attacks	0.793	0.063	0.000	0.000	0.117	0.143
F-test Israeli attacks	0.003	0.045	0.000	0.000	0.655	0.432

Note: The dependent variable is the total number of hate crimes toward Jews (columns 1) and Muslims (2). The independent variables are victims from Israeli and Palestinian attacks day t and t-1 categorized by mutually exclusive percentile dummy variables. For victims of Israeli attacks, the first variable indicates a fatal attack with one victim, the second from one victim up to the 90th percentile (2-6 victims), the third from the 90th percentile to the 95th percentile (7-10 victims), the fourth from the 95th percentile to the 99th percentile (11-38 victims) and the last variable indicates a fatal attack with more than 38 victims (99th percentile and above). For victims of Palestinian attacks, the first variable indicates a fatal attack with one victim, the second from one victims up to the 95th percentile (2 victims), the fourth from the 95th percentile to the 99th percentile (3-10 victims) and the last variable indicates a fatal attack with more than 11 victims (99th percentile and above). All models control for year, calendar-month and weekday fixed effects, as well as a set of controls for holidays, events, and news pressure which are presented in Section 4.2. Column 1-2 are estimated using a maximum-likelihood negative binomial model. Column 3-4 are estimated using OLS. Newey West standard errors allowing for autocorrelation of up to seven lags in parenthesis.

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

95th percentile (7-10 victims), the fourth from the 95th percentile to the 99th percentile (11-38 victims) and the last variable indicates more than 38 victims (99th percentile and above). For victims of Palestinian attacks, the first variable indicates a fatal attack with one victim, the second from one victim up to the 95th percentile (2 victims), the fourth from the 95th percentile to the 99th percentile (3-10 victims) and the last variable indicates a fatal attack with more than 11 victims (99th percentile and above). The results in column 1 show that anti-Jewish hate crimes are triggered by days with Israeli attacks in the top percentile. Anti-Jewish hate crimes do not seem to be triggered by days with fatalities between the 95 and 99th percentile, or any of the other dummies, suggesting that the effect is non-linear and primarily driven by large attacks. Column 2 shows that anti-Islamic hate crimes are triggered by Palestinian attacks in the top percentile, as well as by Israeli attacks in the 67-90th percentiles. We note, however, that the F-test of the effect of Palestinian attacks on anti-Islamic hate crime is only significant at the 10% level. As a placebo test, we regress anti-Black and anti-Hispanic hate crimes on the same independent variables. The results are shown in column 5 and 6. Although two individual coefficients are statistically significant, the F-test for joint significance decisively show that that neither Palestinian nor Israeli attacks appear to affect anti-Black and anti-Hispanic hate crimes.

We further Column 3 and 4 of Table 5 regress the occurrence and length of conflict news on the same dummies. The magnitudes of the point estimates suggest that days with more fatalities have a larger effect on both the occurrence and length of conflict news. However, the effect is not significant for some of the dummies in the lower part of the distribution.

4.4 The Effect of Conflict News on Hate Crime

Using the specification in Equation 2, we regress hate crimes on our measure of daily U.S. mass media coverage of the conflict. This measure approximates the general newsworthiness of the conflict a particular day. In Section 3.3, we show that this measure only partly reflects the variation in conflict fatalities the preceding days. Several important differences between the conflict fatalities measure and the conflict news measure are worth stressing. First, our media variable likely captures the general newsworthiness of an attack to a U.S. audience better than counting the number of fatalities. The context of the attack, not captured by a fatality count, likely affects both reporting and any behavioral response. Second, the measure can capture triggering events that are not fatal attacks. For example, on December 6, 2017, President Trump announced that the U.S. recognizes Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and begin the process of moving its embassy to Jerusalem. This immediately triggered anti-Israel protests and anti-Semitic incidents were reported in both the U.S. and Europe (ADL,

2017). Third, conflict events cannot trigger hate crimes if potential offenders never learn about them. The media variable is likely better at capturing the degree to which potential offenders are exposed to information about the conflict. However, at this stage, we cannot disentangle the effect of mass media outlets reporting on the conflict from that of the actual conflict events, or from other mechanisms through which conflict information might reach potential perpetrators. For example, potential hate crime offenders could receive information on events in the conflict through alternative media sources, such as media focusing on the middle east (e.g. Al Jazeera), social media, or personal contacts in the region.

With the above caveats in mind, we estimate Equation 2 using the length of conflict news as the independent variable. Analogously to the previous analysis, column 1 in Table 6 presents the results of regressing the number of hate crimes on day t on the length of conflict reporting the same day, and subsequent columns gradually introduces one, two and seven lags of the independent variable. Results show that conflict news is triggering hate crime towards Jews. However, we find no evidence in this specification that conflict news, on average, triggers hate crime towards Muslims. For anti-Jewish hate crime, the significance of individual coefficients disappears as we add more lags but the F-test shows that the lags are statistically different from zero. Henceforth, we focus on conflict news today and yesterday. However, the results are qualitatively the same if we also include the day before yesterday in the collapsed measure.

In column 1 and 4 of Table 7, we regress anti-Jewish and anti-Islamic hate crimes on the total length of conflict news today and yesterday. Column 1 shows a highly significant effect of conflict news on anti-Jewish hate crime. One additional minute of conflict news reporting increases the number of anti-Jewish hate crime by 0.07 or 3% from the sample mean. Column 4, however, shows no significant effect of conflict news on anti-Islamic hate crime. This mirrors the results from Table 4, showing a significant effect of the total number of victims today and yesterday on anti-Jewish but not anti-Islamic hate crime. Unfortunately, we cannot separate the conflict news variable into coverage of Israeli and Palestinian attacks. However, due to the relative dominance of Israel fatal attacks in terms of frequency and intensity, we speculate that most conflict reporting is covering Israeli attacks, which does not appear to trigger hate crimes towards Muslims. This will attenuate the effect of news on anti-Islamic hate crime. To differentiate the effect of news reporting on Israeli and Palestinian attacks, in columns 2, 3, 5 and 6, we regress anti-Jewish and anti-Islamic hate crime on conflict news when there has been an Israeli or Palestinian attack today or yesterday.¹⁷

¹⁷Note that this estimation quickly becomes very restrictive, in particular when looking at days with Palestinian attacks which are relatively few in our sample. Therefore, we cannot for example split the sample into days in which there was a Palestinian attack but no Israeli attacks, as these days are too few for any meaningful estimation.

Table 6: The Effect of Conflict News on Hate Crime

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Anti- Jewish	Anti- Jewish	Anti- Jewish	Anti- Jewish	Anti- Islamic	Anti- Islamic	Anti- Islamic	Anti- Islamic
<i>Length of Conflict</i>								
<i>News day...</i>								
(t)	0.048*** (0.011)	0.021 (0.014)	0.020 (0.015)	0.006 (0.015)	0.048* (0.023)	0.061 (0.035)	0.058 (0.037)	0.069 (0.039)
(t-1)		0.035** (0.013)	0.028 (0.016)	0.024 (0.017)		-0.021 (0.036)	-0.043 (0.047)	-0.057 (0.045)
(t-2)			0.010 (0.015)	-0.019 (0.018)			0.031 (0.039)	0.045 (0.048)
(t-3)				0.017 (0.016)				0.013 (0.041)
(t-4)				0.007 (0.017)				-0.021 (0.040)
(t-5)				0.003 (0.018)				0.024 (0.043)
(t-6)				0.017 (0.017)				-0.130** (0.047)
(t-7)				0.023 (0.014)				0.079* (0.040)
<i>Controls:</i>								
FEs (year, month, DOW)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Holidays and events	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
News Pressure (t and t+1)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5700	5634	5568	5256	5700	5634	5568	5256
Mean dependent var.	2.371	2.371	2.368	2.363	0.414	0.414	0.413	0.402
Sd. of dependent var.	1.844	1.845	1.845	1.833	0.696	0.696	0.695	0.681
Model	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB
Pseudo R-squared	0.032	0.033	0.033	0.034	0.044	0.044	0.044	0.046
F-test ind. vars. (p-value)	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.038	0.110	0.127	0.084

Note: The dependent variable is the total number of hate crimes toward Jews (columns 1-4) and Muslims (columns 5-8). In columns 1 and 5, the independent variable is our measure of the length of conflict-related news in the U.S. at day t. Subsequent columns gradually adds one, two and seven lags of the independent variable. All models are estimated using a maximum-likelihood negative binomial model with Newey West standard errors allowing for auto-correlation of up to seven lags in parenthesis.

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table 7: News on the Israel-Palestine Conflict and Hate Crimes

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Anti- Jewish	Anti- Jewish	Anti- Jewish	Anti- Islamic	Anti- Islamic	Anti- Islamic	Anti- Black	Anti- Hispanic
		Israeli	Palestinian		Israeli	Palestinian		
Sample:	All days	attack at t or t-1	attack at t or t-1	All days	attack at t or t-1	attack at t or t-1	All days	All days
Conflict news (today and yesterday)	0.028*** (0.006)	0.032*** (0.006)	0.034*** (0.007)	0.021 (0.012)	0.022 (0.013)	0.034* (0.016)	0.004 (0.003)	0.009 (0.006)
<i>Controls:</i>								
FEs (year, month, DOW)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Holidays and events	Yes	Yes	-	Yes	Yes	-	Yes	Yes
News Pressure (t and t+1)	Yes	Yes	-	Yes	Yes	-	Yes	Yes
Observations	5634	2638	676	5634	2638	676	5634	5634
Mean dependent var.	2.371	2.569	2.766	0.414	0.408	0.402	6.369	1.251
Sd. of dependent var.	1.845	1.955	2.011	0.696	0.699	0.725	3.000	1.219
Model	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB
R-squared	0.033	0.037	0.046	0.043	0.067	0.087	0.057	0.032

Note: The dependent variable is the total number of hate crimes toward Jews (columns 1-3) and Muslims (columns 4-6). The independent variable is our measure of the length of conflict-related news aggregated for day t and t-1. Column 2 and 5 restricts the sample to days in which there was an Israeli attack the past two days, and column 3 and 6 restricts the sample to days in which there was a Palestinian attacks the past two days. All models control for year, calendar-month and weekday fixed effects, as well as a set of controls for holidays, events, and news pressure which are presented in Section 4.2. All models are estimated using a maximum-likelihood negative binomial model with Newey West standard errors allowing for auto-correlation of up to seven lags in parenthesis.

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Column 2 and 3 shows that conflict news, when there has been an Israeli or Palestinian attack today or yesterday, significantly increases anti-Jewish hate crimes. An additional minute of news reporting on such days increases the number of anti-Jewish hate crimes by 0.07 or 3% from the sample mean. The significant effect of conflict news on days with Palestinian attacks might be driven by the substantial overlap between the samples. Approximately 80 percent of all days with a Palestinian attack today or yesterday also had an Israeli attack, and news reporting on days with Palestinian attacks are likely covering many Israeli attacks as well. Column 5 and 6 shows that conflict news significantly increases anti-Islamic hate crime on days with Palestinian attacks today or yesterday but not on days with Israeli attacks the same day or the day before. Another minute of conflict news when there has been a Palestinian attack today or yesterday increases anti-Islamic hate crime by 0.014 hate crimes or 3.5% from the sample mean.

The results in Table 7 corroborate the findings from the fatalities data in Table 4. Apart from the significant effect of conflict news reporting on days with Palestinian attacks, we find the same pattern between the attacker and the victims of hate crime. News reporting after an Israeli attack increases hate crime towards Jews and news reporting after Palestinian attacks increases hate crime toward Muslims.

In Table 15 in the Appendix we explore how the main results in Table 7 are affected by controlling for future conflict news. The main finding, i.e. the effect of conflict news today and yesterday on anti-Jewish hate crimes, is relatively unaffected when we add future conflict reporting to the model. Why is the effect of conflict fatalities sensitive to controlling for leads, while the effect of conflict news is not? We speculate that this is because the length of conflict news better reflect the triggering effect of a certain event, as compared to the number of fatalities a particular day.

Table 8 once again relaxes the linearity assumption and alleviates the possible problem of influential observations by splitting the independent variables into dummies based on the distribution of conflict news in our sample. The independent variables in Table 8 are based on the total length of conflict news day t and $t - 1$, categorized by mutually exclusive percentile dummy variables. The reference category is dates with no conflict news reporting today or yesterday. The first variable indicates any news reporting up to the 90th percentile (1.44 minutes), the second from the 90th up to the 95th percentile (1.45 - 3.05 minutes), the third from the 95th up to the 99th percentile (3.06 - 8 minutes), and the last variable indicates duration of news reporting in the 99th percentile and above (more than 8 minutes).

The findings in Table 8 show a similar pattern of heterogeneity as the conflict fatalities. We find no significant effect of conflict news below the 99th percentile on anti-Jewish or anti-Islamic hate crime. However, conflict news today and yesterday above the 99th percentile

Table 8: Non-linear Effects of Conflict News on Hate Crimes

	(1) Anti- Jewish	(2) Anti- Jewish	(3) Anti- Jewish	(4) Anti- Islamic	(5) Anti- Islamic	(6) Anti- Islamic	(7) Anti- Black	(8) Anti- Hispanic
Sample:	All days	Israeli attack at t or t-1	Palestinian attack at t or t-1	All days	Israeli attack at t or t-1	Palestinian attack at t or t-1	All days	All days
<i>Conflict News (t and t-1)</i>								
>0 to 1.44 minutes (percentiles: [77-90], 769 dates)	-0.005 (0.032)	-0.025 (0.040)	0.076 (0.072)	-0.015 (0.084)	0.002 (0.106)	0.018 (0.201)	-0.013 (0.019)	-0.002 (0.041)
1.45 to 3.05 minutes (percentiles: [90-95], 297 dates)	0.017 (0.041)	0.035 (0.048)	0.134 (0.077)	0.097 (0.122)	0.072 (0.137)	-0.061 (0.226)	-0.002 (0.026)	0.068 (0.065)
3.06 to 8 minutes (percentiles: [95-99], 231 dates)	0.089 (0.052)	0.109 (0.059)	0.210** (0.073)	0.145 (0.110)	0.179 (0.119)	0.540* (0.210)	0.034 (0.028)	0.063 (0.059)
>8 minutes (percentiles: [99-100], 58 dates)	0.395*** (0.097)	0.419*** (0.097)	0.503*** (0.119)	0.088 (0.195)	0.094 (0.212)	0.379 (0.228)	0.011 (0.045)	0.131 (0.095)
<i>Controls:</i>								
FEs (year, month, DOW)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Holidays and events	Yes	Yes	-	Yes	Yes	-	Yes	Yes
News Pressure (t and t+1)	Yes	Yes	-	Yes	Yes	-	Yes	Yes
Observations	5765	2693	687	5765	2693	687	5765	5765
Mean dependent var.	2.369	2.563	2.763	0.417	0.410	0.405	6.358	1.255
Sd. of dependent var.	1.846	1.956	2.021	0.699	0.702	0.730	3.002	1.221
Model	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.032	0.037	0.048	0.044	0.068	0.090	0.058	0.031
F-test Conflict news variables	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.636	0.611	0.072	0.630	0.433

Note: The dependent variable is the total number of hate crimes toward Jews (columns 1-3), Muslims (column 4-6), Blacks (column 7) and Hispanics (column 8). The independent variable is our measure of the length of conflict-related news aggregated for day t and t-1 and categorized by mutually exclusive percentile dummy variables. The first variable indicates conflict news greater than 0 up to the 90th percentile, the second from the 90th percentile up to the 95th percentile, the third from the 95th percentile to the 99th percentile, and the last variable indicates conflict news of the 99th percentile and upwards. All models control for year, calendar-month and weekday fixed effects, as well as a set of controls for holidays, events, and news pressure which are presented in Section 4.2. All models are estimated using a maximum-likelihood negative binomial model with Newey West standard errors allowing for auto-correlation of up to seven lags in parenthesis.

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

significantly increases hate crimes toward American Jews. Compared to a day with no conflict news today or yesterday, conflict news reporting above the 99th percentile increases anti-Jewish hate crime by .51 hate crimes or 24% from the sample mean.

Again, we proxy the effect of reporting on Palestinian and Israeli attacks, respectively, by restricting our sample to days with Israeli and Palestinian attacks. The effect of news coverage is robust for anti-Jewish hate crime, while a significant coefficient only appears for anti-Islamic hate crime when we restrict the sample to days with Palestinian attacks. The F-test also falls short of conventional levels of statistical significance. Together with the findings from the linear analysis, the results show a strong and consistent effect of conflict news reporting on anti-Jewish hate crime, while the evidence for an effect on anti-Islamic hate crime is weaker. The weaker effect on anti-Islamic hate crime could be driven by that we have less variation on reporting of Palestinian attacks, or that potential hate crime offenders see a less strong connection between Palestinians and Muslims compared to Israelis and Jews. Lastly, in columns 7 and 8, neither the individual coefficients on the F-tests show any significant effects of conflict news reporting on anti-Black and anti-Hispanic hate crime.

We consistently find that conflict news coverage increases hate crimes against American Jews. We proceed to examine two important questions in light of these findings. First, can smaller attacks, which result in extensive media coverage, induce hate crime? Second, what is the mechanism driving the effect of conflict news coverage on anti-Jewish hate crime? Due to the dominance of Israeli attacks during our sample period, we focus only on anti-Jewish hate crime.

To address these questions, we construct a new media variable, which only includes reporting on violence in the conflict, and estimate the same non-linear models using our new conflict news coverage variable. We present these findings in Table 9. In column 1, we present the findings on the whole sample, and in column 2, we exclude weeks that have attacks in the 99th percentile or above. Column 1 shows that violent conflict news coverage augments the effect of conflict news on anti-Jewish hate crime. The coefficients are greater in magnitude compared to the findings in Table 8. In addition, the second most intensive category of conflict news is significant, which the equivalent effect in Table 8 was not. This suggests that reporting on violent events may be particularly triggering. When we drop weeks of large attacks, in column 2, we find that the individual coefficients are quite similar, although the statistical significance of the most extensively covered events disappears. The F-test also does not reach conventional levels of statistical significance. In sum, we cannot exclude that extensively covered attacks in, for instance, the 95th may trigger hate crime, but the evidence is weaker compared to very large attacks. The size of the attack is only one, albeit an important one, of potentially many variables determining how much salience

or grievances an attack causes. Still, we find little evidence that attacks below the 95th percentile triggers hate crime.

The second question addresses the mechanisms underlying the effect of conflict news coverage on anti-Jewish hate crime. First, it could be that the events covered by U.S. news media generate grievances against Israel and Jews, triggering potential hate crime offenders in the U.S. to commit hate crimes. Second, it could be that reporting on the conflict and Israel in general, regardless of the actual content of the coverage, strengthens social identities, thereby activating already existing grievances against Israel and American Jews. The stronger effects of *violent conflict news coverage* compared to *conflict news coverage* hints at the importance of the content of the news coverage. We further investigate this in column 3, by examining whether coverage of the Israel-Lebanon war affects hate crime. The war, between Israel and Hezbollah, took place during approximately one month in 2006, and is estimated to have resulted in 1,200-1,300 Lebanese casualties and 165 Israeli casualties. The intensity of the war makes it difficult to identify the effect of the media coverage on individual days and the short duration greatly decreases the number of identifying observations. Still, we find that media coverage of the conflict strongly increases anti-Jewish hate crime for all categories except for news coverage greater than 8 minutes. The F-test decisively shows that coverage of the Israel-Lebanese conflict strongly increased hate crime against American Jews.

Conflict coverage of violence induces anti-Jewish hate crime. Yet, this findings is consistent both with the grievance and the salience mechanism. To further disentangle the two, we examine the effect of *non-violent conflict news* and *non-violent non-conflict news* on anti-Jewish hate crime in column 4 and 5. For both analyses, we do not find any evidence that suggests that non-violent news coverage of Israel or the Israel-Palestine conflict induces anti-Jewish hate crime. None of the individual coefficients are significant, and neither are the F-tests. If anything, that four of the six individual coefficients are negative suggests that reporting which does not focus on violence might decrease hate crime towards Jews. Although the statistical power is low and we caution against making strong inference, these results suggest that the mechanism driving anti-Jewish hate crime is not salience of Israel or the Israel-Palestine conflict, but is driven by the content of the news reporting, consistent with the grievance mechanism.

5 Sensitivity Analysis

In the section, we show that our results are unaffected by adding a large set of temporal controls and that they are not driven by specific conflict periods, U.S. states or choice of

Table 9: Effects of Mass Media Coverage on Israel on Anti-Jewish Hate Crime

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Anti-Jewish	Anti-Jewish	Anti-Jewish	Anti-Jewish	Anti-Jewish
<i>Violent Conflict News (t and t-1)</i>					
>0 to 1.44 minutes (425(401) dates)	-0.023 (0.040)	-0.028 (0.041)			
1.45 to 3.05 minutes (173(156) dates)	0.040 (0.048)	0.008 (0.048)			
3.06 to 8 minutes (163(128) dates)	0.148** (0.057)	0.131* (0.065)			
>8 minutes (41(18) dates)	0.468*** (0.099)	0.335 (0.172)			
<i>Violent Israel-Lebanon Conflict News (t and t-1)</i>					
>0 to 1.44 minutes (7 dates)			0.455* (0.221)		
1.45 to 3.05 minutes (9 dates)			0.427*** (0.122)		
3.06 to 8 minutes (15 dates)			0.368* (0.188)		
>8 minutes (13 dates)			0.018 (0.153)		
<i>Non-Violent Conflict News (t and t-1)</i>					
>0 to 1.44 minutes (327 dates)				-0.011 (0.047)	
1.45 to 3.05 minutes (47 dates)				0.027 (0.071)	
3.06 to 8 minutes (9 dates)				-0.081 (0.214)	
>8 minutes (0 dates)				-	
<i>Non-Violent Non-Conflict News (t and t-1)</i>					
>0 to 1.44 minutes (192 dates)					0.054 (0.056)
1.45 to 3.05 minutes (8 dates)					-0.230 (0.323)
3.06 to 8 minutes (4 dates)					-0.188 (0.304)
>8 minutes (0 dates)					-
<i>Controls:</i>					
FEs (year, month, DOW)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Holidays and events	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
News Pressure (t and t+1)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5765	5644	5765	5765	5765
Mean dependent var.	2.369	2.362	2.369	2.369	2.369
Sd. of dependent var.	1.846	1.841	1.846	1.846	1.846
Excluding week of large attacks	-	Yes	-	-	-
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.032	0.033	0.032	0.031	0.031
F-test Conflict news variables	0.000	0.111	0.000	0.943	0.424

The dependent variable is the total number of hate crimes toward Jews. The independent variable is our three different measures of Israel related news aggregated for day t and t-1 and categorized by mutually exclusive dummy variables. The first set of dummies contain all news reporting mentioning Israel in the headline. The second set of dummies excludes all reporting on the Israel-Palestine conflict from this measure. The third set of dummies excludes all reporting on the Israel-Lebanon war in 2006 in addition to reporting on the Israel-Palestine conflict. The second to last row indicates whether days with a large attack (99th percentile or higher) in the week prior are excluded from the sample. All models control for year, calendar-month and weekday fixed effects. All models are estimated using a maximum-likelihood negative binomial model with Newey West standard errors allowing for auto-correlation of up to seven lags in parenthesis.

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

model specification.

In Table 16, we estimate the effect of conflict news and conflict fatalities on hate crime while adding one set of temporal controls at a time. The table shows that the findings are not dependent on including a specific set of control variables.

In Table 17, we split the sample into four particularly intense conflict periods and estimate the effect of conflict fatalities and conflict news today and yesterday on hate crime. We exclude the conflict periods one at a time. The conflict periods are the Second Intifada, Operation Cast Lead, Operation Pillar of Defense and Operation Protective Edge. We provide a description of the conflict periods in Section 2. Panel A shows the effect of conflict fatalities on anti-Jewish and anti-Islamic hate crime. The effect of victims from Palestinian attacks on anti-Islamic hate crime is robust for excluding all periods from the sample. The effect of victims from Israeli attacks on anti-Jewish hate crime is robust to dropping all conflict periods except Operation Protective Edge. Although Operation Protective Edge lasted only for 6 weeks, it accounts for 24% of the fatalities from Israeli attacks in our sample. However, the point estimate also decreases in magnitude, and this null-finding is likely not exclusively driven by increased uncertainty. In panel B, we estimate the effect of conflict news on hate crime while dropping individual conflict periods. The effect of conflict news today and yesterday on anti-Jewish hate crime is robust to dropping all periods but the Second Intifada, although it is close to being statistically significant as indicated by the F-test in column 3 ($p = .062$). Although the point estimate decreases slightly compared to the coefficients in column 1, 3, 4 and 5, the null-finding is primarily driven by increasing uncertainty. The Second Intifada lasted for approximately five years, and accounts for 65% of the conflict news reporting in our sample. Similar to the main results, we find no effect of conflict news on anti-Islamic hate crime regardless of the conflict period excluded.

The results in Table 17 shows some sensitivity of the results for dropping conflict periods. This sensitivity may be a function of the linear functional form. The non-linear analyses suggest that attacks and conflict news reporting in the 99th percentile and above are driving the results. If smaller attacks and levels of news reporting have no effect on hate crime, the linear functional form may attenuate the estimate when conflict periods with intense attacks and conflict news reporting are dropped from the analysis. To investigate this, we estimate the specification from Table 5 and Table 8 while dropping individual conflict periods.

Table 18 shows the result of the mutually exclusive fatality indicator variables on anti-Jewish and anti-Islamic hate crime. Column 2, 3, 4 and 5 show that the significant effect of Israeli attacks above the 99th percentile on anti-Jewish hate crime remains regardless of what conflict period is dropped. Columns 7, 8, 9 and 10 show that the effect of Palestinian attacks above the 99th percentile or above on anti-Islamic hate crime is robust to dropping

each individual conflict period. Using the analogous specification for conflict news, we find that the significant effect of conflict news reporting above the 99th percentile today and yesterday on anti-Jewish hate crime is robust to dropping individual conflict periods, while we find no effect on anti-Islamic hate crime. These results emphasize that very large attacks and very intense conflict news reporting appear to be the most important drivers of hate crime, and that these findings are not driven by one particular period of the sample.

We further probe the sensitivity of the results by examining if they are sensitive to dropping certain U.S. state from the sample, or if they are contingent on the statistical model estimated. In Table 20 we estimate our main models of conflict fatalities and conflict news on hate crime, while excluding hate crime in California, New York or New Jersey from the sample. These three states have the highest number of anti-Jewish and anti-Islamic hate crime in our sample. Panel A shows that the effect of Israeli attacks on anti-Jewish hate crime, and Palestinian attacks on anti-Islamic hate crime, is robust to excluding hate crimes occurring in these states. Likewise, the significant effect of conflict news coverage on anti-Jewish hate crime remains when dropping hate crime observations from the individual states, while the null-finding of conflict news on anti-Islamic hate crime remains insignificant.

In Table 21, we estimate our main specifications using ordinary least squares, on the number of hate crimes, and a probit regression on an indicator variable for the incidence of anti-Jewish or anti-Islamic hate crime on that day. For anti-Islamic hate crime, the findings hold regardless of what model is used to estimate the effect for both conflict fatalities, in panel A, and conflict news, in panel B. The effect of Israeli attack fatalities, in panel A, and conflict news, in panel B, on anti-Jewish hate crime are robust for being estimated with least squares. However, we find no significant effects in the probit regression. This appears to be driven by a ceiling effect, as approximately 86% of our days in the sample has at least one reported incidence of anti-Jewish hate crime.

6 Concluding Remarks

We examine if the Israel-Palestine conflict causes hate crime towards Jews and Muslims in the U.S. Using daily data between 2000 and 2016, we find that conflict fatalities and U.S. mass media coverage of the conflict trigger hate crimes the following days. Specifically, anti-Jewish hate crimes increase after Israeli attacks. The effect is driven by days with large attacks or intensive media coverage of violence. Anti-Islamic hate crime increases after Palestinian attacks, but the effect of conflict news reporting is weaker.

Using information on the content of conflict media reporting, we examine the mechanisms underlying the effect of conflict news coverage on anti-Jewish hate crime. Conflict

news reporting may generate hate crimes against Jews because it generates grievances. Alternatively, reporting on the conflict and Israel, regardless of the actual content of the coverage, may activate already existing grievances. While we find strong effects of reporting on violent events in the conflict, we find no evidence that reporting on non-violent events effects trigger hate crimes. The results suggest that the mechanism driving anti-Jewish hate crime is not salience of Israel or the Israel-Palestine conflict in general, but is driven by the content of the news reporting, consistent with the grievance mechanism.

Why is the effect of Palestinian attacks and conflict reporting on anti-Islamic hate crime weaker? First, the fatalities data and the conflict news data from our sample period is dominated by Israeli aggression. Thus, there is more variation to exploit when estimating the effects of Israeli attacks compared to Palestinian attacks. Second, it is possible that the perceived connection between the behavior of Israel and American Jews is stronger than the connection between the behavior of Palestinian militants and American Muslims among potential hate crime offenders.

As news and social media reporting becomes ever more rapid, individuals with ties to conflicts but residing in other parts of the world, can immediately be updated on significant conflict events. With increasing migration and technological advancement, the consequences of regional conflicts becomes less bounded to a specific location. As a consequence, shown by the results from this study, victimization can transcend conflict locality through rapid media reporting and other information channels. If mass media reporting can act as the primary channel through which distant conflicts can induce violent and criminal behavior, this raises important questions with regards to the practices and editorial decisions at mass media news outlets. Further research is needed to understand if the extent and type of conflict reporting can affect violent behavior.

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7 Appendix

7.1 Conflict Dynamics

We investigate the conflict dynamics with respect to fatal attacks by replicating the empirical response function of [Jaeger and Paserman \(2008\)](#). [Jaeger and Paserman \(2008\)](#) find that fatal attacks appear to be unidirectional. A fatal Palestinian attack significantly increases the number of Palestinian fatalities in the Israeli attacks following the Palestinian attack. This pattern does not hold for a fatal Israeli attack. There is no significant increase in the number of Israeli fatalities from a Palestinian attack in the wake of an Israeli attack. We follow the empirical strategy of [Jaeger and Paserman \(2008\)](#), and replicate the non-parametric empirical response functions for our whole sample with our variable definitions. The Israeli empirical response function is calculated as

$$IsrRF_t = \left(\frac{\sum_{s:I_s>0} I_s}{\sum_{s:I_s>0} 1} \right)^{-1} \left(\frac{\sum_{s:I_{s-t}>0} I_s}{\sum_{s:I_{s-t}>0} 1} - \frac{1}{T} \sum_s P_s \right) \quad (3)$$

, and

$$PalRF_t = \left(\frac{\sum_{s:P_s>0} P_s}{\sum_{s:P_s>0} 1} \right)^{-1} \left(\frac{\sum_{s:P_{s-t}>0} P_s}{\sum_{s:P_{s-t}>0} 1} - \frac{1}{T} \sum_s P_s \right) \quad (4)$$

where P_s and I_s are the number of Palestinian and Israeli fatalities on day s . The Israeli response function can consequently be interpreted as the excess number of Palestinian fatalities t days after a fatal Palestinian attack per Israeli fatality. The Palestinian response function is interpreted analogously.

We first note that we are able to replicate the findings of [Jaeger and Paserman \(2008\)](#) for the second intifada using our own data and using our slightly different definition of Israeli and Palestinian fatalities. Estimating the model on our whole sample, we find similar pattern as for the second intifada, shown in figures [3](#) and [4](#).

The Israeli response to a fatal Palestinian attack is statistically and economically significant: a fatal Palestinian attack increases the mean number of Palestinian fatalities by approximately two Palestinian fatalities per Israeli fatality the day after an attack. The corresponding mean increase in fatalities for the Palestinian side is only .05. Although it is statistically significant, the economic significance is much weaker compared to the Israeli response. The Israeli response is approximately 20-50 times as strong as the Palestinian response. From this we conclude that conflict violence is strongly unidirectional, where an




Figure 3: Israeli Response Function




Figure 4: Palestinian Response Function

Note: The figure shows Israeli and Palestinian non-parametric empirical response functions. The response function indicates the deviation in mean fatalities for the conflict opponent following an own loss caused by the conflict opponent. The left panel shows the deviation in mean number of Palestinian fatalities following an Israeli loss, and the right panel shows the deviation in mean number of Israeli fatalities following a Palestinian loss. A detailed description of the estimation procedures are described in Section 7.1 and in Jaeger and Paserman (2008).

initial Palestinian attack is retaliated by Israel. This corroborates the notion that Palestinians attack in a unexpected and random fashion compared to the Israeli response.

Table 10: Seasonal Variation in Hate Crimes, Conflict Victims and Conflict News 2000-2016 Excluding 6 Months Following The 9/11 Attacks

	Hate crime				Victims				Conflict News		
	Anti-Jewish		Anti-Islamic		Israeli		Palestinian		Any	Avg. length	Tot. length
	Obs.	Share	Obs.	Share	Obs.	Share	Obs.	Share	Share	Minutes	Minutes
Total	13658	1	2405	1	1111	1	9036	1	0.15	0.23	0.62
Day of the week											
Monday	2194	0.16	329	0.14	116	0.09	1118	0.12	0.15	0.22	0.65
Tuesday	2031	0.15	321	0.13	200	0.16	1318	0.14	0.14	0.21	0.62
Wednesday	1906	0.14	359	0.15	204	0.17	1336	0.14	0.14	0.21	0.61
Thursday	1995	0.15	357	0.15	181	0.15	1350	0.14	0.14	0.22	0.63
Friday	2170	0.16	372	0.15	138	0.11	1284	0.14	0.14	0.19	0.56
Saturday	1661	0.12	343	0.14	102	0.08	1432	0.15	0.17	0.30	0.64
Sunday	1701	0.12	324	0.13	170	0.14	1198	0.13	0.21	0.36	0.78
Month of the year											
January	969	0.07	151	0.06	68	0,06	1298	0,14	0.16	0.24	0.65
February	881	0.06	131	0.05	45	0,04	314	0,03	0.11	0.10	0.25
March	1203	0.09	193	0.08	189	0,15	666	0,07	0.18	0.29	0.75
April	1430	0.10	213	0.09	83	0,07	554	0,06	0.14	0.42	1.17
May	1268	0.09	229	0.10	84	0,07	434	0,05	0.17	0.22	0.60
June	1113	0.08	194	0.08	136	0,11	342	0,04	0.20	0.27	0.75
July	963	0.07	216	0.09	117	0,10	2041	0,22	0.21	0.36	1.01
August	1102	0.08	205	0.09	95	0,08	931	0,10	0.18	0.25	0.64
September	1083	0.08	260	0.11	59	0,05	350	0,04	0.13	0.14	0.33
October	1351	0.10	200	0.08	90	0,07	604	0,06	0.14	0.27	0.65
November	1242	0.09	210	0.09	98	0,08	666	0,07	0.15	0.22	0.51
December	1053	0.08	203	0.08	47	0,04	836	0,09	0.10	0.13	0.34

Note: Hate crime data from [FBI \(2016\)](#), data on fatalities from *B'Tselem* and data on conflict news from *Vanderbilt Television News Archive*. The exact sample period is 09-29-2000 – 10-09-2001 and 01-03-2002 – 12-31-2016. The table shows seasonal variation over month of the year and day of the week for anti-Jewish and anti-Islamic hate crime incidents, Israeli and Palestinian victims, and conflict news on ABC, CBS and NBC. For hate crime and victim data, *observation* refers to the number of incidents and victims, and *share* refers to the share of incidents or victims on a given day of the week or month. The first conflict news column shows the share of weekday or month with conflict news reporting. The second conflict news column shows the average length of conflict news on the three networks, and the last conflict news column shows the total length of conflict news on the three networks.

Table 11: Hate Crimes Against Jews and Muslims 2000-2016 Excluding 6 Months After 9/11

	Anti-Jewish		Anti-Islamic	
	Obs.	Share	Obs.	Share
Most common locations				
Other/Unknown	5734	0.42	1129	0.47
Residence/Home	3997	0.29	522	0.22
School/College	1794	0.13	143	0.06
Church/Synagogue/Temple	1078	0.08	316	0.13
Highway/Road/Alley	1055	0.08	295	0.12
Most common offense types				
Destruction of property/Vandalism	9313	0.68	723	0.30
Intimidation	2918	0.21	882	0.37
Simple assault	807	0.06	465	0.19
Other	286	0.02	128	0.05
Aggravated assault	175	0.01	172	0.07
Burglary, breaking and entering	159	0.01	35	0.01
Most common offense states				
California	2075	0.15	306	0.13
Massachusetts	804	0.06	121	0.05
Michigan	234	0.02	283	0.12
New Jersey	2855	0.21	173	0.07
New York	3532	0.26	268	0.11
Ohio	163	0.01	109	0.05
Other	3995	0.29	1145	0.48

Note: Data from the [FBI \(2016\)](#). The table shows the most common locations, the most common offense types, and the most common states for anti-Jewish and anti-Islamic hate crime incidents. *Observations* refers to the number of anti-Jewish and anti-Islamic hate crimes. *Share* refers to the share of hate crimes within the hate crime category. The exact sample period is 09-29-2000 – 10-09-2001 and 01-03-2002 – 12-31-2016.

Table 12: Examples of News Stories on the Israel-Palestine Conflict

Headline	Summary	Length	Order of appearance in broadcast	Network	Included	Filter
middle east / israel and lebanon / violence	(Studio: Charles Gibson) The effort to get more U.N. peacekeeping troops into southern Lebanon reported; scenes shown of French troops arriving.	20 sec	6	ABC	No	Only Israel
middle east / palestinians / factional violence	(West Bank : Tom Aspell) the power struggle among rival Palestinian factions updated; scenes shown of a Hamas victory parade in Gaza and Fatah militiamen trashing Hamas offices in the West Bank .	70 sec	3	NBC	No	Only Palestine
middle east / israelis vs. palestinians / violence	(Jerusalem: Gillian Findlay) Israel's calling off of ceasefire talks about another suicide bombing in Jerusalem featured; scenes shown from the bombing site in the street and of victims on the hospital; details given of Palestinian Authority president Yasir Arafat condemnation of today's attack.	130 sec	4	ABC	Yes	Both in headline
middle east violence / israeli attacks	(Tel Aviv: David Hawkins) Israeli attacks against Palestinian targets in the West Bank and Gaza in retaliation for a wave of terrorist attacks reported; scenes shown on the bomb attack sites and air strikes ordered by Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon against the Palestinian Authority.	130 sec	2	ABC	Yes	Israel in headline, Palestine in abstract
middle east / west bank / jenin	(Tel Aviv: Mark Phillips) The "second battle" of Jenin, West Bank , to determine what happened during the Israeli attack on the Palestinian refugee camp featured; scenes shown of the damages; details given of the contrasting versions of what happened. [Assistant Secretary of State Williams BURNS - says we are seeing a human tragedy.] [Palestinian minister Ziad ABU ZAYYAD - cites the need for an international peacekeeping force.] [Israeli government spokesman Mark SOFER - comments on casualty rumors.]	150 sec	4	CBS	Yes	Palestine in headline, Israel in abstract

Note: Data from *Vanderbilt Television News Archive*. The table illustrates how news on the Israel-Palestine conflict are filtered out from all news stories that appear on the thirty minute evening news on ABC, CBS or NBC. Each row shows information provided by VTNA on five different news stories. We look for stories including the words Israel, Palestine, Gaza, West Bank or Hamas or any words with related roots. However, to be included in our sample of stories, at least one of the following three conditions must apply: 1) the headline contains both an Israeli and Palestinian reference, 2) the headline contains an Israeli reference and the summary a Palestinian reference, 3) the headline contains a Palestinian reference and the summary an Israeli reference. Row 1 and 2 are examples of stories that are filtered out, and row 3-5 are examples of stories that are included based on the three word filters.

Table 13: Holidays and Events Included as Controls

Holidays and events	
Jewish and Israeli	Chanukah, Lag BaOmer, Leil Selichot, Pesach, Pesach Sheni, Purim, Purim Katan, Rosh Hashana, Shavuot, Shmini Atzeret, Shushan Purim, Simchat Torah, Sukkot, Tish'a B'Av, Tu B'Av, Tu BiShvat, Yom Kippur, Yom HaShoah, Yom Ha'atzmaut/Israeli Independence Day, Yom Hazikaron/Israeli's Memorial Day
Islamic and Palestinian	Eid al-Adha, Muharram, The Prophet's Birthday, Isra and Mi'raj, Ramadan, Lailat al-Qadr, Eid al-Fitr, Al Nakba Day
Christian	Epiphany, Ash Wednesday, Palm Sunday, Maundy Thursday, Holy Saturday, Easter Sunday, Easter Monday, Ascension Day, Pentecost, Whit Monday, Trinity Sunday, Corpus Christi, Assumption of Mary, Feast of St Francis of Assisi, All Saints' Day, All Souls' Day, First Sunday of Advent, Feast of the Immaculate Conception, Christmas Eve
Federal	New Year's Day, Martin Luther King Jr. Day, Presidents' Day, Memorial Day, Independence Day, Labor Day, Columbus Day, Veterans Day, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas Day
Major events	General election, Congress start session, Main party national conventions, Special congressional elections, Gubernatorial elections, Presidential inauguration, State primary, Presidential caucuses, Special Senate elections, Iowa caucuses, Other presidential primaries, Other presidential caucuses, Statewide elections, State of the Union address, Super Tuesday, New Hampshire Presidential Primary, FIFA World Cup, FIFA World Cup Final

Note: The table shows all holidays and events included as control variables. The selection of holidays and events is described in Section 4.2.

Table 14: The Effect of Conflict Party Fatalities on Hate Crime, Introducing Leads

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Anti- Jewish	Anti- Jewish	Anti- Jewish	Anti- Jewish	Anti- Islamic	Anti- Islamic	Anti- Islamic	Anti- Islamic
<i>Victims Israeli attacks day...</i>								
(t+7)				0.003*** (0.001)				0.002 (0.002)
(t+6)				-0.000 (0.001)				0.001 (0.002)
(t+5)				-0.001 (0.001)				0.000 (0.002)
(t+4)				-0.003** (0.001)				0.001 (0.002)
(t+3)				0.002 (0.001)				-0.006* (0.003)
(t+2)			0.002* (0.001)	0.003** (0.001)			-0.002 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.003)
(t+1)		0.002 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)		0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)
(t and t-1)	0.002** (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
<i>Victims Palestinian attacks day...</i>								
(t+7)				-0.015 (0.008)				0.002 (0.017)
(t+6)				0.008 (0.009)				0.004 (0.019)
(t+5)				0.003 (0.007)				0.011 (0.019)
(t+4)				-0.002 (0.007)				0.015 (0.017)
(t+3)				-0.014* (0.007)				0.011 (0.015)
(t+2)			0.007 (0.007)	0.007 (0.007)			0.024 (0.013)	0.024 (0.013)
(t+1)		0.004 (0.009)	0.003 (0.008)	0.003 (0.008)		0.024 (0.018)	0.023 (0.018)	0.021 (0.018)
(t and t-1)	0.005 (0.005)	0.004 (0.005)	0.004 (0.005)	0.005 (0.005)	0.030** (0.010)	0.029** (0.010)	0.028** (0.010)	0.028** (0.010)
<i>Controls:</i>								
FEs (year, month, DOW)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Holidays and events	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
News Pressure (t and t+1)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5764	5764	5763	5758	5764	5764	5763	5758
Mean dependent var.	2.368	2.368	2.368	2.369	0.417	0.417	0.417	0.417
Sd. of dependent var.	1.844	1.844	1.845	1.845	0.699	0.699	0.699	0.699
Model	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB
F-test Isr. lead 2-7 (p-value)			0.021	0.000			0.328	0.305
F-test Pal. lead 2-7 (p-value)			0.289	0.099			0.066	0.486
F-test Palestinian and Israeli attack (p-value)	0.005	0.099	0.368	0.518	0.007	0.013	0.010	0.014
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.031	0.031	0.032	0.032	0.044	0.045	0.045	0.045

Note: The dependent variable is the total number of hate crimes toward Jews (columns 1-4) and Muslims (columns 5-8). Column 1 and 5 regresses the two dependent variables on the main independent variables of interest: the total number of victims from an attack from the respective sides the past two days. Subsequent columns add one, two and seven leads of the independent variables. All models control for year, calendar-month and weekday fixed effects, as well as a set of controls for holidays, events, and news pressure which are presented in Section 4.2. All models are estimated using OLS, with Newey West standard errors allowing for autocorrelation of up to seven lags in parenthesis.

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table 15: Conflict News and Hate Crimes, Introducing Leads

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Anti- Jewish	Anti- Jewish	Anti- Jewish	Anti- Jewish	Anti- Islamic	Anti- Islamic	Anti- Islamic	Anti- Islamic
<i>Length of Conflict</i>								
<i>News day...</i>								
(t+7)				0.011 (0.015)				-0.007 (0.037)
(t+6)				-0.030 (0.018)				0.069 (0.042)
(t+5)				0.016 (0.018)				-0.044 (0.052)
(t+4)				0.007 (0.016)				0.014 (0.049)
(t+3)				0.000 (0.016)				-0.007 (0.041)
(t+2)			0.032* (0.014)	0.033 (0.017)			0.009 (0.039)	0.006 (0.042)
(t+1)		-0.007 (0.015)	-0.026 (0.016)	-0.027 (0.017)		0.075* (0.037)	0.071 (0.043)	0.078 (0.043)
(t+t-1)	0.028*** (0.006)	0.031*** (0.008)	0.028*** (0.008)	0.027** (0.009)	0.021 (0.012)	-0.011 (0.021)	-0.011 (0.021)	-0.022 (0.023)
<i>Controls:</i>								
FEs (year, month, DOW)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Holidays and events	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
News Pressure (t and t+1)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5634	5569	5503	5208	5634	5569	5503	5208
Mean dependent var.	2.371	2.360	2.358	2.370	0.414	0.412	0.411	0.410
Sd. of dependent var.	1.845	1.835	1.831	1.836	0.696	0.693	0.689	0.688
Model	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.033	0.033	0.033	0.034	0.043	0.044	0.044	0.047
F-test leads (p-value)			0.061	0.156			0.121	0.282

Note: The dependent variable is the total number of hate crimes toward Jews (columns 1-4) and Muslims (columns 5-8). In columns 1 and 5, the independent variable is our measure of the length of conflict-related news aggregated for day t and t-1. Subsequent columns gradually introduces the length of conflict news t+1(tomorrow), t+2, and up to t+7. All models control for year, calendar-month and weekday fixed effects, and are estimated using a maximum-likelihood negative binomial model. Newey West standard errors allowing for autocorrelation of up to seven lags in parenthesis.

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table 16: Robustness Checks: Controls and Alternative Hate Crimes

Panel A: Conflict Fatalities

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Anti-Jewish	Anti-Jewish	Anti-Jewish	Anti-Jewish	Anti-Jewish	Anti-Islamic	Anti-Islamic	Anti-Islamic	Anti-Islamic	Anti-Islamic	Anti-Black	Anti-Hispanic
Victims Israeli attack (t and t-1)	0.002** (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.000)	0.001 (0.001)
Victims Palestinian attack (t and t-1)	0.006 (0.005)	0.005 (0.005)	0.005 (0.005)	0.005 (0.005)	0.004 (0.004)	0.030** (0.010)	0.030** (0.011)	0.030** (0.010)	0.030** (0.010)	0.028** (0.010)	0.005 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.006)
<i>Controls:</i>												
FEs (year, month, DOW)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Holidays	-	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	-	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Political events	-	-	Yes	Yes	Yes	-	-	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
News Pressure (t and t+1)	-	-	-	Yes	Yes	-	-	-	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
2 lags dep. var	-	-	-	-	Yes	-	-	-	-	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5766	5766	5766	5764	5763	5766	5766	5766	5764	5763	5763	5763
Mean dependent var.	2.367	2.367	2.367	2.368	2.367	0.417	0.417	0.417	0.417	0.417	6.357	1.255
Sd. of dependent var.	1.844	1.844	1.844	1.844	1.844	0.699	0.699	0.699	0.699	0.699	2.999	1.222
Model	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB
F-test PA and IA	0.001	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.006	0.005	0.007	0.006	0.007	0.008	0.143	0.286
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.026	0.031	0.031	0.031	0.033	0.037	0.041	0.042	0.044	0.047	0.058	0.032

Panel B: Conflict News

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	Anti-Jewish	Anti-Jewish	Anti-Jewish	Anti-Jewish	Anti-Jewish	Anti-Islamic	Anti-Islamic	Anti-Islamic	Anti-Islamic	Anti-Islamic	Anti-Black	Anti-Hispanic
Conflict news (today and yesterday)	0.029*** (0.006)	0.029*** (0.006)	0.029*** (0.006)	0.028*** (0.006)	0.025*** (0.006)	0.019 (0.012)	0.019 (0.013)	0.020 (0.012)	0.021 (0.012)	0.018 (0.012)	0.004 (0.003)	0.009 (0.006)
<i>Controls:</i>												
FEs (year, month, DOW)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Holidays	-	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	-	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Political events	-	-	Yes	Yes	Yes	-	-	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
News Pressure (t and t+1)	-	-	-	Yes	Yes	-	-	-	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
2 lags dep. var	-	-	-	-	Yes	-	-	-	-	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5636	5636	5636	5634	5633	5636	5636	5636	5634	5633	5633	5633
Mean dependent var.	2.370	2.370	2.370	2.371	2.370	0.415	0.415	0.415	0.414	0.415	6.369	1.251
Sd. of dependent var.	1.845	1.845	1.845	1.845	1.845	0.696	0.696	0.696	0.696	0.696	3.000	1.219
Model	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.028	0.032	0.032	0.033	0.034	0.036	0.041	0.041	0.043	0.046	0.057	0.032

Note: The dependent variable is the total number of hate crimes toward Jews (columns 1-5), Muslims (columns 6-10), Blacks (column 11) and Hispanics (column 12). The independent variables in Panel A are total victims today and yesterday from either Israeli or Palestinian attacks. The independent variable in Panel B is our measure of conflict related news aggregated for today and yesterday. Controls for holidays, political events, and News Pressure are presented in Section 3. All models control for year, calendar-month and weekday fixed effects, and are estimated using a maximum-likelihood negative binomial model. Newey West standard errors allowing for autocorrelation of up to seven lags in parenthesis.

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table 17: Robustness Checks: Dropping Conflict Periods

Panel A: Conflict Fatalities

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Anti-Jewish	Anti-Jewish	Anti-Jewish	Anti-Jewish	Anti-Jewish	Anti-Islamic	Anti-Islamic	Anti-Islamic	Anti-Islamic	Anti-Islamic
Victims Israeli attack (today and yesterday)	0.002** (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)	0.003 (0.002)
Victims Palestinian attack (today and yesterday)	0.007 (0.005)	0.015 (0.016)	0.006 (0.005)	0.007 (0.005)	0.008 (0.005)	0.027* (0.011)	0.048 (0.026)	0.025* (0.011)	0.026* (0.011)	0.027* (0.011)
<i>Controls:</i>										
FEs (year, month, DOW)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Holidays and events	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
News Pressure (t and t+1)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5933	4367	5910	5925	5883	5933	4367	5910	5925	5883
Mean dependent var.	2.369	2.245	2.368	2.368	2.367	0.469	0.441	0.470	0.468	0.469
Sd. of dependent var.	1.849	1.757	1.847	1.848	1.851	1.039	0.718	1.040	1.039	1.042
Model	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB
Excluded period	None	2nd Intifada	Cast Lead	Pillar of Defense	Protective Edge	None	2nd Intifada	Cast Lead	Pillar of Defense	Protective Edge
Share vic. excluded fr. PA	0.000	0.779	0.007	0.005	0.056	0.000	0.779	0.007	0.005	0.056
Share vic. excluded fr. IA	0.000	0.345	0.149	0.018	0.236	0.000	0.345	0.149	0.018	0.236
F-test Independent variable(s)	0.001	0.004	0.000	0.001	0.107	0.007	0.050	0.006	0.012	0.022
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.031	0.030	0.032	0.031	0.033	0.057	0.039	0.057	0.057	0.057

Panel B: Conflict News

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Anti-Jewish	Anti-Jewish	Anti-Jewish	Anti-Jewish	Anti-Jewish	Anti-Islamic	Anti-Islamic	Anti-Islamic	Anti-Islamic	Anti-Islamic
Conflict News (today and yesterday)	0.030*** (0.006)	0.026 (0.014)	0.031*** (0.006)	0.030*** (0.006)	0.025*** (0.006)	0.016 (0.014)	0.016 (0.022)	0.017 (0.015)	0.009 (0.015)	0.014 (0.015)
<i>Controls:</i>										
FEs (year, month, DOW)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Holidays and events	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
News Pressure (t and t+1)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5797	4251	5774	5791	5747	5797	4251	5774	5791	5747
Mean dependent var.	2.373	2.248	2.372	2.373	2.371	0.467	0.438	0.469	0.467	0.467
Sd. of dependent var.	1.849	1.757	1.848	1.849	1.852	1.044	0.715	1.045	1.044	1.047
Model	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB
Excluded period	None	2nd Intifada	Cast Lead	Pillar of Defense	Protective Edge	None	2nd Intifada	Cast Lead	Pillar of Defense	Protective Edge
Share Conflict News Excl.	0.000	0.644	0.052	0.023	0.068	0.000	0.644	0.052	0.023	0.068
F-test Independent variable(s)	0.000	0.054	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.263	0.475	0.259	0.565	0.356
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.033	0.030	0.033	0.033	0.034	0.057	0.038	0.056	0.057	0.057

Note: The dependent variable is the total number of hate crimes toward Jews (columns 1-5) and Muslims (columns 6-10). The independent variables in Panel A are total victims today and yesterday from either Israeli or Palestinian attacks. The independent variable in Panel B is our measure of conflict related news aggregated for today and yesterday. Column 1 and 5 includes the whole sample period between 2000-2016, while subsequent columns excludes one conflict period at the time. The definition of these conflict periods are further explained in Section 3. All models control for year, calendar-month and weekday fixed effects, as well as a set of controls for holidays, events, and news pressure which are presented in Section 4.2. All models are estimated using a maximum-likelihood negative binomial model with Newey West standard errors allowing for auto-correlation of up to seven lags in parenthesis.

Table 18: Robustness of Heterogenous Effects of Fatalities: Dropping Conflict Periods

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Anti-Jewish	Anti-Jewish	Anti-Jewish	Anti-Jewish	Anti-Jewish	Anti-Islamic	Anti-Islamic	Anti-Islamic	Anti-Islamic	Anti-Islamic
<i>Israeli attacks (t and t-1)</i>										
1 victim (percentiles: [52-67], 925 dates)	0.039 (0.030)	0.012 (0.035)	0.038 (0.030)	0.039 (0.030)	0.033 (0.030)	-0.066 (0.068)	-0.084 (0.074)	-0.065 (0.068)	-0.068 (0.069)	-0.063 (0.068)
2-6 victims (percentiles: (67,90], 1400 dates)	0.035 (0.028)	0.039 (0.033)	0.034 (0.028)	0.037 (0.028)	0.025 (0.028)	0.167** (0.062)	0.158* (0.071)	0.170** (0.062)	0.163** (0.063)	0.172** (0.063)
7-10 victims (percentiles: (90,95], 238 dates)	-0.038 (0.048)	-0.042 (0.067)	-0.038 (0.048)	-0.037 (0.048)	-0.048 (0.048)	-0.046 (0.132)	-0.072 (0.188)	-0.041 (0.132)	-0.051 (0.132)	-0.059 (0.134)
11-38 victims (percentiles: (95,99], 217 dates)	0.054 (0.054)	0.118 (0.082)	0.053 (0.055)	0.058 (0.055)	0.021 (0.054)	0.183 (0.133)	0.028 (0.173)	0.213 (0.132)	0.153 (0.137)	0.219 (0.137)
>38 victims (percentiles: (99-100], 59 dates)	0.340*** (0.094)	0.341** (0.106)	0.441*** (0.096)	0.321** (0.102)	0.198 (0.111)	0.199 (0.204)	0.159 (0.224)	0.286 (0.224)	0.114 (0.220)	0.136 (0.292)
<i>Palestinian attacks (t and t-1)</i>										
1 victim (percentiles: [87-93], 371 dates)	0.038 (0.042)	-0.010 (0.062)	0.044 (0.042)	0.039 (0.042)	0.034 (0.042)	0.051 (0.103)	0.172 (0.134)	0.044 (0.104)	0.053 (0.103)	0.069 (0.103)
2 victims (percentiles: [93-95], 136 dates)	0.014 (0.070)	-0.217 (0.150)	0.010 (0.070)	0.014 (0.071)	0.009 (0.070)	-0.108 (0.138)	0.015 (0.183)	-0.116 (0.139)	-0.116 (0.141)	-0.099 (0.142)
3-10 victims (percentiles: (95-99], 205 dates)	0.048 (0.053)	0.119 (0.096)	0.046 (0.054)	0.050 (0.054)	0.045 (0.054)	0.241 (0.144)	0.223 (0.181)	0.222 (0.147)	0.226 (0.150)	0.245 (0.147)
>11 victims (percentiles: [99-100], 49 dates)	0.059 (0.079)	0.251 (0.278)	0.050 (0.079)	0.059 (0.079)	0.051 (0.082)	0.429* (0.186)	0.611 (0.313)	0.418* (0.186)	0.436* (0.187)	0.406* (0.202)
<i>Controls:</i>										
FEs (year, month, DOW)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Holidays and events	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
News Pressure (t and t+1)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5765	4367	5742	5757	5715	5765	4367	5742	5757	5715
Mean dependent var.	2.369	2.245	2.368	2.368	2.367	0.417	0.441	0.418	0.416	0.416
Sd. of dependent var.	1.846	1.757	1.845	1.845	1.849	0.699	0.718	0.699	0.698	0.699
Model	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB
Excluded period	None	2nd Intifada	Cast Lead	Pillar of Defense	Protective Edge	None	2nd Intifada	Cast Lead	Pillar of Defense	Protective Edge
Share vic. excluded fr. PA	0.000	0.779	0.007	0.005	0.056	0.000	0.779	0.007	0.005	0.056
Share vic. excluded fr. IA	0.000	0.345	0.149	0.018	0.236	0.000	0.345	0.149	0.018	0.236
F-test Palestinian attacks	0.793	0.336	0.780	0.781	0.847	0.063	0.217	0.079	0.071	0.100
F-test Israeli attacks	0.003	0.011	0.000	0.011	0.223	0.045	0.200	0.029	0.068	0.037
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.032	0.030	0.032	0.032	0.033	0.046	0.040	0.046	0.046	0.046

Note: The dependent variable is the total number of hate crimes toward Jews (columns 1-5) and Muslims (columns 6-10). The independent variables are victims from Israeli and Palestinian attacks day t and t-1 categorized by mutually exclusive percentile dummy variables, identical to those used in Table 5. Column 1 and 5 includes the whole sample period between 2000-2016, while subsequent columns excludes one conflict period at the time. The definition of these conflict periods are further explained in Section 3. All models control for year, calendar-month and weekday fixed effects, as well as a set of controls for holidays, events, and news pressure which are presented in Section 4.2. All models are estimated using a maximum-likelihood negative binomial model with Newey West standard errors allowing for auto-correlation of up to seven lags in parenthesis.

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table 19: Robustness of heterogenous effects of Conflict News: Dropping Conflict Periods

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Anti-Jewish	Anti-Jewish	Anti-Jewish	Anti-Jewish	Anti-Jewish	Anti-Islamic	Anti-Islamic	Anti-Islamic	Anti-Islamic	Anti-Islamic
<i>Conflict News (t and t-1)</i>										
>0 to 1.44 minutes (percentiles: [77-90], 769 dates)	-0.005 (0.032)	0.027 (0.045)	-0.004 (0.032)	-0.003 (0.032)	-0.017 (0.032)	-0.015 (0.084)	-0.068 (0.113)	-0.012 (0.084)	-0.024 (0.084)	-0.018 (0.085)
1.45 to 3.05 minutes (percentiles: [90-95], 297 dates)	0.017 (0.041)	0.060 (0.062)	0.014 (0.041)	0.019 (0.041)	0.004 (0.041)	0.097 (0.122)	0.133 (0.188)	0.112 (0.123)	0.088 (0.122)	0.090 (0.123)
3.06 to 8 minutes (percentiles: [95-99], 231 dates)	0.089 (0.052)	0.084 (0.088)	0.100 (0.054)	0.093 (0.053)	0.065 (0.054)	0.145 (0.110)	0.005 (0.174)	0.183 (0.111)	0.113 (0.110)	0.147 (0.113)
>8 minutes (percentiles: [99-100], 58 dates)	0.395*** (0.097)	0.421* (0.172)	0.414*** (0.106)	0.408*** (0.101)	0.321** (0.100)	0.088 (0.195)	0.086 (0.251)	0.047 (0.219)	-0.016 (0.213)	0.116 (0.216)
<i>Controls:</i>										
FEs (year, month, DOW)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Holidays and events	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
News Pressure (t and t+1)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5765	4367	5742	5757	5715	5765	4367	5742	5757	5715
Mean dependent var.	2.369	2.245	2.368	2.368	2.367	0.417	0.441	0.418	0.416	0.416
Sd. of dependent var.	1.846	1.757	1.845	1.845	1.849	0.699	0.718	0.699	0.698	0.699
Model	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB
Excluded period	None	2nd Intifada	Cast Lead	Pillar of Defense	Protective Edge	None	2nd Intifada	Cast Lead	Pillar of Defense	Protective Edge
Share Conflict News Excl.	0.000	0.644	0.052	0.023	0.023	0.000	0.644	0.052	0.023	0.023
F-test Independent variable	0.001	0.133	0.002	0.002	0.021	0.636	0.893	0.444	0.750	0.631
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.032	0.030	0.032	0.032	0.034	0.044	0.039	0.044	0.044	0.044

Note: The dependent variable is the total number of hate crimes toward Jews (columns 1-5) and Muslims (columns 6-10). The independent variable in is our measure of conflict related news aggregated for today and yesterday categorized by mutually exclusive percentile dummy variables, identical to those used in Table 8. Column 1 and 5 includes the whole sample period between 2000-2016, while subsequent columns excludes one conflict period at the time. The definition of these conflict periods are further explained in Section 3. All models control for year, calendar-month and weekday fixed effects, as well as a set of controls for holidays, events, and news pressure which are presented in Section 4.2. All models are estimated using a maximum-likelihood negative binomial model with Newey West standard errors allowing for auto-correlation of up to seven lags in parenthesis.

* p <0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 20: Robustness Checks: Dropping States

Panel A: Conflict Fatalities

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Anti- Jewish (no CA)	Anti- Jewish (no NJ)	Anti- Jewish (no NY)	Anti- Muslim (no CA)	Anti- Muslim (no NJ)	Anti- Muslim (no NY)
Victims Israeli attack (today and yesterday)	0.001* (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)	-0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)
Victims Palestinian attack (today and yesterday)	0.008 (0.005)	0.005 (0.006)	0.004 (0.006)	0.028* (0.012)	0.039** (0.013)	0.023 (0.013)
<i>Controls:</i>						
FEs (year, month, DOW)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Holidays and events	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
News Pressure (t and t+1)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5572	4398	4391	5572	4398	4391
Mean dependent var.	2.020	1.951	1.804	0.411	0.431	0.436
Sd. of dependent var.	1.688	1.619	1.572	0.935	1.029	1.102
Share of hate crimes excluded	0.152	0.208	0.258	0.130	0.078	0.093
Model	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB
F-test Independent variable(s)	0.005	0.017	0.073	0.004	0.014	0.055
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.028	0.026	0.045	0.057	0.069	0.073


Panel B: Conflict News

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Anti- Jewish (no CA)	Anti- Jewish (no NJ)	Anti- Jewish (no NY)	Anti- Muslim (no CA)	Anti- Muslim (no NJ)	Anti- Muslim (no NY)
Conflict News (today and yesterday)	0.024*** (0.006)	0.030*** (0.006)	0.021** (0.007)	0.018 (0.016)	0.020 (0.018)	0.009 (0.016)
<i>Controls:</i>						
FEs (year, month, DOW)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Holidays and events	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
News Pressure (t and t+1)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5443	4306	4298	5443	4306	4298
Mean dependent var.	2.023	1.948	1.811	0.409	0.430	0.437
Sd. of dependent var.	1.688	1.618	1.576	0.939	1.035	1.109
Share of hate crimes excluded	0.152	0.208	0.258	0.130	0.078	0.093
Model	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB	ML NB
F-test Independent variable(s)	0.000	0.000	0.002	0.238	0.282	0.561
(Pseudo) R-squared	0.030	0.027	0.046	0.057	0.069	0.074

Note: The dependent variable is the total number of hate crimes toward Jews (columns 1-3) and Muslims (columns 4-6). The independent variables in Panel A are total victims today and yesterday from either Israeli or Palestinian attacks. The independent variable in Panel B is our measure of conflict related news aggregated for today and yesterday. Column 1 and 4 exclude hate crimes in California, column 2 and 5 exclude hate crimes in the state of New Jersey, while column 3 and 6 excludes hate crimes in the state of New York. All models control for year, calendar-month and weekday fixed effects, and are estimated using a maximum-likelihood negative binomial model. Newey West standard errors allowing for autocorrelation of up to seven lags in parenthesis.


* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Figure 5: Distribution of Average Conflict News Per Broadcast



Note: The figure shows the distribution of conflict news coverage on ABC, NBC and CBS, with the 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles marked with red vertical lines. The left panel shows the full sample distribution. The right panel excludes all zeros, and showing the distribution for days with attacks.

Figure 6: Distribution of Anti-Jewish and Anti-Islamic Hate Crime



Note: The figure shows the distribution of anti-Jewish and anti-Islamic hate crimes, with the 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles marked with red vertical lines. The left panel shows the full sample distribution. The right panel excludes all zeros, and showing the distribution for days with reported hate crimes.

Table 21: Robustness Checks: Model Specification

Panel A: Conflict Fatalities

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Anti-Jewish	Anti-Jewish	Anti-Jewish (dummy)	Anti-Islamic	Anti-Islamic	Anti-Islamic (dummy)
Victims Isr. attack (t + t-1)	0.002** (0.001)	0.004** (0.001)	0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Victims Pal. attack (t + t-1)	0.006 (0.005)	0.016 (0.014)	0.011 (0.015)	0.030** (0.010)	0.014* (0.006)	0.020* (0.009)
<i>Controls:</i>						
FEs (year, month, DOW)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5766	5766	5766	5766	5766	5766
Mean dependent var.	2.367	2.367	0.864	0.417	0.417	0.321
Sd. of dependent var.	1.844	1.844	0.343	0.699	0.699	0.467
Model	ML NB	OLS	Probit	ML NB	OLS	Probit
F-test PA and IA	0.001	0.002	0.174	0.005	0.032	0.041
Pseudo R-squared	0.026	0.094	0.046	0.037	0.062	0.040

Panel B: Conflict News

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Anti-Jewish	Anti-Jewish	Anti-Jewish (dummy)	Anti-Islamic	Anti-Islamic	Anti-Islamic (dummy)
Conflict news (t + t-1)	0.029*** (0.006)	0.096*** (0.023)	0.028 (0.017)	0.019 (0.012)	0.008 (0.005)	0.018 (0.012)
<i>Controls:</i>						
FEs (year, month, DOW)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	5636	5636	5636	5636	5636	5636
Mean dependent var.	2.370	2.370	0.864	0.415	0.415	0.320
Sd. of dependent var.	1.845	1.845	0.343	0.696	0.696	0.467
Model	ML NB	OLS	Probit	ML NB	OLS	Probit
Pseudo R-squared	0.028	0.100	0.047	0.036	0.060	0.040

Note: The independent variables in Panel A are total victims today and yesterday from either Israeli or Palestinian attacks. The independent variable in Panel B is our measure of conflict related news aggregated for today and yesterday. The dependent variable is the either total number of hate crimes toward Jews (columns 1-2) and Muslims (columns 4-5) or a dummy indicating the occurrence of at least one hate crime towards Jews(column 3) or Muslims(column 6). Column 1 and 4 uses a maximum-likelihood negative binomial model, column 2 and 5 uses an OLS, and column 3 and 6 uses a Probit regression. All models control for year, calendar-month and weekday fixed effects. Newey West standard errors allowing for autocorrelation of up to seven lags in parenthesis.

* p <0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001